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VOLUME 39, NUMBER 1, WINTER 1998

Autonomy through Separation?:
Environmental Law and the Basic Law of
Hong Kong

Benjamin L. Liebman*

One hundred days after taking office as Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) of the People's
Republic of China, Tung Chee-hwa pledged both to take steps to
improve Hong Kong's environment, 1 and to increase coordination of

environmental policy with officials in neighboring Guangdong Province. 2 Tung's comments marked a rhetorical shift from environmental
policy in British Hong Kong: eight years earlier, the Hong Kong
government's first White Paper on environmental policy, Pollution in
3
Hong Kong-A Time to Act, made only passing mention of China. Yet
the White Paper was not alone in its view that Hong Kong could
think of its problems independently from those across the border.
Promulgated ten months after the White Paper, Hong Kong's miniconstitution under Chinese rule, the Basic Law for the Hong Kong
4
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,

* Class of 1998, Harvard Law School. This Article received the Yong K. Kim Memorial Prize.
I would like to thank the Kim family, as well as the numerous people who provided me with
comments and suggestions at various stages of my writing this Article: William Alford, Bryan
Bachner, William Barron, Helen Causton, Abram Chayes, Donald Clarke, Jill Cottrell, Daniel
Esty, Yash Ghai, Jonathan Hecht, Lisa Hopkinson, C. Stephen Hsu, lain Johnston, Carlos
Wing-Hung Lo, Kelley Loper, Roda Mushkat, Eric Pan, Eric Rassbach, Megan Reilly, Lester
Ross, Rajan Subberwal, Felicity Thomas, Frank Upham, and Plato Yip, as well as the many people
in China who provided me with invaluable assistance.
1. See Hong Kong's Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa Gives First Policy Address (hereinafter Tung
Address], Section D, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 10, 1997, availablein LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
Environmentalists criticized Tung for failing to introduce any new initiatives in the speech.
See Green Groups Blast ChiefExecutive for Saying Little on Environment in Speech, 20 INT'L ENV'T REP.
CURR. REP. (BNA) 21, at 974 (Oct. 15, 1997).
2. See Tung Address, supra note 1.
3. See generally HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, POLLUTION IN HONG KONG-A TiME TO Acr

(1989).
4. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China, adopted by the National People's Congress on April 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511 (1990),
1990 FAGUI HUIBIAN at 5 [hereinafter Basic Law]. For an overview of the Basic Law, see generally
YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEw CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1997); THE BASic LAw AND HONG
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emphasizes separating Hong Kong from the rest of China at the same
time as it provides for Chinas resumption of sovereignty over Hong
Kong.
This Article uses an analysis of the status of environmental law in
Hong Kong to argue that the Basic Law's vision of autonomy for Hong
Kong is limited and unworkable. Three weaknesses undermine the
effectiveness of the Basic Law. First, the Basic Law fails to provide a
comprehensive or realistic mechanism for determining Hong Kong's
status in international law, and as a result fails to secure Hong Kong's
status both internationally and in China. Second, the Basic Law's
conception of a sphere of autonomy for Hong Kong that separates
Hong Kong from the rest of China is at odds with the reality of Hong
Kong's integration with China, and thus may impede efforts at much
needed regional problem solving. Third, the Basic Law mirrors weaknesses in Chinese law more generally by failing to delineate sufficiently
Hong Kong's autonomy, and by neglecting to provide any mechanism
5
for guaranteeing that Hong Kong's autonomy will be maintained.
Much analysis leading up to Hong Kong's return to China focused
on whether the Basic Law would adequately protect Hong Kong from
China, and whether Hong Kong's status in international organizations

KONG'S FUTuRE (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert Chen eds., 1988) (discussing the 1988 draft of
the Basic Law). The National People's Congress (NPC) enacted the Basic Law pursuant to article
31 of the Chinese constitution, which states that "[the state may establish special administrative
regions when necessary." XIANFA [CONSTSTUTION), 1982 FAGuI HuminL,
at 1, art. 31. The

constitution also states that "the systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be
prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." Id. Although the Basic Law is subordinate to .the Chinese constitution, the precise status

of the constitution in the Hong Kong SAR is unclear. See GHAI, supra, at 57, 61-62.
The statement that the Basic Law will serve as a mini-constitution is controversial: some argue
that the law is simply an ordinary statute granting limited authority to Hong Kong. See GHAI,
supra, at 137; see also Ann D. Jordan, Lost in the Translation: Two Legal Cultures, the Common Law
Judiciary and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.

335, 351 (1997) (arguing that "fijn the Chinese legal hierarchy the Basic Law is merely another
... national-level law" and thus "is not a mini constitution"); infra text accompanying note 291
(discussing the NPC's power to repeal the Basic Law). But see Tung Address, supra note 1, ("The
Basic Law is the constitutional law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.").
China began drafting the Basic Law in 1985, 18 months after China and the United Kingdom

signed the Joint Declaration, which provides for China to "resume the exercise of sovereignty
over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997." Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's

Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, pars. 1, Dec. 19, 1984 [hereinafter Joint
Declaration). For an overview of the negotiations leading up to the Joint Declaration and a
discussion of the declaration, see GHAI, supra, at 36-38, 43-56. Britain was not involved in the
Basic Law's drafting, though it did at times attempt to influence the drafting of the document.
See id. at 59-60.
5. The emphasis on separation is understandable: the Basic Law's emphasis on walling Hong
Kong off from the rest of China reflected an attempt to assuage fears of Hong Kong's residents
regarding Hong Kong's return to China. See infra note 18 (discussing the failure of the Basic Law
to increase public confidence in Hong Kong's reversion).
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would be preserved. 6 Inquiry into the status of international environmental law in Hong Kong suggests different questions. Does the Basic
Law adequately provide for Hong Kong's integration with the rest of
China? Does the Basic Law account for the new international obligations Hong Kong may assume as part of China? Does the Basic Law
account for the different statuses the Hong Kong and Chinese legal
systems accord international law?
The problems this Article examines are neither limited to international or cross-border environmental law, nor to Hong Kong. Inconsistencies and attempts at separation in the Basic Law in some cases
parallel inconsistencies and rigid categorizations in international treaties. Moreover, the conceptual and practical problems that impede
environmental solutions in Hong Kong and Guangdong also plague
attempts to address trans-jurisdictional environmental problems elsewhere in China. Environmental law in Hong Kong poses broad challenges to Chinas rigid notions of state sovereignty, which are at the
heart of China's policy toward Hong Kong, China's participation in
international lawmaking, and China's domestic legal system.
Clear definition of Hong Kong's placement in specific international
agreements was beyond the scope of the task the Basic Law's drafters
faced in the late 1980s. It would have been unrealistic, for example,
to have expected the Basic Law to stipulate Hong Kong's development
status in specific international agreements post-1997. But one of the
Basic Law's specific goals was to define a sphere of autonomy for Hong
Kong, both within China and internationally. The Basic Law fails to
meet this goal conceptually and practically: this Article demonstrates
that the separation-based conceptual framework the Basic Law creates
is in tension with the reality of Hong Kong's integration into China.
This Article also shows that the practical mechanism the Basic Law
creates does little to clarify Hong Kong's status or to provide Hong
Kong with autonomy in a range of organizations and relationships.
The problems that undermine the Basic Law are not surprising.
Some of the problems that weaken the effectiveness of the Basic Law
plague other Chinese laws. Scholars have criticized Chinese laws and
the Chinese constitution for being vague or aspirational, and have
7
noted the numerous competing sources of legal authority in China.
The Basic Law differs from other Chinese laws, however, in that it is
being implemented in a highly developed legal system. Hong Kong's
executive branch, courts, and legislature are much more likely to base

6. See, ag., sources cited infra note 79.
7. See, eg., Anthony R. Dicks, CompartmentalizedLaw andJudicial Restraint: An Inductive View
of SomeJurisdiionalBarriersto Reform, 141 CHINA Q. (1995) passim; Perry Keller, Sources of Order
in Chinese Law, 41 Ait. J. Comp'. L. 711, passim (1994).
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their actions and decisions on the Basic Law than are their mainland
counterparts to base decisions on Chinese national laws or the Chinese
constitution. The challenge facing Hong Kong is to develop its relationship with China despite the Basic Law's lack of clarity, in much
the same way as mainland government agencies and local authorities
structure their decisions and lawmaking within the confines of vague
statutory language and unclear lines of legal authority. The risk is that
Hong Kong's relationship with China may suffer from the arbitrariness
that undermines the effectiveness of law in China.
This Article suggests Hong Kong's relationship with China will
develop as a result of a range of factors-international agreements,
regional problems, local interests-that the Basic Law does not fully
contemplate. The reality of this relationship will necessarily diverge
from the framework the Basic Law creates. In many cases, China, Hong
Kong, and the international community are likely to overlook the
imperfections described herein as they focus on Hong Kong's continued
economic prosperity and Hong Kong's political status. Solutions to
environmental problems will not depend on the details of formalist
interpretations of the Basic Law, but Hong Kong's environmental
relationship with the rest of China will reflect, and challenge, the
governance model the Basic Law creates. To the degree China is able
to acknowledge and address these challenges, it will be better prepared
to secure Hong Kong's place in China, and to address questions of law
and governance in China as a whole.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I briefly introduces the
Basic Law's provisions regarding autonomy and the environment, summarizes Hong Kong's and China's environmental problems and efforts
to date to address such problems, and describes the status of international environmental law in Hong Kong and China prior to Hong
Kong's reversion to China.
Part II examines the status of international environmental law under
the Basic Law. After examining the framework the Basic Law creates
for determining Hong Kong's international status and contrasting this
framework with international norms of state succession, Part II discusses five problems that undermine the Basic Law's attempt to define
Hong Kong's place in China and the international community, demonstrating that the Hong Kong-China relationship cannot work in the
manner the Basic Law envisions. First, the Basic Law fails to take
account of the need for third party consent in determining the SAR's
status, and fails to contemplate that Hong Kong may accede to new
international obligations as part of China. Second, the Basic Law fails
to account for whether Hong Kong has developed or developing nation
status in international agreements. Third, the Basic Law fails to contemplate the interrelation of economic and trade issues with environ-
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mental issues and the possibility that, by granting autonomy to Hong
Kong in international trade organizations, the Basic Law may also grant
autonomy in environmental foreign policy. Fourth, the Basic law fails to
consider the ways in which China may influence Hong Kong's environmental and trade policies indirectly, and thus undermine the autonomy
the law grants to Hong Kong. Fifth, the Basic Law fails to take account
of the different status of international treaties in Hong Kong and
China, and the possibility that such differences may allow Hong Kong
de facto veto power over international agreements signed by China.
Part III examines the Basic Law's implications for cross-border environmental problems in the Pearl River Delta. Part III argues that the Basic
aw's emphasis on separating and distinguishing Hong Kong from the
rest of China may impede solutions to regional environmental problems.
Part IV explores the impact of the Basic Law's weaknesses on efforts
to address trans-jurisdictional environmental problems elsewhere in
China and on efforts to rethink Hong Kong's status in China. Part IV
argues that such rethinking is contingent on Chinas acceptance of less
rigid conceptions of sovereignty, both in its relations with its subnational units and its relations with the international community.
L BACKGROUND
A. The Basic Law and Hong Kong's Autonomy
The Basic Law both asserts Chinas sovereignty over Hong Kong and
separates Hong Kong from the rest of China. The law declares that "[the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the
People's Republic of China," 8 and that the SAR shall "exercise a high
degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent
judicial power."9 In enumerating specific powers of the SAR government, the Basic Law focuses on trade and economic issues:'°Hong
Kong has "independent finances"'" and its own freely-convertible currency,' 2 formulates its own "monetary and financial policies," 13 and
remains a "separate customs territory."' 4 The Basic Law provides for
8. Basic Law, art. 1.
9. Basic Law, art. 2. The Basic Law states that "under the principle of 'one country, two
systems,' the socialist system and policies will not be practised in Hong Kong." Id., preamble.
autonomy of the HKSAR has to be found
10. See GHAi, supra note 4, at 140 (stating that "[t]he

principally within the interstices of the economic system established for it"). Professor Ghai notes
that the autonomy the Basic Law grants Hong Kong differs from that seen in other areas of the world

because the purpose of autonomy in the Hong Kong SAR is to preserve Hong Kong's economic
system; "[ajutonomy issecondary, and is contingent on the other, larger aim." Id. at 181.
11. Basic Law, art. 106.
12. Basic Law, art. 111.
13. Basic Law, art. 110.
14. Basic Law, art. 116; see generally BAsic LAw arts. 105-35 (providing for Hong Kong's
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the SAR to pursue free trade policies, 15 and for Hong Kong to continue
"as a centre of international and regional aviation. '16 The Basic Law's
emphasis on economic autonomy was to be expected. The law reflects
China's belief that it can allow Hong Kong economic independence
without sacrificing Chinese sovereignty.1 7 The law also may reflect
China's view that if it convinces Hong Kong's citizens that the territory's economy will not suffer, they will more readily accept life under
Chinese rule. 18
Non-economic provisions of the Basic Law underscore the separation
of Hong Kong from the rest of China. 19 The law grants Hong Kong
powers not vested in any of China's other subnational units. Hong
Kong possesses the right to issue its own passports 20 and to maintain
its own immigration policy for non-Chinese citizens. 21 Hong Kong
maintains its own judicial system. 22 National laws are not to be applied
in the SAR, subject to certain exceptions, 23 and "[njo department of
the Central People's Government ...may interfere in the affairs which

economic autonomy from China). More than a fifth of the Basic Law's 160 articles come under
the chapter titled "Economy." See id.
15. See Basic Law, art. 115.
16. See Basic Law, art. 128.
17. See Wu Jianfan, Several Issues Concerningthe Relationship Between the CentralGovernment ofthe
People's Repoublic ofChina andthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2 J. CHINESE L. 65, 66-68
(1988); Xiao Weiyun, What's the Legal Status of Hong Kong?, CHINA L., June 15, 1996, at 90; c.
Tung Urges HK People to beConfident About Future, Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 17, 1996 atailable
in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File ("W]e must be mindful and sensitive to our sovereign's
aspirations in the international arena and be particularly sensitive to the feeling of the Chinese
people in areas of sovereignty and territorial integrity." (quoting SAR Chief Executive-designate
Tung Chee-hwa) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18. There is little evidence that the promulgation of the Basic Law reassured Hong Kong's
citizens about their future: "the final draft of the Basic Law depressed public confidence in Hong
Kong to a level even lower than that immediately after the June 4 Incident." Ming K. Chan,
Democracy Derailed Realpolitik and the Making ofthe Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90, in THIE HONG
KONG BASIc LAw: BLUEPRINT FOR 'STABILITY AND PROSPERITY' UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 3, 26 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991). Yet given the close proximity of
the Basic Law's promulgation to the Tiananmen crackdown, it may not be fair to judge public
reaction to the Basic Law independently from the crackdown itself. Professor Ghai argues that
the signing of the Joint Declaration did, to a degree, reassure Hong Kong residents, but that
confidence slipped with the publication of the 1988 and 1990 drafts of the Basic Law. See GHAI,
supra note 4, at 57-61.
19. The Basic Law itself does not provide a clear list of the SAR's powers; for such a list, see
GHAI, supra note 4, at 146.
20. See Basic Law, art. 154.
21. See id. The status of immigration from other parts of China is less clear: article 22 states
that the central government shall determine immigration levels from China to Hong Kong, after
consultation with the SAR. See Basic Law, art. 22; GHAI, supra note 4, at 172-73 (discussing the
ambiguity of articles 22 and 154).
22. "The judicial system previously practiced in Hong Kong shall be maintained, except for
those changes consequent upon the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region." Basic Law, art. 81.
23. See Basic Law, art. 18; see also infra note 221 (discussing article 18).
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the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own
24
in accordance with" the Basic Law.
Commentators have echoed the Basic Law's emphasis on Hong Kong's
separation from China. Most observers have focused on the degree of
autonomy the Basic Law grants to Hong Kong, or the degree to which
this autonomy will be honored post-1997. 25 Criticism of the Basic Law
has often targeted provisions in the Basic Law that restrict Hong
Kong's moves towards democracy, 26 or the possibility that Chinese
interpretations of the Joint Declaration's statement that "Ithe laws
currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged" will
undermine Hong Kong's autonomy by locking Hong Kong into the
undemocratic system in place at the time of the Joint Declaration's
signing. 27 Few observers have questioned whether separation is the
appropriate model for Hong Kong's return to China.
In contrast to the Basic Law's detailed provisions regarding Hong
Kong's economic affairs, the law makes only passing reference to Hong
Kong's environment. 28 The Basic Law mentions Hong Kong's natural
environment three times: article 7 states that "[t]he land and natural
resources within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
be State property;" 29 article 97 specifies that the SAR's district organizations may be responsible for "environmental sanitation;" 30 and article
119 instructs the SAR government to "formulate appropriate policies
to . . . pay regard to the protection of the environment." 31 None of
these provisions signify substantial concern for the environment. Arti-

24. Basic Law, art. 22.
25. See, eg., GHAI, supra note 4, at 139 (arguing that in prescribing "details of the capitalist
system that Hong Kong must preserve," the Basic Law "erodes into the autonomy that [Hong

Kong] might otherwise have enjoyed"); Chan, supra note 18, at 28 ("The Basic Law ensures
that all of the crucial levers of power are left in China's hands."); WtANG ENBAO, HONG KONG
1997: THE POLITIcs OF TRANISTION 110 (1995) ("[A]s long as the Basic Law is implemented

the autonomy of Hong Kong will be protected.").
26. See, eg., Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNATI' L. 301, 313 (1996)
(stating that the Basic Law's system for elections "seriously strains the notion of democratic
elections"); GHAI, supra note 4, at 226-41, 259-63; cf WILLttas GOODHART, YM. RAJA Az=Z
ADDRUSE, JOHN Down, & HANS-HEINER KuEHNE, CouNTDowN TO 1997, at 67-75 (Int'l
Commission of Jurists, 1992) (criticizing British reluctance to introduce democracy in Hong

Kong).
27. Joint Declaration, supra note 4, art. 3, para. 3. For a discussion of the Chinese view of the
meaning of article 3 in the context of Hong Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance, see Wu Jianfan,
The Bill of Rights: China Responds to Criticism of the PWC's Legal Proposals, WINDow, Nov. 10,
1995, at 10.
28. Environmental affairs, with passing references, fare better than some other policy areas
that the Basic Law does not mention at all. For a discussion of such omissions, see GHAs, supra
note 4, at 146.
29. Basic Law, art. 7.

30. Basic Law, art. 97.
31. Basic Law, art. 119.
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cle 7 is intended to make clear that title in Hong Kong's land shifted
from the British Crown to the Chinese government, 32 article 97 serves
merely as an example of areas that may be delegated to district board
control, and article 119's mention of the environment follows a list of
nine "trades" that Hong Kong is to promote. 33 Nevertheless, article
119's instruction that Hong Kong's government should "pay regard to
the protection of the environment" does establish that the Basic Law
intends for local environmental lawmaking to be within the SAR's
sphere of autonomy.
B. EnvironmentalProtection in Hong Kong and China
One explanation for the Basic Law's lack of emphasis on the environment may be that Hong Kong and China were just beginning to
develop environmental law when China drafted the Basic Law in the
late 1980s. 34 Hong Kong did not establish its Environmental Protection Department (EPD) until 1986. 35 Since then, the territory has
32. Some ambiguity exists on this point. In general, the phrase "State property" has been
taken to mean property of the Chinese government. Under such a construction, the land comes
under the control of the SAR government when the Chinese government vests title in the land
with the SAR government. This would allow leases in the SAR to be signed by the SAR
government. See GIs, supra note 4; cf WANG, supra note 25, at 107 (stating that Article 7 shifts
title to the SAR government).
33. See Basic Law, art. 119. Article 119 states that "tr]he Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall formulate appropriate policies to promote and co-ordinate
the development of various trades such as manufacturing, commerce, tourism, real estate, transport, public utilities, services, agriculture and fisheries, and pay regard to the protection of the
environment." Basic Law, art. 119. The article can be read to require policies for the various
economic areas listed, but that the SAR government merely "pay regard to" the environment,
One observer has argued that the placement of the reference to the environment demonstrates
the Basic Law's relative lack of concern with the environment. See Roda Mushkat, Environnmtal
Problems and Policy Response in Hong Kong: An Evaluation From an InternationalLegal Perspective, 2
AsIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 113, 118-19 (1992).
34. China created the Basic Law Drafting Committee in 1985; the first draft of the law was
made public in 1988. See Chan, supra note 18, at 4; GHAi, supra note 4, at 57-58.
The extremely low level of environmental protection in Hong Kong in the 1980s suggests a
possible silver lining to the Basic Law's lack of detail regarding environmental policy. As Professor
Ghai argues, the Basic Law's detailed description of economic issues may actually undermine
Hong Kong's autonomy by restricting the SAR's future policy choices. See GHAI, supra note 4,
at 139-40. China objected to Hong Kong's pre-1997 political reforms, see id. at 272-74, and
certain pre-1997 infrastructure projects, see infra note 243, by arguing that the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law preserve the political and financial systems in place in 1984. Absent detailed
provisions in either document regarding environmental policy, Hong Kong's environmental policy
may be free to develop beyond its state at the time of the signing of the Joint Declaration or
the enactment of the Basic Law. Such development, however, is unlikely under the pro-business
individuals China has chosen to lead the first SAR government. Se infra text accompanying notes
222-228.
35. Prior to the establishment of the EPD in 1986, Hong Kong established an Environmental
Protection Unit (EPU), in 1977, and an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in 1981. See
Environmental Protection Department, ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, at 3 (1996). Al-

though the EPA was "more weighty" than the EPU, the EPA's "role was largely advisory." See id
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enacted "a staggering number of new environmental laws." 36 Despite
this increased environmental lawmaking and increasing awareness of
environmental problems, 37 Hong Kong is plagued by air,38 water,39 and
noise pollution 40 that makes Hong Kong "[a] first world economy with
a third world environment." 41 Hong Kong is the most densely populated urban area in the world. 42 The celebrated Victoria Harbour has
"become a vast sewage and industrial waste pit" that is "now under
threat of virtually disappearing altogether as a result of' the Hong
Kong government's land reclamation program. 43 Public concern re-

In contrast, the EPD is "responsible for all pollution prevention and control measures, including
the planning of the territory's sewage and wastes management programmes, but excluding
responsibility for conservation and the natural environment[,j which remains with the Agriculture
& Fisheries Department." Id. at 5. For a description of the EPD's responsibilities, see id.
China established its National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) in 1984, under the
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction; NEPA became independent of the ministry and thus
an agency directly under the State Council in 1988. See The NationalEnvironmentalProtection Agency
(NEPA), in CHINA ENVIRONMENT YEARBOOK 1994, at 217, 218 (Zhang Lijun ed., 1995).
36. Mei Ng & Lisa Hopkinson, A Little Green Dragon?, 5 AsIAN J. ENVTL. MGMT. 75, 75
(1997). For an overview of Hong Kong's environmental legislation, see ENVIRONMENT HONG
KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 8-17, 116-29.
37. See Wong Koon-kwai, The Environment: Heading Towards Sustainability?, in THE OTHER
HONG KONG REPORT 1996, at 367, 374-76 (Nyaw Mee-Kau & Li Si-ming eds., 1996). Increased
awareness does not appear to translate into increased support for environmental programs. See
infra text accompanying note 44.
38. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 9-11; Elisabeth Tacey, Ozone
Attack Pushes Air Pollution to Record Levels, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 27, 1996, at I
(reporting record air pollution levels in Hong Kong); Ng Kang-Chung & Angela Li, Pollution
Record Leaves HK Choking, . CHINA MORNING PosT, Jan. 4, 1996, at 1 (same). Hong Kong "has
one of the highest per capita electricity consumption levels in the world" and emits "twice the
world average of carbon dioxide per person." See Mei Ng, Letter to the Editor, Energy Efficiency
Should beFirst Choice, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Oct. 25, 1996, at 30.
39. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 16-18; Fiona Holland, Saturday
Focus, Little Hope for an Empty Ocean, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 26, 1996, at 21 (reporting
that "Hong Kong has plundered and polluted its seas with hardly a backward glance").
40. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 11-12.
41. Ng & Hopkinson, supra note 37; see also Editorial, Putting the Environment on the Agenda,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at 10 (arguing that many of the government measures
that have been put in place are "cosmetic" or only scratch "the surface of the problem").
42. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 2.
43. Reclamation of the Harbour-Fateor Folly?, URB. PLAN.& ENVTL. Q. (Fred Kan & Co.),
Dec. 1995, at 1; see also Cleanup Plan for Victoria Harbor Stalls, But Serious Pollution Problems
Continue, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 387 (May 17, 1995) (derailing pollution in
Victoria Harbour). Commentators have blamed Hong Kong's polluted waters and inadequate
enforcement of Hong Kong's environmental laws for outbreaks of cholera in the colony. See Terri
Mottershead, Endangerment of PublicHealth-The Real Cost of Water Pollution in Hong Kong, H.K.
ENV=L. L. Ass'N NEWSL. (Hong Kong Environmental Law Ass'n), Sept. 1994, at 1-2.
For a more positive view of steps Hong Kong has taken to address environmental problems,
see Bowen Leung Po-wing, Foreword, ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35 (describing
progress in implementing Hong Kong's anti-pollution strategy); Katharine Morton, Hong Kong:
Moving Mountains, ENV'T RISK, Sept. 1993, yearbook ed. at 33-35 (arguing that "Hong Kong
has one of the most sophisticated environmental regulatory and management systems in Asia"
and quoting EPD acting director John Boxall as stating "[t]ell me somewhere else in the world
that has gone from virtually no controls to reasonable controls in 10 years on an economy growing
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garding the environment remains low: a Hong Kong environmental
group reported that a 1996 study ranked Hong Kong last of 39
countries and territories in public support for environmental protecion.4
Inadequate enforcement has undermined increased environmental
lawmaking. Commentators have criticized the Hong Kong court system's "generally sympathetic approach ...to environmental offenders"4 5 and have noted that the courts are "reluctant to treat environmental offenses seriously."4 6 Although Hong Kong's environmental
laws constitute "a comparatively sophisticated framework," most of
these laws rely on Hong Kong's Environmental Protection Department
for enforcement of penalties. 47 Yet the courts may simply reflect the
views of Hong Kong society more generally: many environmentalists
blame Hong Kong's obsession with economic growth for a general lack
48
of environmental concern.

at an average of 8% per annum"); The Environment, HONG KONG 1995,409,409 (Renu Daryanani
ed., 1995) (reporting that "government expenditure on the environment" was approximately
'three percent of public spending" and that "the Hong Kong Government has been moving
rapidly and investing large sums of money to correct past environmental mistakes").
44. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, OvERALL STATE OF HONG KONG'S ENVIRONMENT (Jan. 1997)
(on file with author). The same report showed that a majority of Hong Kong residents were not
willing to pay increased taxes to fund environmental measures. See id.
45. URB. PLAN.& ENVTL. L. Q. (Fred Kan & Co.), Dec. 1995, at 1. The report noted as an
example that an offender "convicted of its 2nd, 3rd and 4th offences ... was fined the sale
amount . . . on each conviction," HK$10,000, which is a fraction of the maximum fine of
HK$400,000 "plus [HK$] 10,000 for each day the offence .. . continued." Id
46. URB3. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. Q. (Fred Kan & Co.), Sept. 1995, at 1; see also Attorney Says
UninformedJudiciaryFailingto Enforce EnvironmentalLaws, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA)
955 (November 16, 1994) (reporting criticism of the Hong Kong judiciary's enforcement of
environmental laws).
Hong Kong's judiciary appears to be playing an increasingly active role in environmental
enforcement. In one month in 1996, courts issued 63 convictions for breaches of anti-pollution
legislation. See HK Courts Make Convictions Against Pollution Makers, Xinhua News Agency, Feb.
14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
47. Are Hong Kong's Anti-Pollution Laws Effectively Enforced?, URB. PLAN. & ENv'rL. L. Q. (Fred
Kan & Co.), June 1996, at 1. Hong Kong's laws do nor provide "for ordinary citizens to bring
proceedings against a polluter, or against the EPD for failing in its job to enforce the law." Id
Although Hong Kong law includes the "common law rights of action against polluters," including "private and public nuisance, trespass and negligence," no such action "has ever been brought
by citizens or the Attorney General against polluters." Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). The report
notes that pollution levels have "dramatically increased" since the enactment of Hong Kong's
anti-pollution laws, and blames this increase in part on the EPD's reliance on "consultation,
advising and warning" rather than prosecution of environmental offenders. Id
For an overview of the EPD's enforcement activities and environmental convictions, see
ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 130-41.
48. "[IThe environmental agenda [inHong Kong] has often ... been delimited to match the
archetypal image of Hong Kong as a place where its people are efficient, profit-maximizing,
ruthlessly individualistic in the market but only to serve the goal of fulfilling familial duties at
the end of the day." Man Si-wai, The Environment, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S
CHALLENGES AHEAD 319, 320 (Joseph YS. Cheng & Sonny S.H. Lo eds., 1995). Hong Kong
politicians often oppose strict environmental controls on the grounds that the economic costs of
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Discussion of Hong Kong's environment must take place in the
context of an understanding of the current state of environmental
protection in China. Chinas environmental standards influence Hong
Kong in at least three ways. First, Hong Kong suffers the direct effects
of air and water pollution from across the border in Guangdong Province. 49 Second, weaker enforcement of pollution controls elsewhere in
China may induce Hong Kong companies to move polluting activities
across the border to Guangdong. 50 Third, concern with the uncertainties of life under Chinese rule may accentuate Hong Kong's obsession
with economic development: "[tlhe combination of Hong Kong's manic
materialism and profound political anxiety is now proving as lethal a
cocktail for the local environment as the uncontrolled poisons her
factories pour into the once-fragrant harbour."' 1
Although numerous reports have commented on the dismal state of
China's environment, 52 there are also reasons to be optimistic regarding
China's commitment to environmental protection. China's moves to
tighten environmental protection are increasingly driven by recognition of the large costs environmental destruction will have on economic
development. Like Hong Kong, China has begun to implement a wide
array of new environmental legislation,53 and China's environmental

such legislation will be too great. See Bryan Bachner, Regulating Pollution in the People's Republic of
China: An Analysis of the Enforcement of Environmental Law, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. & PoL'y
373, 400, 406 (1996).
49. See infra textaccompanying notes 233-239.
50. See Tom Korski, Lax Laws Allow Foreign Pollution to Relocate, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 4, 1997, at 12.
The movement of many Hong Kong factories across the border may have negative environmental effects on Hong Kong: many of the factories and farms along Guangdong's Dongjiang
River, Hong Kong's primary water source, are Hong Kong-owned. See Vincent Rj. Chen, River
of No Return?, ONE EARTH, Spring 1997, at 15, 17. But see Pamposh Dhar, Hong Kong--Environment: Rapid Growth Leaves Legacy of Pollution, Inter Press Serv., Oct. 3, 1995, at 1 ("The problem
of industrial pollution [in Hong Kong] has abated somewhat with the movement of industries
across the border into Chinas Guangdong province .... ).
51. Linda Siddall, The Environment, in THE OTHER HONG KONG REPORT 1991, 402, 405
(Sung Yun-wing & Lee Ming-kwan eds., 1991). Man Si-wai identifies three arguments used
against stricter environmental concerns in the run-up to Hong Kong's return to China: Hong
Kong cannot survive without continued rapid economic growth, which will not be possible with
stricter environmental controls; Hong Kong should not obsess with preserving its own environment, as the significance of Hong Kong's environment is reduced when viewed as only a small
part of China; and Hong Kong's political liberties can only be preserved if Hong Kong remains
useful to China economically-environmentalism stands in the way of this necessary continued
development. See Man, supra note 48, at 320-21.
52. See, eg., VACLAV SmIn,CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (1993); Homer Sun, Note,
Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power Development in the People's Republic of China, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1015, 1018-21 (1996); Sheila Tefft, Fueling Pollution, S. CHINA MORNING
POST,Sept. 22, 1995, at 23; Tim Zimmermann, Susan V. Lawrence, Brian Palmer & Philippe B.
Moulier, China Takes a Deep Breath, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 1996, at 36.
53. See, eg., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Zaosheng Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Environmental Noise Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China], reprinted
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regulatory bodies have become increasingly aggressive. In July, 1996,
for example, China ordered the closing of 999 factories along the
Huaihe River, one of the world's most polluted rivers. 54 Guangdong
has also taken steps to improve environmental protection, including
banning new coal- and oil-fired plants from the Pearl River Delta,
closing polluting plants, and moving polluting factories out of urban
areas. 55 These may be small steps in relation to the size of China's
environmental problems, but they suggest caution in regard to assumptions that Beijing will directly undermine Hong Kong's environmental protection mechanisms.
The conventional wisdom has been that Hong Kong's return to
China entails significant risks to the Hong Kong environment. 56 Alin ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENvTL. NEws] Nov. 2, 1996, at 3; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa [Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's
Republic of China], May 15, 1996, reprinted in ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA EINVTL.
NEws], May 21, 1996, at 2; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjing
Fangzhi Fa [Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of
China], Oct. 30, 1995, 1995 FAGUI HUIBIAN at 55; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Xuran
Fangzhi Fa [Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China], Aug.
29, 1995, 1995 FAGUI Hums at 5. For an overview of China's environmental laws, see generally
Julia Epley Klee & Felicity C. Thomas, An Evolving EnvironmentalFramework: China's Environmental
Policies, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan. 11, 1997, at 24; CHINA ENVIRONMENT YEARBOOK 1994, supra
note 35, at 34-79; CHINA ENVIRONMENT YEARBOOK 1995, at 9-28 (Zhang Lijun ed., 1996).
For a discussion of problems confronting China's recent attempts to strengthen environmental
laws, see generally William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's
EnvironmentalDilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 125 (1997).
54. See Tom Korski, FactoriesClosed as EnvironmentalAgency Targets Polluters, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at 8; Liu Yinglang, River Quality Improves after Forced Shut-Down, CHINA
DAIL, Aug. 8, 1996, at 15. The director of China's National Environmental Protection Agency
(NEPA) stated in 1996 that NEPA had shut 30,000 polluting factories in the previous three
years. See Mei Ng, Environment ChiefLooks Ahead, ONE EARTH, Spring 1996, at 22.
Many observers are skeptical of the effectiveness of such actions, noting that many closed
factories reopened shortly after being shut, or combined with other factories in order to avoid
the new regulations. Author's interviews with academics and environmental officials in Beijing,
July 1996. Cf. Liu Yinglang, Henan Wlns War Against PollutingFactories, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 29,
1996, at 31 (reporting that "some manufacturers are waiting to reopen their plants instead of
switching to cleaner industries").
55. See Guangdong to Control Industrial Pollution, Xinhua News Agency, May 12, 1995 available
in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; South China Delta Bans PetrochemicalPower Plants,REIUTER
EUROPEAN Bus. REP. May 31, 1995; see also Daniel Kwan, $13.4b Earmarkedfor Anti-Pollution
Drive; Tax Breaks and Low-Interest Loans to Entice investors to Join Crusade, S. CHINA MORNING
POsT, Aug. 6, 1996, at 3 (detailing Guangdong's plans to increase investment in environmental
protection, especially in Shenzhen); China'sGuangdong ProvinceSpending $206 million to Reduce Coal
PlantS02, UTIL. ENV'T REP., Oct. 27, 1995, at 15; see also EntironmentalMarket Trends in Four
East Asian Areas, E. ASIAN ExEcrWuv REP., Oct. 15, 1995 at 8 (describing Guangzhou as "one
of the leading cities in China in environmental protection"); Guangdong's Environment Protection
Fruitful, Xinhua News Agency, June 11, 1996 available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File
(reporting that Guangdong "leads the country in tree planting" and that the provincial government has "mapped out over 120 environmental protection-related rules and regulations" in the
past five years); Geangdong Shuts Down 295 Polluting Factories, WASH. TiaEs, Oct. 18, 1996, at
A19 (reporting that Guangdong closed 295 polluting factories in September 1996).
For a discussion of environmental law in Guangdong, see Bachner, supra note 48, at 385-91.
56. See, eg., Bryan Bachner, Conserving a Legal Heritagein Hong Kong: Environmental Regulation
After 1997, 19 Lo. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 363, 363 (1997) ("[The restoration of mainland
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though there is little question that China faces colossal environmental
challenges, or that Hong Kong is far ahead of China in most areas of
local environmental protection," 7 this Article argues that future threats
to Hong Kong's environment are more likely to come from Hong
Kong's continued concern with economic growth and business interests' domination of the SAR government, 58 than from interference from
Beijing or Guangdong. Similarly, this paper argues that impediments
to addressing Hong Kong's environmental problems are likely to stem
not from return to Chinese rule, but rather from the Basic Law's
emphasis on separation, a conception of autonomy that fails to appreciate the interconnectedness of China's and Hong Kong's environmental problems, and that ignores the implications of environmental
policy for economic affairs and conceptions of sovereignty.
C. InternationalEnvironmental Law in Hong Kong and China
China has not lagged behind Hong Kong in international environmental law. China was a relative latecomer to international environmental treaties, 59 but in the past decade China has begun to play an
active role in international environmental lawmaking, and has become
a signatory to the major international environmental treaties. 60 China
authority over Hong Kong in 1997 raises serious questions for the territory's future environmental
policy."); Julie Bloch, Conservation in a Concrete Jungle: Political, Legal and Societal Obstacles to
EnvironmentalProtection in Hong Kong, 6 GEO. INTL E' vTL. L. Rav. 593, 594 (1994) ("[Alctions
taken before 1997 to incorporate conservation goals into current laws and policies may prevent
serious environmental harm in the future.").
57. See, eg., Get Tough with China, Say Greens, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 4, 1995, at 6
(reporting that Hong Kong "has stricter pollution controls on power stations" than China); Mei
Ng, EnvironmentalChiefLooks Ahead, ONE EARTH, Spring 1996, at 22 (reporting NEPA director
Xe Zhenhua as stating that Hong Kong's environmental controls are more advanced than those
in China). But see Bachner, supra note 48, at 401 (noting that Hong Kong's environmental policy
is "unprogressive ... vis a vis many... countries, including the People's Republic of China");
Ng Cho Nam, Letter to the Editor, Polluters W1l Come Back to Haunt Us, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, July 20, 1995, at 20 (noting that "[e]nvironmenral regulations in China are equally, if not
more, comprehensive and stringent than those in Hong Kong"); Foo Choy Peng, Clean City Policy
Could Bring HK Greater Returns, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 10, 1997, at 3 (reporting that
"Shanghai's commitment to environmental protection ... puts Hong Kong to shame").
The mainland Chinese press has at times cited Hong Kong's environmental policies and
environmental organizations as positive examples. See, &g., Miao Kun, Weile luse de Xianggang [For
a Green Hong Kong], ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENovTL. NEws], June 29, 1997, at 1
(discussing activities of Friends of the Earth-Hong Kong).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 224-228.
59. China recognized only one international environmental protocol prior to 1970, which
"dealt with gas and germ warfare." Cai Shouqiu & Mark Voigts, The Development of China's
Environmental Diplomacy, 3 PAc. Rim L. & Pos'Y J. S-17, S-19 (1993). China participated in the
1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm, but China was not a
signatory to the conference's final agreement. See id. at S-22; see also Roda Mushkat, The Daya
Bay Nuclear Plant Project in the Light of International Environmental Law, 7 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN
L.J. 87, 103 (1990) (discussing China's participation in the Stockholm conference).
60. See RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 185-97 (1991); Abram Chayes & Charlotte Kim, China and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in ENERGIZING CHINA:
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is a signatory to most international environmental agreements that
have come into force in the past two decades, including the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 61 the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol), 62 and the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, 63 the
64
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),
65
the Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention),
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Climate Change Convention), 66 the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
(Ramsar Convention),67 and the Basel Convention on Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention). 68 Although Britain applied 69 the four ozone agree-

RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Michael B. McElroy,

Chris P. Nielsen, & Peter Lydon, eds., forthcoming 1998).
61. Wenna Convention for the Protetion of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/IG.53/Rev. 1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), T.I.A.S. 11,097
(entered into force Sept. 22, 1988). China acceded to the treaty on September 11, 1989. Sce
UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS
As AT 31 DECEMBER 1995, at 917 (1996) [hereinafter MULTLATERAL TREATIES].

62. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. China acceded to the
treaty on June 14, 1991. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, Supra note 61, at 917.

63. Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Adopted at London, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537 [hereinafter London Revisions].
China acceded to the revisions on June 14, 1991. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 61,

at 917. China has not signed the Copenhagen Amendments to the Montreal Protocol. See
Adjustments and Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer Adopted at Copenhagen, Nov. 25, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 874 (1993) (entered into force June
14, 1994) [hereinafter Copenhagen Revisions].
64. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar.
3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1996, at 330 (reporting China

a parry to the Convention) [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE].
65. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Biodiversity
Convention]. China ratified the treaty on January 5, 1993. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, sipra
note 61, at 908.
66. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 LL.M. 849 [hereinafter
Climate Change Convention]. China ratified the treaty on December 22, 1994. See MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, supra note 61, at 904.
67. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat,
opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Ramsar
Convention]. See TREATIES IN FORCE, stpra note 64, at 331 (reporting Chinese membership in
the Convention).
68. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waites and their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG 80/3 (1989), S. TREATY DOc. No. 5, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention]. China acceded to the treaty on
December 17, 1991. See MULTATERAL TREATIES, supra note 61, at 917.
69. Prior to July 1, 1997, Hong Kong's participation in international agreements was formally
decided by the United Kingdom, but in practice "tw]hen Britain agreetd] to an international
convention the Hong Kong government [was] normally asked whether it wishe[d] to be bound
by it." NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 221 (5th ed.
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ments, 70 CITES,7 1 the Ramsar Convention, 72 and the Basel Convention 73 to Hong Kong, 74 and the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
reached agreement regarding the continued application of a number of
environmental agreements to the Hong Kong SAR, 75 Britain did not
1991). In both the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, international agreements require domestic
legislation to become part of domestic law. See PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONsTrruTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 39 (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 210-222
(discussing the status of international agreements in domestic Hong Kong law). Priot to local

enactment, international agreements "merely create obligations between governments and do not
affect the legal position of individuals in domestic law." WESLEY-SMrrH, supra, at 40-41.
70. Hong Kong is a signatory to the Copenhagen Revisions, which China has not signed. See
MULTILATERAL TREATIES,supra note 61, at 885 n.7, 889 n.9, 891 n.4, 892 n.3.
71. See TREATIES INFORCE, supra note 64, at 331 n.9. It is questionable how far
either China
or Hong Kong has gone to meet its obligations under CITES. One scholar notes that "a
substantial endangered species trade still exists" in Hong Kong. Bloch, supra note 56, at 597.
Hong Kong has not always been a fill participant in CITES even in formal terms: Hong Kong
delayed implementation of the international ban on ivory by six months, thanks to a British
reservation for Hong Kong. See id. at 610. Hong Kong's and China's experience with CITES and
the Ramsat Convention, see infra note 72, emphasizes the importance of local enforcement, rather
than mere international obligation. Absent a high degree of administrative commitment to
enforcing environmental regulations, local effects of international commitments are likely to be
minimal.
72. See TREATIES INFORCE, supra note 64, at 332 n.5. At present one Hong Kong location,
the Mai Po Marshes, is a Ramsar site. See PLANNING, ENVIRONMENT & LANDS BRANCH,
HEADING TowARDs SUSTAINABILITY: THE THIRD REvIEw OF PROGRESS ON THE 1989 WHITE
PAPER PoLrusot IN HONG KONG-A TmE TO ACT 31 (1986) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER

THIRD REVIEW]. Mai Po became a Ramsar site in 1995. See Hong Kong to Protect Wetland, Xinhua
News Agency, Apr. 24, 1996 available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; see also John Flint,
Patten Reveals Boost to Mai Po, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 1995, at 5 (noting that Mai
Po's Ramsar listing "places a moral, nor legal, responsibility, on [Hong Kong's government] to
protect the site"). Hong Kong moved extremely slowly to designate the Mai Po Marshes as a
Ramsar site, perhaps because China was not initially a party to the treaty. See Mushkat, supra
note 33, at 123. Six Chinese wetland reserves were identified for protection when China joined
the Ramsar Convention in 1992. See Rare Birds Under W7ell Protectionin Northeast China, Xinhua
News Agency, May 6, 1994 available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
73. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 61, at 898 n.8. For a discussion of the Basel
Convention's status in Hong Kong, see infra text accompanying notes 195-208.
74. Other environmental agreements Britain applied to Hong Kong include the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Damage. See TREATIES IN
FORCE, supra note 64, at 386-89; Jill Cotrell, EnvironmentalProtection, in TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAw IN HONG KONG 211, 214-15 (Philip Smart & Andrew Halkyard eds., 1993); David
McKellar, International Maritime Pollution Conventions in Hong Kong (Part 1), H. K. ENvTL. L.
ASS'N NEWSL. (Hong Kong Envtl. Law Ass'n), Dec. 1994, at 8-9; see also Alison Wiseman, Steps
to Halt Oil Pollution, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 1, 1994, at 2 (discussing regulations to
bring Hong Kong into compliance with amendments to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships). China is a party to most marine pollution treaties. See
TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 64, at 386-89. Britain also applied the Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, 49 Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 349, entered into force Jan. 16, 1935, to

Hong Kong. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 64, at 453. Although not listed as a parry to
the original 1931 Convention, China is a party to the 1956 protocol to the Convention. See id.
at 453-54. Hong Kong has enacted domestic legislation banning the capture of certain species
of whales.
75. Britain and China established the Joint Liaison Group pursuant to the Joint Declaration.
See Joint Declaration, supra note 4, art. 5 ("The Government of the United Kingdom and the

HarvardInternationalLaw Journal / Vol 39
apply either the Climate Change Convention or the Biodiversity Convention to the territory.76 Environmental agreements did not rank high
on the colonial government's list of priorities: Hong Kong's pre-transition participation in international agreements was largely concerned
77
with trade relations.
Hong Kong's and Chinas statuses with regard to the Climate Change
and Biodiversity Conventions contrast with international agreements that
received the most attention in the run-up to Hong Kong's reversion
to China. Commentators generally discussed Hong Kong's post-1997
treaty obligations with reference to treaties extended to Hong Kong
that China had not joined, 78 particularly the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 79 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).8 0 Similarly,
Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth transfer
of government in 1997, and with a view to the effective implementation of this Joint Declaration,
a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up ....
); id at Annex II (providing for the
establishment and operation of the Joint Liaison Group). As of October 1996, the Joint Liaison
Group had agreed on the application of nine multilateral "conservation" treaties and five "marine
pollution" treaties to the Hong Kong SAR. See List of Agreed MultilateralTreaties to Apply to SAR,
Oct. 10, 1996, at 1-2, 8-9 (on file with author). Included in the list are the Ramsar Convention,
CITES, the Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol, London and Copenhagen Amendments to the
Montreal Protocol, and the Basel Convention. See id. For a discussion of the operation of the Joint
Liaison Group, see Hired Gun, NEw GAzE=, Aug. 1994, at 16, 16-21.
76. See MULTILATERAL TEnATiS, supra note 61, at 907 n.2, 911 n.1. Hong Kong is also not
a party to the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 33 1.L.M. 1014 (1994), opened for
signature Apr. 1, 1994, despite Hong Kong being the world's tenth largest importer of tropical
timber. See Ban on Imported Hardwood Timber to Hong Kong Unlikely, Seminar Agres, 17 Int'l Env't
Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 5, at 233 (Mar. 9, 1994). China has signed the agreement. See Tropical
Timber, 19 Int'l Envr Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 19, at 807 (Sept. 18, 1996). At a 1994 seminar
on tropical hardwoods in Hong Kong, environmentalists, industry representatives and Hong
Kong government officials agreed that "a ban on the import of hardwood timber into Hong Kong
is unlikely." See Ban on Imported Hardwood Timber to Hong Kong Unlikely, Seminar Agrcs, supra.
Hong Kong has banned the use of tropical hardwoods in government construction projects. See
RoA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, TwO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITrES: THE CASE OF
HONG KONG 100 & n.100 (1997); Kathy Griffin, HK Poseron PaperRecycling, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 10, 1994, at 6.
77. See MINERS, supra note 69, at 220.
78. See, ag., Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong as an InternationalLegal Person, 6 EMORY INT'L L. RIsv.
105, 148 (1992) ("The territory's predicament lies in the fact that the continuation of external
ties and international agreements is essential in order to maintain the territory's prosperity and
its status as a major international commercial center. This predicament is compounded because
the PRC is not a party to many of the international agreements presently extending to the
territory."). In February 1996, China approved the continued application of "more than 200
multilateral treaties covering aviation, finance and shipping" to the Hong Kong SAR. Simon
Holberton, Chinese Approve HK's Treaties, FIN. TuMEs, Feb. 10, 1996, at 3.
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
80. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter ICESCR]. For articles discussing the status of the treaties in Hong Kong,
see, e.g., Mushkat, supra note 78, at 150; Donna Deese Skeen, Can Capitalism Surrive Under
Communist Rule? The Effect of Hong Kong's Reversion to the People's Republic of China in 1997, 29
INT'L L. 175, 196-203 (1995); Davis, supra note 26, at 311-21 (1996); George E. Edwards &
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scholars noted the possible difficulties in continued enforcement of
extradition treaties between Hong Kong and foreign states.81 Yet whereas
human rights treaties and extradition treaties are cases in which Hong
Kong's return to China poses a possible threat to continued application
of international agreements,8 2 and suggest areas of international law in
which Hong Kong has been a more active participant than has China,
examination of the post-reversion applicability of environmental agreements reveals an area of international law in which Chinas participation has exceeded that of Hong Kong, and thus raises the question
whether Hong Kong, in becoming part of China, has assumed new
international obligations.
II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UNDER THE
BASIC LAW
A. The Basic Law and Norms of State Succession
The Basic Law provides for Hong Kong's status in a wide range of
international agreements to remain unchanged. Yet the framework the
law establishes for assessing Hong Kong's status in international agreements is ill-suited to environmental agreements for two principal
reasons. First, the Basic Law is primarily concerned with maintaining
Hong Kong's status with regard to economic and trade and human
rights agreements. Thus, although the Basic Law does include proviMark Zuckerman, Rights Monitoring Under Threat? Hong Kong at the United Nations, CHINA RTs.
F., Winter 1996, at 28, 29-31; Johannes Chan, State Succession to Human Rights Treaties. Hong Kong
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 45 INf'L & COMp. L. Q. 928, 934
(1996). The Basic Law provides for the continued application of both treaties in Hong Kong,
stating that, "[t]he provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong
shall remain in force." Basic Law, art. 39. For a discussion of the possible interpretations of article
39, see GHAI, sjpra note 4, at 386-87,419-20; see also Shin-ichi Ago, Application of ILO Conventions
to Hong Kong After 1997, 17 DALHousm L.J. 612, 619 (1994) (questioning continued application
of International Labor Organization conventions applicable to Hong Kong but not ratified by
China). China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997. See Chinese Eitvoy Signs InternationalRights
Treaty, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File.
81. See, eg., Janice M. Brabyn, Extraditionand the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 20
CAsE W. Ras. J. INT'L L. 169, 173-174 (1988) (noting that Hong Kong's pre-1997 "extradition
powers and relations [were] a direct consequence of, and [were] dependent upon, its colonial
status," and thus that "both powers and relations [regarding extradition would] end when that
colonial status ends" if nothing were done to provide for the continued application of such
agreements).
82. For discussion of the status of human rights norms in the SAR, see Richard Swede, One
Territory-ThreeSystems? The Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 44 INT'L & COM?, L. Q. 358, 359 (1995)
("Mhere are grounds for supposing that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
...will continue to be applied in the territory."); GHM, supra note 4, at 371-427 (noting that
the Basic Law itself recognises and entrenches the ICCPR). For a discussion of the continued
application of the U.S.-Hong Kong extradition agreement, see infra note 104.
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sions regarding agreements to which China, but not Hong Kong, is a
party, the language of the Basic Law makes clear that the chief concern
is with maintaining Hong Kong's status in organizations or agreements
to which China is not a party. Environmental agreements challenge
this framework, as China is a signatory to important agreements that
Britain did not apply to Hong Kong. Environmental agreements may
thus provide one of the first tests of the degree to which China treats
Hong Kong as an integrated part of the People's Republic. Second, the
Basic Law's categorization of international agreements fails to clarify
whether concern for maintaining Hong Kong's economic and cultural
independence from China permits Hong Kong to maintain independent
status with regard to agreements only partially linked to trade or
culture. This section will first examine the Basic Law's provisions
regarding the applicability of international agreements in the SAR in
an attempt to assess the status of environmental agreements, and then
will briefly contrast such provisions with norms of state succession.
1. The Basic Law
The Basic Law provides that the central government will be responsible for Hong Kong's foreign affairs8 3 and defense8 4 Yet the Basic Law
also allows Hong Kong to maintain independent status in certain
and organizations, and to conduct a range of
international agreements
"external affairs"8 5 under the designation "Hong Kong, China." 86 The
Basic Law suggests two mechanisms for analyzing the status of international environmental agreements in the SAR. First, the Basic Law
includes provisions that determine the applicability of treaties to the
SAR with reference to whether such treaties were applicable in Hong
Kong or China prior to Hong Kong's reversion to China. Second, the
Basic Law provides for Hong Kong's continued participation in certain
types of agreements. Neither mechanism clarifies the status of environmental agreements.
The Basic Law separates treaties into two categories: treaties to
which China is a party, and treaties to which China is not a party. First,
Article 153 of the Basic Law states that "It]he application to the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of international agreements to
which the People's Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be
decided by the Central People's government. 8 7 Such decisions, however, will be made "in accordance with the circumstances and needs of
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Basic
Basic
Basic
Basic
Basic

Law, art. 13.
Law, art. 14.
aw, ch. VII.
aw, art. 151.
Law, art. 153.
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the Region, and after seeking the views of the government of the
Region."8' s The Basic Law's discussion of treaties to which China is a
party does not include any mention of the status of such agreements
in British Hong Kong. Although previous application may play a role,
via consideration of Hong Kong's circumstances and consultation with
the SAR government, Article 153 suggests that application of such
agreements may be considered independent from pre-transition application. The Basic Law's failure to guarantee the continued application
in the SAR of agreements previously applied both in Hong Kong and
China may be an affirmation of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong;
China wanted to signal that Hong Kong's participation in international
agreements will be as a part of China.89 Yet the Basic Law also leaves
open the possibility that China may terminate the application of some
treaties in Hong Kong, despite China's own participation in such
treaties, or alter Hong Kong's status with regard to international
agreements. As discussed below,90 such possibilities are particularly
relevant in the environmental sphere, where Hong Kong's and China's
different development statuses may imply different international obligations.
Second, the Basic Law expressly provides for the possible continued
application of agreements applied in Hong Kong, but not China.
Article 153 states that "[international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented in
Hong Kong may continue to be implemented in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region." 91 The article also provides for the
future application of agreements to which China is not a party, stating
that "[t]he Central People's Government shall, as necessary, authorize
or assist the government of the Region to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the Region of other relevant international
agreements." 92 The Basic Law neither specifies what types of treaties

88. Id.
89. Cf Basic Law, art. 152 ("Representatives of the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may, as members of delegations of the People's Republic of China,
participate in international organizations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and
affecting the Region... using the name 'Hong Kong, China."').

90. See infra text accompanying notes 148-180.
91. Basic Law, art. 153.
92. Id. The Basic Law's provisions regarding continued application of treaties largely echo the
provisions of the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration. The Joint Declaration states that "[International
agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented

in Hong Kong may remain implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."
Joint Declaration, supra note 4, annex 1, § XI. The Joint Declaration also provides that "agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the

Central People's Government... after seeking the views" of the SAR government. Id The Joint
Declaration suggests that the PRC and the SAR may be parties to some agreements or organizations on different terms: the declaration states that Hong Kong "shall continue to retain its
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may continue in force, nor specifies what body shall make such determination, but the text suggests a presumption in favor of continued
application of agreements that China has not signed.
Environmental agreements appear to fall into the first category of
agreements: China is a signatory to most environmental agreements
Britain applied to Hong Kong, 93 and is party to the Climate Change
and Biodiversity Conventions, which Britain did not apply to Hong
Kong. 94 Thus, under Article 153, the application of international environmental agreements post-reversion "shall be decided by the Central
People's government." 95 When or how such decisions will be made is
unresolved; a literal reading of the Basic Law suggests that Hong Kong
will not have international obligations under any agreements to which
China is a party until China expressly applies such treaties to Hong
Kong. Whether or when the central government will do so for all
environmental agreements is unclear.96 Yet even if environmental agreements fall into the first category of treaties, the second category is also
relevant for environmental treaties. Provisions for an international identity
for Hong Kong separate from that of China could establish a precedent
for Hong Kong to have independent status within international agree97
ments that are or become applicable to both Hong Kong and China.
status in an appropriate capacity" in organizations in which both the PRC and Hong Kong
participated prior to July 1, 1997. Id.
93. The one major exception is the Copenhagen Revisions to the Montreal Protocol, which
Britain applied to Hong Kong but which China has not signed. See supra note 63.
94. See supra note 76.
95. But see infra text accompanying notes 128-147 (arguing that the Basic Law overlooks the
need for third party consent to Hong Kong's omission from environmental agreements to which
China is a signatory).
96. Chinese observers and officials have said they expect the central government to handle the
status of environmental agreements on a case by case basis. Author's interviews with academics
and environmental officials in Boston, Nov. 1996. China has taken action regarding the four
ozone agreements: in June 1997, China informed the United Nations that the Vienna Convention,
Montreal Protocol, and London and Copenhagen Revisions to the Montreal Protocol would
continue to be applied in Hong Kong after July 1, 1997. See Xinhua English Newswire, June 6,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 11180894; Int'l Agreements Implemented in HK May Continue, Xinhua

English Newswire, June 6, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 11180957. In a possible sign that Hong
Kong will not have independent status in environmental agreements applied in both Hong Kong
and China, China announced in August 1997 that the Mai Po Nature Reserve had become China's

seventh Rarmsar site, or wetland of international importance. See Fiona Holland, Mainland Urged
to Boost Status ofKey Wetland Site, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 23, 1997, at 6. China's official

report of the announcement made no mention of the fact that Mai Po had already been designated
a Ramsar site by Britain. See China's Seventh Wetland Under Ramsar Convention, Xinhua News
Agency, Aug. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.

97. This Article does not examine the possibility that, independent of the Basic Law, Hong
Kong may have acquired an independent "international legal personality." MUSHKAT, supra note
76, at 1-41. Professor Mushkar argues that "Hong Kong possesses a degree of latitude to engage

in international action autonomously... matched by no other non-sovereign government in the
contemporary system." Id. at 4. Professor Mushkat further states that China and Britain "have
conferred on the HKSAR express functions and powers that imply possession of international
personality, including the maintenance and development of relations with states, regions, and
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Article 153 of the Basic Law does not distinguish the various
international agreements Britain applied to Hong Kong, or that China
signed, but other provisions of the Basic Law suggest the types of
agreements in which Hong Kong has autonomy.98 Article 151 states
that Hong Kong may "maintain and develop relations and conclude
and implement agreements with foreign states and regions and relevant
international organizations in the appropriate fields, including the
economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications,
tourism, cultural and sports fields." 99 Other provisions of the Basic Law
reveal similar concern with maintaining Hong Kong's economic and
trade relations. Thus, the Basic Law provides for Hong Kong to remain
a "separate customs territory" and to continue to participate in "relevant international organizations and international trade agreements...
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements
regarding international trade in textiles."' 00 The Basic Law also includes specific articles allowing for Hong Kong to continue as a
separate entity in international shipping' 01 and aviation. 10 2 Furthermore, the Basic Law permits Hong Kong autonomy in some non-trade
international agreements. The Basic Law explicitly provides for the
continued application of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, 10 3 and allows
Hong Kong to "make appropriate arrangements with foreign states for

international organizations as well as the conclusion and implementation of international and
regional agreements." Id at 11.
98. The Basic Law also distinguishes "foreign affairs," Basic Law, art. 13, from "external
affairs," Basic Law, ch. VII, suggesting that China will control all of Hong Kong's foreign affairs,
but that Hong Kong has autonomy in external affairs. Such a distinction may be circular, and
thus unsustainable: Hong Kong's external affairs
are those affairs in which it has autonomy, while
its foreign affairs are those over which Beijing has control. See GHAI, supra note 4, at 433-34.
99. Basic aw, art. 13.
100. Basic Law, art. 116. For a list of "international organizations in which Hong Kong's
continued participation has been agreed in the JLG," see MUSHKAT, supra note 76, at 191-92;
see also Sino-BritishJointDeclaration(Summary) (last modified Oct. 31, 1995) <http://info.gov.hklinfb/
jd-sum.htm#rights> (noting that prior to Hong Kong's return to China, the Joint Liaison Group
"reached agreement on Hong Kong's continued participation in 26 international organizations").
101. See Basic aw, arts. 124-27.
102. See Basic aw, arts. 128-35. Article 133 permits Hong Kong, "[a]cring under specific
authorizations from the Central People's Government," to "renew or amend" airservice agreements previously in force and to "negotiate and conclude" new airagreements. Id., art. 133.
103. Basic Law, art. 39. The precise language of the article, however, leaves some doubt as to
the extent of application of the ICCPR and ICESCR. The Basic Law specifies that the Conventions
"as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Id. Hong Kong did not enact its Bill of Rights
Ordinance until 1991, a year after the NPC adopted the Basic Law. See generally THE HONG
KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993).
Despite the fact that China is nor a signatory to the ICCPR, the Chinese government has
indicated that it, and not the SAR government, will be responsible for meeting the reporting
requirements of the treaty. See Maureen Pao, Reports on Rights to be filed in UN, H.K. STANDARD,
Nov. 6, 1997 availablein LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.

HarvardInternationalLaw Journal / Vol. 39
reciprocal juridical assistance," subject to the authorization of the
central government. 1° 4
Such specific provisions fail to establish whether Hong Kong will
be permitted to act autonomously in international environmental agreements. The Basic Law's omission of specific mention of the environment from the areas in which Hong Kong will have autonomy may
suggest that environmental agreements are not within Hong Kong's
sphere of autonomy. However, environmental agreements may also be
analogous to the types of agreements in relation to which Hong Kong
will have autonomy: environmental norms are directly linked to trade
and economic relations. 105 Moreover, environmental agreements, like
economic and trade agreements, may require significant adjustments
1
in domestic law. 06
There are also strong arguments against such analogies. One reason
Hong Kong is able to continue its membership in the World Trade
Organization is that WTO membership is open to "[alny State or
separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations," not only to nations. 107 One commentator observes that Hong Kong's continued participation in the WTO
and the Asian-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) is possible because such
For a discussion of Hong Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance, see THE HONG KONG BILL OF
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH, supra, passim; Davis, supra note 27, at 319-21; GHAI, sIpra

note 4, at 389-411. On January 20, 1997 Hong Kong's provisional legislature recommended the
repeal of articles in the Bill of Rights Ordinance requiring all other Hong Kong legislation be
in line with the ordinance. See How the Laws are Affected, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 21,

1997, at 6. The NPC Standing Committee subsequently announced that the relevant articles of
the ordinance would not have effect after July 1, 1997. SeeDecision of the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress on Treatment of the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong
in Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, Annex 2, art. 7, Feb. 23, 1997. For an explanation of
the Chinese view that Hong Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance violated the Sino-U.K. Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law, see Wu,supra note 28; see also GHAI, swpra note 4, at 351-52,
418-23 (detailing Chinese objections to the ordinance).
104. Basic Law, art. 96. For a discussion of extradition in pre- and post-transition Hong Kong,
see Brabyn, supra note 81, at 169. The status of Hong Kong's extradition agreements post-reversion is unclear. One American court refused to extradite an individual to Hong Kong in the
run-up to the reversion, stating that Hong Kong would "cease to have any existence beyond that
as a part of China," and thus that Hong Kong would not be "able to fulfill its obligations as a
requesting sovereign under" the U.S.-Hong Kong extradition treaty. Lui v. United States, 957 F
Supp. 1280, 1286 (D. Mass. 1997). The court stated that "Hong Kong reverts to China on July
1, 1997," but argued that "[t)he terms of the [Extradition] Treaty do not." Id. at 1288. The
decision was subsequently reversed. See United States v. Lui, 110 E3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997). The
U.S., China, and Hong Kong have agreed on the terms of an extradition treaty between the U.S.
and the SAR; as of August 1997, ratification of the treaty was pending in the United States
Senate. See Simon Beck, Senators Add Protection to Extradition Treaty, S. CHINA MORNING POST,

Aug. 2, 1997, at 4.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 180-193.
106. See infra note 115.
107. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XII, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144, 1150 (emphasis added).
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organizations are not limited to states. 08 Environmental agreements,
in contrast, are agreements among states; 10 9 to the degree that Hong
Kong's continued participation in the WTO depends on the nature of
the WTO--an organization of customs territories-Hong Kong's autonomous participation in international environmental agreements and organizations seems implausible. Yet there are also counter arguments to
this analysis: the ICCPR and ICESCR are limited to states, 110 and
require that the treaty be applied in all of a signatory state's territory."'
Despite this language, the Basic Law provides for the continued application of both treaties. Moreover, Article 151 of the Basic Law expressly permits Hong Kong to enter into agreements with foreign
states,"12 despite Hong Kong's own non-state status.
The Basic Law thus yields little insight into the status of environmental agreements in the SAR. The omission of environmental agreements from the Basic Law suggests both that the Basic Law's drafters
did not foresee the rapid development in environmental agreements
that was beginning at the time of drafting, 113 and that the drafters
were not concerned with environmental protection, whether via domestic or international policymaking."14 Environmental agreements are
108. See W. K. Chan, Thinking Globally-Hong Kong's Partidpationin InternationalEnvironmental
Forums,5 AsIAN J. ENv1T. MGrr. 85, 87 (1997). Professor Chan argues that "[t]he clear principle
... is that the future Hong Kong government is free to participate in international forums, even
to the extent of signing international treaties, as long as there are no sovereignty implications
and Hong Kong participates as an 'economy' or a 'territory'; otherwise, Hong Kong can only
participate through its sovereign state." Id.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 135-139.
110. See lCCPR, snpra note 79, art. 48, para. 1, ("The Present Covenant is open for signature
by any State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any
State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has
been invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present
Covenant."); ICESCR, supra note 80 art. 26, para. 1 (same). Although the phrase "member of any
of its specialized agencies" could be construed to include Hong Kong, which is a member of
some such agencies, "[tlhe phrase was not intended to allow ratification or accession by a
non-State entity." Chan, supra note 80, at 941-42.
111. See ICCPR, snpra note 79, art. 50, ("The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend
to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions."); ICESCR, supra note 80, art.
28 (same); cf Chan, supra note 80, at 940 (arguing that "fajrticle 50 should not be applicable in
the case of transfer of territory from one sovereign State to another sovereign State which is not
already a party to the ICCPR").
112. See Basic Law, arc. 151.
113. The Basic aw's failure e.plicitly to consider international environmental agreements was
not surprising; both Hong Kong and China were just beginning to take steps toward tightening
their environmental laws in the late 1980s, and the Montreal Protocol, one of the first international environmental agreements requiring significant commitments by Hong Kong, did not
enter into force until 1989.
114. The Basic Law Drafting Committee included 36 members from China and 23 members
from Hong Kong, and "[t]he Hong Kong members . . . were overwhelmingly drawn from
professional and business sectors of the economy." Chan, supra note 18; see also MARK ROBERTI,
THE FALL OF HONG KONG: CHINA's ThIumPH AND BRiTAIN's BETRAYAL xiii (1984) (noting that
Hong Kong's representatives on the committee were "conservative businesspeople").
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also distinct from the agreements and fields the Basic Law lists in that
environmental agreements require greater sacrifice of state sovereignty.11 5
Chinas willingness to allow Hong Kong autonomy in trade, culture,
and even human rights may have stemmed from the belief that Beijing
could delegate responsibility for Hong Kong's external affairs in these
areas without encroaching on Chinese sovereignty; this is less true in
the environmental field, where Hong Kong's compliance with international norms may not be separable from China's own compliance.
2. State Succession
Although the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration
provide for Hong Kong's continued status as an international actor, the
Joint Declaration is binding only between the United Kingdom and
China, and the Basic Law only within China. Commentators have
suggested viewing Hong Kong's reversion to China in the context of
international norms of state succession, 1 6 particularly in the context
of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States. 117 Such an exercise
illuminates additional problems with the Basic Law's failure to provide
guidance as to the status of international environmental agreements.
115. Although trade and human rights agreements may require adjustments in domestic law,
sovereignty, environmental agreements
and thus may be seen as significant infringements on state
require more complex administrative mechanisms. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 60, at 3. The
degree of domestic adjustment required may not be of particular concern to China in the case of
Hong Kong, since the Basic Law grants Hong Kong autonomy in local environmental policy and
national environmental laws will not apply in the SAR, but to the degree China sees environmental agreements as sovereignty-related, China may be unwilling to allow Hong Kong autonomy in environmental diplomacy.
116. See, eg., Roda Mushkat, The Transition from British to Chinese Rulh in Hong Kong: A
Discussion of Salient InternationalLegal Issues, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & Poi.y 171, 194 (1986).
117. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978,
1978 U.N.J.YB. 106, 17 I.L.M. 1488 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Succession of States],
Neither Britain nor China is a signatory to the Convention. See Mug TLnRAL 'TfUATIrS, supra
note 61, at 848. Nevertheless norms ofstate succession are likely to be used by third-party states
to evaluate the status of treaties in the SAR, and provide a useful guidepost for evaluating the
Basic Law's provisions. Moreover, the difficulties facing application of state
succession norms to
environmental agreements in the Hong Kong SAR demonstrate that difficulties ascertaining the
status of international environmental agreements under the Basic Law are not unique to that
document.
The Vienna Convention's norms have been challenged in the context of human rights agreements. Speaking with reference to Hong Kong, the chairman of the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee stated that "[o]nce the people living in a territory find themselves under the
protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, such protection cannot
be denied to them by virtue of the mere dismemberment of that territory or its coming within
the jurisdiction of another State or of more than one State." Statement by the Chairpersonon Behalf
of the Human Rights Committee Relating to the Considerationof the Partof the Fourth PeriodicReport of
the United Kingdom Relating to Hong Kong, CCPR/CI79/Add.57 (3 Nov. 1995), reproduced in 3(2)
I.H.R.R. 410 (1995), quotedin Chan,stpra note 80, at 934. Professor Chan notes that, in contrast
to the Human Rights Committee, "the practice of other human rights treaties bodies is ambivalent and inconclusive." Id at 937.
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The convention provides that
(w]hen part of the territory of a'State, or when any territory for
the international relations of which a State is responsible . . .
becomes part of the territory of another state: (a) treaties of the
predecessor State cease to be in force in respect of the territory to
which the succession of States relates from the date of the succession of States and (b) treaties of the successor state are in force in
respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates
from the date of the succession of states, unless it appears from
the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the
treaty to that territory would be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for
its operation." 8
Three general problems confront attempts to apply the convention
to Hong Kong. First, the convention suggests that Hong Kong's
international legal obligations should become one with those of China,
a view that directly clashes with the clear intent of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law that Hong Kong maintain its independent
status with regard to certain treaties and international organizations to
which China is not a signatory or member." 9 This conflict highlights
a deficiency in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Hong Kong
and Britain cannot determine whether Hong Kong maintains independent status with regard to international agreements; Hong Kong's
continued participation is contingent on the consent of third party
20
participants in international agreements and organizations.1
Second, China is likely to object to any classification of Hong Kong's
reversion as state succession. China believes that it has merely resumed
control over Hong Kong; 12 1 China refers to Hong Kong's return to
118. Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra note 117, Annex I, pt. 2, art. 15, at
1496; see also Mushkat, supra note 78, at 146-47 (discussing application of the Convention to
Hong Kong); Note, Taking Reichs Seriously: German Unifation and the Law of State Succession, 104
HARv. L. RaV. 588, 591-92 (1990) (discussing the "moving boundaries rule" of state succession
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
119. Cf Shawn B. Jensen, InternationalAgreements Between the UnitedStates and Hong Kong Under
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act, 7 TEmp. INT'L & Comp. I.J. 167, 179 (1993) (arguing
that "the Joint Declaration modifies a recognized rule of public international law on state
succession to treaties").
120. See MuSHKAT, supra note 76, at 28-29; Jensen, supra note 119, at 183; Mushkat, supra
note 78, at 149. The Joint Liaison Group's activities suggest recognition of the need to obtain
third party consent. One of the principal tasks of the Joint Liaison Group has been to obtain
third party consent to the continued application of agreements to Hong Kong in cases in which
China is not a party to such agreements. See Hired Gun, supra note 75, at 18; see also infra text
accompanying notes 127-146 (discussing need for third party consent).
121. See Mushkat, supra note 78, at 149; cf Liu Hanpeng, Lingtu Zhuquan Biangeng Huo Huifu
Xingshi Hon Tiaoyue Jicheng Wenti [Questions Regarding Succession to Treaties after the Change or
Restoration of TerritorialSovereignty], in ZHONGGUO GuoJIFA NsANKAN 1987 [CHINESE YB. INT'L
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China as "the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong
Kong." 122 Yet despite this objection, China's actions in signing the
Joint Declaration and in setting forth provisions in the Basic Law
regarding treaty succession suggest implicit recognition that Hong
Kong's transition is a case of state succession. Moreover, the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States defines a "succession of states" as
"the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the
international relations of the territory."' 123 Regardless of whether Britain transferred sovereignty over Hong Kong to China or whether China
merely resumed the exercise of sovereignty it had always possessed,
responsibility for Hong Kong's international relations has shifted from
qualifies as state
the United Kingdom to China, and thus the transition
24
succession for the purposes of the Convention.
Third, China may object to the application of the Convention on
State Succession on the grounds that neither China nor Britain is a
signatory to the convention. Although the convention itself embodies
norms established by numerous cases of state succession in the past
half century, China has repeatedly made clear that it will not be bound
by international norms to which it has not consented. Moreover, given
the shared concern of China and many foreign countries of maintaining
Hong Kong's autonomy in economic and trade relations, it is unlikely
that foreign states will object to preservation of Hong Kong's independent status in international agreements, even if such status violates
state succession norms. International norms regarding state succession
could be used, however, by states arguing that Hong Kong should be
bound by all international agreements to which China is a party.125
Even if norms of state succession are applied, they are likely to prove
problematic. International environmental agreements provide the area
in which international treaty succession norms might be most important to Hong Kong, as they represent an area in which Hong Kong
may assume new obligations as part of China. But, as with the case of
the Basic Law, simply deciding which treaties will be applied in Hong
Kong is insufficient: application of environmental agreements to Hong
Kong may also require determination of Hong Kong's status in such

L. 1987] 54, 56 (Zhongguo Guojifa Xuehui [Chinese Ass'n of Int'l Law) ed., 1987) (arguing that
there is a distinction between restoration of sovereignty over a territory, where sovereignty has
never been lost but exercise of sovereignty has been interrupted, and recovery of sovereignty,
where sovereignty is lost and then regained).
122. Joint Declaration, supra note 4, annex I, § 1; Basic Law, preamble.
123. Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra note 117, art. 2(b), 17 I.L.M. at 1490.
124. See Mushkar, supra note 78, at 146-47.
125. Cf.infra text accompanying notes 127-146 (discussing the possibility that Hong Kong
acceded to new international obligations on July 1, 1997).

1998 / Environmental Law and the Basic Law of Hong Kong

257

agreements, and significant revision of Hong Kong's domestic legislation.
B. The Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions:
New Obligations and the Need for Third-Party Consent
The Basic Law fails not only to provide a framework for determining
the status of international agreements in Hong Kong, but also to
acknowledge that certain agreements may be applicable to Hong Kong
regardless of the provisions of the Basic Law. The law's statement that
"[tihe application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is
or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People's government" 126 may face an initial challenge in the application to Hong Kong
of the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions. Examination of
the status of the treaties in the SAR reveals the Basic Law's failure to
acknowledge the need for third-party consent in determining Hong
Kong's status in international organizations and agreements. 2 7 Although Britain and China in practice acknowledged the need for the
Sino-British Joint Liaison Group to obtain third-party consent to
ensure Hong Kong's continued participation in international organizations and agreements post-reversion, examination of the Climate Change
and Biodiversity Conventions suggests that in the absence of thirdparty consent to Hong Kong's continued non-participation the treaties
became applicable to Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. Inquiry into the
status of the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions in the
Hong Kong SAR also reveals the Basic Law's disregard of the possibility that Hong Kong would assume new international obligations
when it became part of the PRC.
Following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, which resulted in China and
the United Kingdom ratifying the Climate Change and Biodiversity
Conventions, 128 the Hong Kong government decided not to participate
in either convention. At the time, Hong Kong claimed that its "unique
position after 1997" prevented application of the treaties in the territory.1 29 The Hong Kong government cited concerns over Hong Kong's
potential financial obligations and uncertainty over Hong Kong's status
as equivalent to a developed or developing country under the trea126. Basic Law, art. 153.
127. The statement in the Basic Law that China alone will determine the status of international agreements in the SAR parallels China's view of the Basic Law itself. One commentator
has noted that despite the Sino-British Joint Declaration, "Beijing... insisted that the drafting
of the Basic Law was entirely a domestic Chinese matter with input from Hong Kong residents."
Chan, supra note 18, at 22.
128. See MuiL n.AERxA TREATIES, supra note 61, at 904-05, 908-09.
129. Doubts Over Green Pacts, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 3, 1992, at 6.
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ties.' 30 Despite its refusal to request that the United Kingdom apply
the treaties to Hong Kong, the territory's government pledged support
for the conventions' principles, 13' and since 1992 the Hong Kong
government has taken some steps toward compliance with the conventions.' 32 Nevertheless, Hong Kong remained outside the treaties and
130. In discussions concerning a Hong Kong Legislative Council motion that Hong Kong
formally adopt the Climate Change and Biodiversiry Conventions, Hong Kong's Secretary for Planning, Environment, and Lands stated that although it might be possible for the United Kingdom
"to ratify
the Conventions on behalf of Hong Kong, as in the case of the Montreal [Protocol] ..
such an arrangement for Hong Kong... would need to take into account the status under which
Hong Kong might be designated." Hong Kong Legislative Council, Dec. 2, 1992. The statement
suggests the Hong Kong government was aware of the potential costs that it might be obliged
to bear if joining as a territory of the United Kingdom resulted in developed country status. See
also WHrrE PAPER THIRD REw, supra note 72, at 31 (stating that "[s]ome legal and practical

problems prevent Hong Kong from formally adopting the Convention on Biological Diversity,
but we are committed to meeting the environmental objectives of the Convention").
Hong Kong's claim that its "unique position after 1997" made joining the conventions difficult
is undermined by Hong Kong's compliance with developed country requirements in the Montreal
Protocol and the London and Copenhagen Amendments to the protocol. As with the Climate
Change Convention, under the Montreal Protocol, China, as a developing country, is not required
to take concrete steps to reduce emissions in the short-term. See infra text accompanying notes
148-177 (discussing differing status for developed and developing countries under the Climate
Change Convention and the ozone agreements). Hong Kong's decision to stay out of the Climate
Change and Biodiversiry Conventions was due in part to a changed political atmosphere: concerns
over offending China were not nearly as strong in the late 1980s, when the United Kingdom
signed the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, as they were in 1992. Author's interviews
with academics in Hong Kong, March 1997. By 1992, Hong Kong was careful to avoid taking
steps that suggested it had state status. Id. Additionally, Hong Kong was able to request that
Britain apply the Copenhagen and London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol-which also
came into force in the early 1990s-because the target dates for phasing out CFC imports were
prior to Hong Kong's return to China. Id. Although the fact that the United Kingdom's adoption
of the Climate Change and Biodiversiry Conventions came three years after the United Kingdom
signed the Montreal Protocol--and therefore Hong Kong was three years closer to returning to
China-may have factored into Hong Kong's reluctance to join the treaties, Hong Kong's
decision, particularly regarding the Climate Change Convention, was also likely due to the
potential cost of compliance. Cf MUSHKAT, supra note 76, at 101 (stating that "none of the
arguments [against Hong Kong's joining the Rio treaties] seems convincing, however, in light
of the territory's role as an international legal entity capable of extensive and autonomous
participation in international agreements").
131. Doubts Over Green Pacts, supra note 129. Although the Hong Kong government stated
that it intended to take steps to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and protect the environment,
the government did not state whether it intended to meet developing or developed country
targets. See id.
132. In 1993, Hong Kong conducted an inventory and drafted projections ofgreenhouse gases,
as mandated by the Climate Change Convention. See Kathy Griffin, Concern at Greenhouse Gas
Control, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Jan. 9, 1993, at 4. The EPD reported Hong Kong's 1990
production of greenhouse gases to be 34.9 million tons, and predicted that by 2000 the figure
would drop to approximately 32.5 million tons. See id. However, "no legally enforceable measures
have been introduced designed to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases," and the Hong Kong government's actions regarding both the Climate Change Convention
considerably short of effective implementation of the Rio
and the Biodiversiry Convention "fall(]
treaties." MUSHKAT,supra note 76, at 101.
Regardless of whether Hong Kong participates in the Climate Change Convention, global
warming may present a significant threat to Hong Kong: a 1993 report found that 35% of the
years. See Kathy Griffin, Threat to HK Over
Pearl River Delta could be under water within fifty
Rising Seas, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, July 2, 1993, at 6.
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thus, prior to July 1, 1997, had no formal obligation to comply with
133
the agreements.
The Basic Law conflicts with statements in the Climate Change and
Biodiversity Conventions that suggest the treaties should apply to
entire nations. As both conventions are treaties "to which the People's
Republic of China is . . .a party," under the Basic Law's formulation
the Chinese government possesses the power to determine application
of the agreements to Hong Kong. 134 The treaties, in contrast, suggest
that China does not have such a choice. 135 The two agreements expressly provide for compliance by nations, and include no language
that suggests that a portion of a nation may be excluded from a
signatory nation's obligations under the agreements. The Climate Change
Convention's provisions regarding developed country emissions require
"national policies ...on the mitigation of climate change."' 36 Such
language suggests that had Hong Kong become part of a nation
currently obligated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such a requirement would apply to Hong Kong. 137 Similar language regarding the
commitments of all parties to the treaty suggests that, in the absence
of an explicit waiver from other parties to the Climate Change Convention, Hong Kong must be included in reporting requirements
applicable to China. 138 The Biodiversity Convention likewise suggests
133. Hong Kong-like most countries-appears reluctant to take steps to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. For example, the Hong Kong Environmental Departmentes 1996 annual report,
while discussing in depth Hong Kong's efforts to reduce ozone-depleting chemicals, makes no
mention of the Climate Change Convention. See Environmental Protection Department, ENvsRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, passim (1996). For discussion of Hong Kong's
compliance with the Montreal Protocol, see infra text accompanying notes 156-159. One commentator has stated that Hong Kong was content to be a free-rider in the climate change
negotiations. See Bloch, supra note 56, at 612-13. Ironically, Hong Kong may actually meet
developed country targets under the Climate Change Convention. See infra note 171.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
135. Norms of treaty succession dictate a similar conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes
116-124.
136. Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, art. 4, 2(a).
137. Annex I to the Climate Change Convention lists countries required to take steps to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions; they are primarily the developed countries of Western Europe, North
America, and Oceania, as well as Turkey, Japan and the transitional economies of Eastern Europe.
See Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, Annex I. At present, developing countries and
newly-industrialized countries are not obligated to reduce emissions. Hong Kong's paradox may
have been that were the Climate Change Convention to be applied to the territory as part of
Britain, Hong Kong might have been considered an Annex I country; as an individual participant
or as part of China, Hong Kong is not obligated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Hong Kong environmentalists point out that Hong Kong's C02 emissions are already at twice
the world average, and per capital electricity consumption exceeds that of some countries,
including Poland and Spain, that are obligated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See Friends
of the Earth, Power without Policy: Friends of the Earth'sPosition on Energy Policy, Oct. 1996, at 11,
14 (on file with author).
138. The Climate Change Convention requires all parties to develop "national inventories of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled
by the Montreal Protocol," Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, art. 4, 1(a), and to
"[formulare, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional
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that, absent agreement of parties to the convention, China is bound to
apply the convention in Hong Kong. The convention stipulates that
"the provisions of this Convention apply, in relation to each Contract' 139
ing Party ...in areas within the limits of its national jurisdiction."
Attempts by China or Hong Kong to argue that Hong Kong should
be excluded from the conventions will undermine the Basic Law's
statement that Hong Kong "is an inalienable part of the People's
Republic of China." 140 China may object to requiring application of
the treaties to Hong Kong by noting that Britain was not required to
apply all of its treaty obligations to Hong Kong. Yet the United
Kingdom never claimed that Hong Kong was actually a part of the
United Kingdom; China, in contrast, maintains that Hong Kong has
always been a part of China.1 4 1 In practice, however, a dispute over
application of the Climate Change or Biodiversity Conventions is
unlikely to arise: given that the conventions require few concrete
actions by developing countries, there is little reason to expect that
third parties will take steps to require Hong Kong to be included in
the Climate Change Convention, or that China will object to including
Hong Kong. 14 2 Nevertheless, Hong Kong's status in the agreements
has important precedential value. Autonomous status under the conventions for Hong Kong would manifest a level of autonomy for Hong
Kong above anything the Basic Law contemplates: unlike membership
in the WTO and other multilateral agreements, in which Hong Kong
can participate as a customs area, 143 the Climate Change and Biodiverand no other non-state
sity Conventions are agreements among states,144
has autonomous status under the conventions.
The conclusion that China lacks the power unilaterally to decide
whether environmental treaties will apply differently to Hong Kong
compared to the rest of China suggests the Basic Law's ambiguity
regarding international environmental agreements will be resolved against

programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change," Climate Change Convention, supra
note 66, art 4, 1(b). As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 230-232, an obligation
on China to reduce emissions would not necessarily require Hong Kong to reduce emissions,
139. Biodiversity Convention, smpra note 65, art. 4. This provision applies with regard to
"components of biological diversity." Id. For "processes and activities," the convention's provisions
apply whenever they are "carried out under" a party's "jurisdiction or control, within the area of
its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Id The convention also
requires the development of "national strategies," id. art. 6(b), which should, in China's case,
include Hong Kong.
140. Basic Law, art. 1.
141. See, eg., Basic aw, preamble; MINERS, supra note 69, at 3-6.
142. Additionally, other signatories to the Conventions are unlikely to demand that China
treat Hong Kong as an integrated part of China, as such a demand could be seen as undermining
Hong Kong's autonomy.
143. See supra text accompanying note 107.
144. See MuLTILATERAL TREATIES, slupra note 61, at 904-05, 908-09.
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Hong Kong maintaining autonomy in international environmental
agreements and organizations. 145 This conclusion is troubling, however,
for compliance with environmental treaties will often require substantial revision of domestic legislation. If the Basic Law grants Beijing
the power to commit Hong Kong to meeting specific environmental
targets, it may also grant the central government the power to rewrite
Hong Kong's environmental laws,14 6 and in so doing to involve itself
importantly in economic affairs in Hong Kong. Moreover, the fact that
Hong Kong's reversion to China will bring with it at least some new
obligations under international environmental law suggests that it is
misguided to see Hong Kong's reversion to China only as a threat to
Hong Kong's environment, and lends support to the view that the
Basic Law overemphasizes Hong Kong's separation from China.
C. Hong Kong's Development Status under InternationalAgreements
The Biodiversity and Climate Change Conventions are not the only
environmental treaties whose status, is unclear in the SAR. The Montreal Protocol, Basel Convention, and other agreements China has signed
and that Britain applied to Hong Kong similarly challenge the Basic
Law's treaty application provisions. Although the Basic Law provides
for the continued application of such treaties in Hong Kong, the Basic
Law does not-and perhaps cannot-specify whether Hong Kong should
participate as a developed or developing country.147 Difficulties in
determining Hong Kong's status stem not only from the Basic Law's
failure to consider Hong Kong's status in treaties that continue in force
post-reversion, but also the international agreements' inconsistent definitions of development. Hong Kong's development status in environmental agreements is important not just in ascertaining Hong Kong's
obligations under international agreements, but also in determining
whether Hong Kong is treated separately from China in such agreements.
Environmental agreements are inconsistent in their definitions of
development status. Although environmental treaties are consistent in
their requirement that developed countries take the lead in addressing
145. Unless China and other signatory states expressly provide for Hong Kong to have such
autonomous status.
146. The Basic Law's failure to consider the need for executing legislation is discussed at
length below. See infra text accompanying notes 209-231. Application of national environmental
laws would not necessarily weaken environmental standards in Hong Kong. See infra note 240.
147. The Basic Law cannot specify whether Hong Kong counts as a developed or developing
country because such determination is made either by the treaties themselves or by agreement of
the parties to the treaties. But had the Basic Law expressly provided for Hong Kong to have
independent status in environmental agreements, it is conceivable that Hong Kong would then
have had a status different from China's in such agreements.
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environmental issues, 148 the various treaties use different standards to
define developed and developing countries. The Montreal Protocol
provides a specific measurement for determining development status:
the protocol stipulates that any country whose per capita consumption
of substances the protocol controls is less that 0.3 kilograms is allowed
a ten-year grace period in phasing-out ozone-depleting substances, and
is entitled to technical and financial assistance from countries whose
consumption exceeds 0.3 kilograms. 14 9 In contrast, the Climate Change
Convention provides a specific list of countries required to meet developed country targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 150 and a
separate, smaller list of countries required to provide financial assistance to other nations. 151 The Climate Change Convention does not,
however, provide a definition of "developing" nations entitled to receive such funds. Similar vagueness characterizes the Biodiversity Convention which, while requiring developed countries to "provide new
and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties
to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing
measures which fulfill the obligations of this Convention,"'152 does not
define "developed" or "developing." The Basel Convention takes yet
another approach. Although the Basel Convention itself does not distinguish between developed and developing parties, the third meeting
of the Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention decided to ban
shipments of waste for disposal from OECD countries to non-OECD
53
members.1
148. See, eg., Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, preamble ("Recognizing . . .the
need for developed countries to take immediate action ... as a first step towards comprehensive
response strategies ... with due consideration of their relative contributions to the enhancement
of the greenhouse effect."); Basel Convention, supra note 68, preamble ("Taking into account...
the limited capabilities of the developing countries to manage hazardous wastes and other wastes
.... ); Montreal Protocol, supra note 62, preamble ("Acknowledging that special provision is
required to meet the needs of developing countries for [substances that deplete the ozone layer]
149. "Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry
into force of the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter within ten years of the date of entry into
force of the Protocol shall, in order to meet itsbasic domestic needs, be entitled to delay its
." Montreal Protocol, supra note 62,
compliance with the control measures ... by ten years ....
art. 5, para. 1.
supra note 137 (listing
150. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, Annex I;see also
Annex I countries). Article 4 of the Convention states that Annex I countries shall "adopt national
policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting (their]
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing [their] greenhouse
gas sinks and reservoirs." Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, art. 4, para. 2(a).
151. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, Annex II. Annex II countries include
Western European nations, the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey. See id
152. Biodiversiy Convention, supra note 65, art. 20, para. 2.
Third Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention
153. See Decision III11,
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste. The decision serves as an
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The different definitions of developing country result in inconsistent
classifications for Hong Kong and potential conflicts between Hong
Kong's and Chinas statuses in international environmental agreements.
Hong Kong has attempted to meet developed country requirements
for the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal
Protocol and subsequent ozone agreements.1 54 Hong Kong banned
local production of ozone-depleting substances in 1989, banned importation of "halons for local consumption" from January 1, 1994, and
banned importation of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and certain other
ozone-depleting substances from January 1, 1996.155 The Hong Kong
Government has stated that "[aIll measures under the Montreal Protocol have been filly met;"'156 imports of CFC for local consumption
were down by eighty-five percent by 1996.157 Hong Kong has also
implemented a quota and licensing system for hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), 158 which will be phased out by 2030 in accordance with
the Montreal Protocol and its amendments. 59 Hong Kong's decision
to comply with developed country standards for the elimination of
ozone producing chemicals may have been due to Hong Kong's emissions being well in excess of the 0.3 kilogram per capita cut-off. With
per capita emissions above 0.3 kilograms, Hong Kong could not claim
a status different from that of Britain: Hong Kong's obligations were
the same whether it was considered a part of Britain or an independent
entity. Hong Kong also could not claim that its reversion to China
created potential conflicts in its status, as China, like other developing
countries, is not exempt from reducing emissions, but rather enjoys a
ten-year deferral in the target date for phasing-out CFCs. Moreover,

amendment to the Convention, and becomes effective upon ratification by 75% of the parties to
the Convention. See Douglas E Brennan, Trade and Environment Goals at a Crossroads: Challenges
for Global Treaties and National EnvironmentalRegulation, 20 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 3,

at 133 (Feb. 5, 1997). As an amendment to the convention, the decision of the Conference of
Parties will not be binding on stares that do not ratify the amendment.
154. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 10-11, 59 (describing Hong

Kong's legislation and program for phasing out the use of ozone-depleting substances).
155. Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department, Control of Ozone Depleting Substances
in Hong Kong-An Update, ACE Paper 47/96 (Sept. 1996) (on file with author).
156. WHITE PAPER THIRD REviEw, supra note 72, at 65. But see Billy Wong Wai-yuk,
Government in Row over Lunch Boxes, S. CHINA MOmNIG PoST,Aug. 29, 1995, at 5 (reporting
environmentalists' claims that Hong Kong was "Failing in its international obligations" under
the Montreal Protocol by not enacting restrictions on styrofoam).
157. See Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department, supra note 155, at 2.
158. Authorities Taking Applicationsfor Allocations of HCFCs in 1996, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr.
Rep. (BNA) 22, at 843 (Nov. 1, 1995).
159. See EPD Extends List of Controlled Substances in Line with Montreal ProtocolAmendments, 18
Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 1, at 31 (January 11, 1995). Hong Kong has also taken steps
to enforce the CFC ban in court; in 1995, the Environmental Protection department brought 17

prosecutions for violations of Hong Kong's Ozone Layer Protection Ordinance. See ENVIRONMENT
HONG KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 132.
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Hong Kong may also have realized that the economic costs6 to Hong
Kong of phasing-out CFCs were not likely to be extensive.1 0
In contrast to Hong Kong, China is a developing country under the
Montreal Protocol, with annual consumption of ozone-depleting substances well below the 0.3 kilogram cutoff.' 61 As Hong Kong has
already phased-out CFCs, it is unlikely that China will take any active
steps to alter Hong Kong's status with regard to the agreements. Yet
failure to do so may raise difficult questions for China. If China
officially alters Hong Kong's status with regard to the Montreal Protocol and claims that Hong Kong is no longer bound to developed
country standards, 162 China is likely to draw international concern that
it is undermining the Montreal Protocol. If China allows the treaty to
remain applied to Hong Kong separately from its application in China,
however, China may set a precedent for treating Hong Kong as an
autonomous entity for the purposes of international environmental
agreements, and thus undermine its own claim that Hong Kong is an
163
inalienable part of China.
Prior to Hong Kong's return to China, Britain and China agreed
that the Montreal Protocol and London and Copenhagen Amendments
to the protocol would continue in force in the SAR.164 Such an agree-

160. Hong Kong did not have any plants manufacturing CFCs or other ozone-depleting
substances; the primary uses of CFCs in Hong Kong were in consumer products and as solvents
in industry. Author's interviews with academics in Hong Kong, March 1997. CFC substitutes
were already available for both consumer products and industrial solvents by the time Hong Kong
agreed to phase-out CFC usage. Id.
161. China's CFC emissions have grown rapidly in the past decade, see Paul J. Smith, Free
Trade and the Environment: Will Free Trade Save China's Environment?, 1 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 27, 33-34
(1994), but China is beginning to switch to production of CFC-free products, see, e.g., Renee Lai,
Green Move to Double Refrigerator Capacity, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 3, 1997, at 3.

162. Hong Kong's emissions are unlikely to raise China above the 0.3 kilogram cutoff.
163. China might avoid this dilemma by agreeing with the Montreal Protocol Conference of
Parties to treat Hong Kong as a special case or by delegating autonomy to Hong Kong for the
purposes of the ozone agreements, but such action might set a precedent for other, more
controversial, areas of environmental diplomacy.
The fact that Hong Kong has reported that it has already phased-out CFCs suggests that
nothing will be done either to alter or clarify Hong Kong's status in the ozone agreements after
July 1, 1997-most likely, the issue will be ignored by all parties. China itself has taken steps
to eliminate CFC usage ahead of the Montreal Protocol's deadline for developing countries. Sre
Jessica Poppele, The CFC Challenge: Chlorofiuorocarbons,CHINA Bus. REv., July 1994, at 34. But
see Fear Over China's Use of CFCs, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 31, 1993, at 2 (reporting that
China's CFC consumption is expected to increase by twenty percent annually). Moreover, Hong
Kong's participation in the ozone agreements as a part of China would not actually affect the
status of ozone-depleting chemicals in Hong Kong, as Hong Kong's domestic legislation regarding the control of such substances will remain in effect. Yet it may become more difficult to
control the already burgeoning black market in CFC imports from China to Hong Kong. See
Elisabeth Tacey, Black Market Blooms in CFCs, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 1995, at 2

(reporting slow process of conversion of CFC-using air conditioners, and noting reports of
"extensive smuggling" of CFCs from China to Hong Kong).
164. See supra note 75.

1998 / Environmental Law and the Basic Law of Hong Kong

265

ment suggests that Hong Kong continues to have an independent
status in these agreements. 165 Yet independent status for Hong Kong
runs contrary to language in the Montreal Protocol that membership
in the protocol be limited to states,16 6 and suggests the possibility that
Hong Kong may have independent status in other environmental
agreements, most importantly the Climate Change Convention. If the
fact that environmental treaties are among sovereign states does not
prevent Hong Kong from maintaining independent status in the ozone
agreements, Hong Kong's non-state status should not prevent it from
conducting autonomous environmental policy-making in other areasor from maintaining a development status different from that of China
167
in agreements applied in Hong Kong and China.
Hong Kong's concern over conflicts in development status was one
of the reasons it decided not to join the Climate Change Convention. 16
If Hong Kong had joined as part of the United Kingdom, Hong Kong
might either have been treated as a part of the United Kingdom, and
thus subject to the provisions regarding Annex I and Annex II countries, or as an independent entity. Under the Climate Change Convention, newly industrialized countries are considered to be developing
nations, 169 and thus an independently-classified Hong Kong would
probably not have faced significant obligations under the Climate
Change Convention. 170 If Hong Kong had been classified in line with
the United Kingdom, however, the territory would have faced significant requirements that it reduce its emissions; Hong Kong's desire
to avoid the risk of such commitments may explain why it remained
165. In notifying the United Nations that all four agreements would continue to apply in the
SAR, China drew a distinction between the Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol, and London

Revisions, all of which China has signed, and the Copenhagen Revisions, which China has not
signed. Compare Xinhua English Newswire, June 6, 1997, 1997 WL 11180894 (listing treaties
signed by China that will continue to apply to Hong Kong) with Int'l Agreements Implemented in
HK May Continue, Xinhua English Newswire, June 6, 1997, 1997 WIL 11180957 (listing
agreements not signed by China that will continue to apply to Hong Kong). Despite this

distinction, the announcements did not suggest any change in Hong Kong's status in the
agreements.
166. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 62, art. 15. Allowing separate status for one portion of
a country would also conflict with the Montreal Protocol's statement that "[n]o reservations may
be made to this Protocol." ld, art. 18.

167. Assigning Hong Kong developed country status could also be used to support arguments
that other economically developed regions of developing countries should have statuses different
from that of the nation as a whole. However, the uniqueness of Hong Kong's position, both in
international law and as a part of China, would undermine the force of such arguments.
168. See supra note 130.
169. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 60, at 7. This was due in large part to China's objection
to newly industrialized countries being classified as developed countries: "China strongly opposed
any differentiation among developing countries on the basis of comparative stages of development

or economic growth." Id. at 20. China was concerned about being singled out due to its rapidly
developing economy and increasing greenhouse emissions. See id.
170. Hong Kong thus would have had equal status with China.
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outside the Climate Change Convention.171 In the absence of further
agreements that impose emissions-reduction commitments on newly
industrialized countries, Hong Kong's post-reversion status is unlikely
to change: if Hong Kong remains outside the convention, it will have
no commitments, and if China applies the convention to Hong Kong,
17 2
the SAR will, as a non-Annex I or II party, have few commitments.
The benefits that may accrue to Hong Kong as part of China and
thus as a developing country may explain Hong Kong's reluctance to
participate in any capacity in negotiations leading up to the Climate
Change and Biodiversity Conventions. Hong Kong's chair was empty
at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development. 17 3 Yet

of reducing
171. Some observers believe that Hong Kong may actually meet the Rio targets
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, due largely to increased use of natural
gas-instead of coal-in Hong Kong's power plants. Author's interviews with academics in Hong
Kong, March 1997. More than half of Hong Kong's C02 emissions arefrom the power sector,
and power sector growth is low. Id. Others dispute the claim that Hong Kong will meet the Rio
targets: Friends of the Earth-Hong Kong estimates that C02 emissions alone will increase by
31% between 1996 and 2000. See Friends of the Earth, Submission to the Advisory Council on
the Environment: Energy Policy, Climate Change and the Environment, July 1996, at 2 (on file
with author); see also
Elizabeth Tacey, The Effiient Way to Save the Planet, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 31, 1997, at 19 (noting that Hong Kong will come closer than many countries and
territories to meeting the goal of reducing greenhouse emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, but also
reporting forecasts that Hong Kong's emissions will reach 170% of 1990 levels by 2010).
172. Montreal Protocol precedent could be relevant if any future agreements impose emissions
restrictions on newly industrialized countries. If Hong Kong were to remain a party to the
Montreal Protocol on different terms from China, a future climate change agreement that imposed
requirements on newly industrialized countries might similarly be applied to Hong Kong.
173. See Chan, supra note 108. Hong Kong's lack of national status may have accounted for
Hong Kong's absence from the Rio Summit. See 'Friends'Aim to Regenerate Spirit of Rio, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Nov. 8, 1994, at 28. Other non-states, however, did send representatives to the
conference. One observer attributes Hong Kong's failure to participate to "the anticipated
opposition from the Chinese government." Hung Wing-ear, The Environment, in THs OTH-R
HONG KONG REPORT 1994, at 253, 255 (Donald H. McMillen & Man Si-wai eds., 1994). Hong
Kong's failure to send a representative to Rio followed China's successful blockage ofHong Kong's
participation in the Second World Climate Conference in 1990, on the grounds that Hong Kong
was not a sovereign state. See Siddall, snpra note 51, at 415.
Britain represented Hong Kong at Rio, but while the United Kingdom signed both the
Climate Change Convention and the Biodiversity Convention, Britain left the decision on whether
Hong Kong would join the Conventions to the Hong Kong government. See Ng Cho-nam & Ng
T"ng-leung, The Environment, in THE OTHER HONG KONG REPORT 1992 364, 379 (Joseph YS.
Cheng & Paul C.K. Kwong eds., 1992). In a report issued in 1993, the Hong Kong government
outlined its official response to the Earth Summit, stating that "the government is determined
the obligations of the
to adopt the standards set out at the 'Earth Summit' and to meet fully
international agreements on the environment applied to Hong Kong." Planning, Environment
and Lands Branch, Government Secretariat, THE HONG KONG ENVIRONMENT: A GREE3N CHAL-

LENGE FOR THE COMMaUNITY 103-04 (1993). The report noted that Hong Kong had already
begun to contribute "to the achievement of the [Climate Change Convention's] objectives" by
increasing the use of natural gas in power plants. Id. at 104. In explaining Hong Kong's status
in the Climate Change and Biodiversiry Conventions, the report stated that "Hong Kong cannot
itself become a party to the two Conventions though they could be extended to us by the UK
before 1997. Our view is that the immediate need is to assess and improve Hong Kong's
performance in line with the principles of the Convention." Id. at 106.
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Hong Kong's decision not to participate in the Climate Change Convention may also reflect deference to China. China has been an active
participant in climate change negotiations, especially as an advocate
for developing countries.17 4 China has argued that developed countries
are primarily responsible for global warming, and thus that developing
country implementation of commitments under the Climate Change
Convention should be contingent on developed countries providing
financial and technical assistance to developing countries. The success
of the Chinese view175 may have been one reason contributing to Hong
Kong's decision to stay outside the Convention, at least while it
remained a British territory.
Hong Kong's reluctance to participate in the Climate Change and
Biodiveisiy Conventions may reveal an additional way in which environmental agreements challenge the Basic Law's conception of post-reversion Hong Kong. In providing for a degree of autonomy in trade
and other areas, the Basic Law appears to assume that Hong Kong
would want to assert its autonomy to whatever degree possible. Yet
Hong Kong's lack of participation in the Rio Conference suggests that
Hong Kong may be happy to defer to China when it comes to environmental agreements-and thus to reap the benefits of developing
country status.
Hong Kong's inclusion in the ozone agreements but omission from
the Climate Change Convention suggests that Hong Kong's status in
environmental agreements is more likely to reflect the degree of autonomy China grants Hong Kong than it is to impact Hong Kong's local
environmental legislation. There are strong arguments in favor of
applying environmental agreements to Hong Kong as a part of China,
rather than as an independent entiry.1 76 To do so, however, particularly
with regard to agreements already applied to Hong Kong, would
undermine confidence both in Hong Kong's autonomy and in the
SAR's commitment to addressing environmental concerns. By choosing, or being told by Beijing, to align itself with China's development
status, Hong Kong may actually be foreclosing the opportunity to
conduct its own environmental diplomacy. Conversely, if Hong Kong
and China do not apply the Biodiversity and Climate Change Conven-

174. See generally Chayes & Kim, supra note 60 (discussing Chinas role in the Climate Change

negotiations).
175. Climate Change Convention article 4(7) states that developing country implementation

"will depend on the effective implementation by developed country parties" of commitments

"related to financial resources and transfer of technology." Climate Change Convention, supra note

66, article 4(7); see also Chayes & Kim, supra note 60, at 9 (discussing the Chinese view, and
noting disagreements between developed and developing countries as to the meaning of article
4(7)).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 136-139.
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tions to the Hong Kong SAR, they will, in effect, be allowing Hong
Kong to assume an autonomous status in international environmental
law which may require Hong Kong to meet developed country targets
under environmental treaties. The precedent-setting nature of these
decisions suggests another failing of the Basic Law. Not only does the
Basic Law underestimate the degree to which Hong Kong's status in
international agreements may be dependent on third-party consent; the
Basic Law also mistakenly assumes that Hong Kong's status in international agreements can be determined on a case by case basis.
The tension China and Hong Kong face in determining Hong
Kong's development status in the Climate Change Convention and
ozone agreements also reflects inconsistencies among environmental
agreements. Having met developed country requirements under the
Montreal Protocol, Hong Kong may have feared being required to
meet developed country targets under the Climate Change Convention.
Yet there were legitimate arguments in favor of Hong Kong having
independent status from Britain-Hong Kong was never a part of the
United Kingdom. Independent status would have led to different
development classifications for Hong Kong in different environmental
treaty regimes, as is the case with other newly industrialized economies. Whereas independent status under the Montreal Protocol would
have required Hong Kong to meet developed country targets, under
the Climate Change Convention Hong Kong would not have been an
Annex I or II party. Treated independently from Britain, Hong Kong
would similarly not have been a developing country under the Basel
Convention, which imposes stricter requirements on OECD members
77
than on other parties.'
The inconsistency among environmental agreements parallels inconsistent determinations of development status in international trade
regimes: Hong Kong is treated on the same terms as developed countries for the purposes of the WTO, but as a developing country for the
purposes of the Multifibre Arrangement. 178 The inconsistencies that
inhere among various multilateral agreements reveal that classifications

177. Hong Kong is not-and cannot become-a member of the OECD because OECD
membership is limited to sovereign nations. See Chan, supra note 108. Thus while a proposed
amendment to the Basel Convention will ban OECD members such as South Korea and Mexico
from shipping hazardous waste to developing countries, see supra text accompanying note 154,
Hong Kong will not be subject to the same prohibition.
178. Cf Henry R. Zheng, The Fourth Multifibre Arrangement and the New Legal Regime for
InternationalTrade in Textiles, 25 COLU. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 308 (1987) ("While developing

countries are generally subject to MFA quotas, all developed countries except for Japan are
exempt."); Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (Multifibre Arrangement), Dec. 20,
1973, art. 6(1), 25 U.S.T. 1001, 930 U.N.T.S. 166; ProtocolExtending the Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Textiles, July 31, 1986, conclusions, paras. 13(a) & (b), GATT B.I.S.D. (33d
Supp.) at 7 (1987).
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reflect political decisions made in the international agreements. Thus
China's efforts to protect the developing status of newly industrialized
countries in the Climate Change Convention negotiations reflected a
new twist to an old game: China attempted to shield itself from future
obligations, just as the U.S. and other western countries sought to
shield themselves from textile imports by treating Hong Kong as a
developing country.
The variation in definitions of development suggests difficulties in
analogizing from how Hong Kong is treated in one agreement to how
Hong Kong should be treated in any other agreement. Yet whether
environmental agreements determine Hong Kong's development status
independently from that of China may have relevance for Hong Kong's
status in economic agreements: as trade and environmental issues become increasingly intertwined, it may become difficult to grant Hong
Kong independent status in trade agreements and not in environmental
agreements-or to treat Hong Kong as part of China for the purposes
1 79
Alof environmental agreements and not for trade agreements.
though determination of Hong Kong's status in individual environmental agreements is beyond the scope of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's
confused status in environmental agreements demonstrates the Basic
Law's failure to recognize that Hong Kong's international status, as
well as Hong Kong's status in China, will result from a range of factors
and be reflected in a variety of contexts, some of which are beyond the
central government's exclusive control.
D. The InterrelatedNature of InternationalCommitments:
Trade and the Environment
The Basic Law fails to consider the interrelated nature of trade and
environmental agreements. The Basic Law grants Hong Kong autonomy in its trade relations without considering that such autonomy may
include significant autonomy in environmental issues. The Basic Law
may thus create a framework whereby Hong Kong is not permitted to
engage directly in environmental treaty-making but is permitted to
use its voice in trade organizations to conduct environmental diplomacy.
A number of environmental agreements include express restrictions
on trade, and CITES and the Basel Convention are primarily concerned
with regulating trade. CITES restricts trade in certain endangered
species, 80 and the Basel Convention restricts trade in hazardous mate179. The unsustainability of inconsistencies between Hong Kong's status in trade and environmental agreements is discussed below. Seeinfra text accompanying notes 180-193.
180. SeeCITES, supra note 64, arts. III-V.
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rials and other wastes.' 8 ' Although not primarily concerned with trade,
the Montreal Protocol bans trade in ozone-depleting substances and
products made with or containing such substances among parties to
the protocol and states that are not parties to the protocol. 8 2 Trade
restrictions in environmental agreements may clash with certain WTO
provisions. For example, GATT article XI restricts the use of quotas
and import bans,18 3 thus creating a potential conflict with the Basel
Convention's pending ban on shipments of hazardous waste from OECD
to non-OECD nations.18 4 Although no environmental treaties have
been directly challenged in the WTO, 8 5 commentators have increasingly noted the potential for clashes between environmental and trade
agreements. Developed countries have expressed concern that the WTO
will be used to undermine the force of environmental agreements;
developing countries have expressed fears that developed countries will
use environmental concerns as pretexts for imposing trade restrictions
86
on developing countries.
181. See Basel Convention, supra note 68, art. 6. The Basel Convention is moving toward an
outright ban on the shipment of hazardous waste from OECD countries to non-OECD countries.
See supra text accompanying note 153.
Hong Kong has enacted at least two pieces of environment-related trade legislation, The Ozone
Layer Protection (Products Containing Scheduled Substances) (Import Banning) Regulation "prohibits the import of controlled products from a country or place not a party to the Montreal
Protocol unless ... it complies with the requirements of the Protocol." ENVIRONmENT HONG
KONG 1996, supra note 35, at 117. The Waste Disposal (Amendment) Ordinance 1995 estab-

lishes a permit system to control "import and export of hazardous and other wastes in accordance
with the requirements [of) the Basel Convention." ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1996, jupra note
35, at 125.
182. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 62, art. 4; see also London Revisions, seipra note 63,
section 0 (amending article 4 to ban exports as well as imports of controlled substances). If Hong
Kong is considered separately from China for the purposes of the ozone agreements, Hong Kong
may be in violation of the agreements if it fails to curtail imports of controlled substances from
China.
Although the Climate Change Convention does not explicitly restrict trade, future provisions
under the convention may restrict trade. See Brennan, supra note 153, at 136 ("Future trade-related environmental measures under [the] Framework Convention on Climate Change are likely
to include C02 and energy taxes, trade restrictions on timber, and restrictions on trade in products
and technologies that cause excessive greenhouse gas emissions such as inefficient motors or
appliances.").
On the relationship between international trade and environmental issues, see generally
DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GATr: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994).
183. See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, 61 Star. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
184. Se Brennan, supra note 153 (discussing the possible impact of GATT provision on
environmental agreements); see also supra note 153 (discussing status of Basel Convention ban on
shipments from OECD to non-OECD nations).
185. See Brennan, supra note 153, at 136-37.
186. In general, developed countries, most notably the U.S. and the European Community,
have backed the use of environment-related trade measures; developing counties have had
"uniformly hostile reactions to the linkage of trade and environment issues across international
borders." Daniel P. Blank, Note, Target-BasedEnvironmentalTrade Measures: A Proposalfor the Nell,
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, 15 STAN. ENvmL. L.J. 61, 87 (1996); see also EsTy, supra
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In contrast to Hong Kong's non-participation in the Rio Earth
Summit, Hong Kong's government describes itself as "an active par187
ticipant" in the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment.
Environmental activists have viewed Hong Kong's participation negatively, claiming that Hong Kong has played a leading role in shifting
"the sentiment" in the committee toward "curtailing the scope of" the
Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and CITES. 188 Environmentalists were particularly concerned with proposals that would give the
WTO "the final say in determining on a case-by-case basis whether
environmental treaties violate global fair trade rules."1 89 Hong Kong's
views in the WTO suggest concern with environmental considerations
being used to control trade. China has also been critical of developed
countries' uses of environmental rules and regulations as trade barriers,
and Chinas reaction to recent WTO decisions on trade and environmental issues suggests that it may back WTO efforts to limit environmental treaties. 190 Indeed, China advocated language in the Climate
note 182, at 187 (noting developing country fears that developed countries will use "trade
restrictions to force acquiescence to northern environmental priorities over which legitimate
disagreement remains regarding the resulting benefits").
187. See WHITE PAPER THIRD REviEW, supra note 72, at 35; see also Chan, supra note 108
(arguing that the "Hong Kong government is uninhibited in being involved in the WTO's
Committee on Trade and Environment").
At the December 1996 meeting of the WTO, members adopted a report of the Committee
on Trade and Environment calling on conflicts between the WTO and environmental agreements
to be resolved through the WTO. See Ministers Adopt Trade/Environment Report, Renew Committee
Createdto Look at Issues,
20 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 1, at 3 (January 8, 1997); q' Chan,
supra note 108 (stating that the "Hong Kong government has not been as proactive [in global
environmental forums) as in trade because the 'autonomy-versus-sovereignty' issue has not been
clearly resolved").
188. Paul Weinberg, Environment: WTO Threatens Environmental Treaties, Groups Warn, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The report
discussed a joint statement the World Wide Fund for Nature, Greenpeace, and Friends of the
Earth issued in advance of the December 1996 WTO meeting in Singapore. See id; see also WTO
Committee Faces U.S. Questions on Role in EnvironmentalPolicy-Making, 18 Int'l Env' Rep. Curr.
Rep. (BNA) 4, at 158 (Feb. 22, 1995) (describing United States' statement that the WTO "is
not the proper forum for environmental policy-making" and noting that Hong Kong was among
the parties stating that the issue required further examination).
189. Weinberg, supra note 188. No WTO member has yet challenged a multilateral environmental treaty as violating the GATT, but WTO panels have found some national environmental
laws to violate GATT provisions. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993); GATE Dispute
Settlement PanelReport; Thailand-Restrictionson Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov.
7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991); GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report:
United States-Taxes on Automobiles, Sept. 30, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Gttwto
File under 1994 GATTPD Lexis 8; Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the
GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENvrL. L. 841, 843 (1996).
190. Chinese satae-ran media gave favorable coverage to a 1996 WTO ruling that U.S.
environmental standards on gasoline discriminated against imported gasoline, and thus violated
principles of free trade. Xinhua paraphrased a trade official of another WTO member state as
saying that the WTO was "showing its teeth," by ruling that "the U.S. just cannot always charge
others with trade protectionism but cite[] sovereignty when that country itself was found guilty
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Change Convention against the use of trade restrictions or discriminatory measures as a means of reaching environmental goals. 19'
Hong Kong's participation in the WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment demonstrates that Hong Kong's participation in trade
organizations may include environmental policymaking. 192 An interpretation of the Basic Law that prohibits Hong Kong from engaging
in independent environmental diplomacy in environmental agreements
but that permits Hong Kong full autonomy in the WTO is thus
incoherent: either Hong Kong must possess autonomy in international
environmental policy, or else Hong Kong's autonomy in the WTO
must be limited.
At present, Hong Kong and China appear to share similar views
regarding the relationship of environmental and trade issues. Both are
skeptical of western countries, in particular the United States, using
environmental arguments as a cloak for trade restrictions. Were a
difference of opinion or interests to develop between China and Hong
193
Kong regarding the interrelation of trade and the environment,
on the same charges." WTO First Ruling: U.S. Discriminates against Gas Imports, Xinhua News
Agency, Jan. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; sce also Xinhtua oil
"Uprisings"Against US Trade Policy, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 30, 1996 available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting Xinhua commentary stating that the WTO ruling
was "a severe warning to US double standards in trade," and stating that the U.S. "practices
double standards in ...environmental protection"). Chinas views regarding the WTO disputes
may, however, reflect Chinas views about the United States mote than China's views regarding
the substantive issues at stake in the disputes.
191. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 60, at 6. The particular language can be found in the
Climate Change Convention, supra note 66, art. 3(1).
192. The degree to which China permits Hong Kong to assert an independent international
environmental policy may also be an issue in organizations to which both China and Hong Kong
are parties. China and Hong Kong are both members of APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum. Hong Kong has maintained its independent status in APEC since July 1,
1997. At least one commentator has suggested that environmental protection and "trade-environment linkages" may be "promising issues for APEC-wide agreements." Jane Khanna, AsiaPacific Economic Cooperationand Challengesfor PoliticalLeadership, WASH. Q., Winter 1996, at 257;
see also Wan-Soon Kim, A Post UR Agenda for Economic Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region: Tho
Korean View, KOREAN OBSERVER, Summer 1995, at 115; Ministers Adopt Urban-OricntcdAction
Plan, Eco-LOG WEEK, July 19, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 8729528 (reporting that "ministers
responsible for the environment" from the 18 APEC members "made a collective commitment
to improving the urban environment"). But see Environmental Issues Low Priority at Asia-Pacific
Economic CooperationForum, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 24, at 987 (November 30, 1994)
(stating that "ft]he environment was a decidedly low-priority issue during a series of [APEC]
forum meetings" and that leaders attending the annual APEC summit "paid scant attention to
...recommendations concerning the environment"). Hong Kong officials have reported raising
environmental issues, in particular the need for cooperation to address cyanide fishing, in APEC
working groups. See LegCo Panel On Environmental Affairs, Minutes of Meeting Held on
Thursday, 13 June 1996, LegCo Paper No. CB(1)102/96-97 (last updated Dec. 24, 1996)
<http:l/legco.gov.hklyr95-96/englishlpanels/ealminutes/ea130696.htm>.
193. Such a conflict is not out of the question, despite Hong Kong's increased tendency to
identify China's economic interests as its own. For example, Hong Kong appears to have acted
reluctantly to restrict the international trade in hazardous waste, see infra text accompanying notes
195-209, due to the important role Hong Kong played as a transshipment point for waste, while
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however, China would face a quandary. Any effort to assert control over
Hong Kong's trade policy may undermine not only the Basic Law, but
the economic independence and thus stability of Hong Kong; any
effort to allow Hong Kong an independent environmental policy might
have precedent-setting value for allowing Hong Kong autonomy with
regard to international environmental agreements, and thus perhaps
other agreements among sovereign states.
E. Indirect Influences
The degree of independence Hong Kong maintains in the WTO
remains to be seen, regardless of whether or not China joins the
WTO. 194 Despite the Basic Law's assurances of autonomy, Beijing's
control of the appointment of the SAR's Chief Executive and the SAR's
provisional legislature raises questions about the degree to which Hong
Kong's government will be willing to take positions that conflict with
those taken by the central government. 195
Beijing is likely to influence strongly Hong Kong's environmental
policy regardless of whether China permits Hong Kong autonomy in
environmental agreements. Hong Kong's experience in implementing
the Basel Convention shows that, in certain areas, Chinas compliance
with an international agreement may force Hong Kong to follow suit.
Chinas ability to exert such indirect influence reveals that even if the
Basic Law expressly provided for Hong Kong to have an autonomous
environmental policy, such a provision would be ephemeral.
Both China and the United Kingdom are parties to the Basel Convention. Although Britain did not initially apply the convention to Hong
Kong, it did so in 1995.196 China signed the convention in 1991,197
China took an aggressive role in calling for the ban of waste shipments from the west to

developing countries.
194. Cf. David E. Sanger, China Faces Teit of Resolve to Join Global Economy, N.Y Ms,
Mar.
2, 1997, at 1, 14 (stating that Hong Kong's autonomous status in the WTO after July 1, 1997
"is largely a fiction" and that "China will undoubtedly be able to use Hong Kong's status to its
trading advantage"). If China remains outside the WTO, Hong Kong could potentially serve as
China's voice within the body, whether by direct Chinese influence over the SAR's representatives
in the WTO, or indirectly, by Hong Kong's representatives' recognition of shared interests with
China. In contrast, Hong Kong repeatedly clashed with the United Kingdom in negotiations
leading up to the establishment of the WTO. Author's interviews with academics in Hong Kong,
March 1997.
195. Cf ROBRTI, supra note 114, at xi ("Beijing... will control every facet of Hong Kong's
affiairs through a hand-picked governor"); Editorial, Badfor Hong Kong, INT'L HERALD T'flB., Dec.
30, 1996 ("The rigged selection this month by China of the future chief executive and legislature
of Hong Kong makes clear that political freedoms will be severely curtailed if not entirely
eliminated once China assumes control on July 1, 1997."); GHAI, supra note 4, at 231-33, 272-80
(discussing selection procedures for the Chief Executive and the provisional legislature).
196. See MULTILATERAL TREATiFS, supra note 61, at 898.

197. Id. at 893. For a brief description of China's early compliance with the Basel Convention,
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and played a key role in advocating a ban on the export of hazardous
wastes from OECD to non-OECD countries, which the Third Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention passed in 1994.198 Hong Kong
took steps to implement the treaty via domestic law, enacting legislation in 1995 "to allow controls under the Convention to be introduced."' 199 Yet the initial Hong Kong law fell short of international
remained a major transfer point for
standards, 201 and Hong Kong
20 1
illegal waste shipments.
China followed up its advocacy of a ban on the export of hazardous
wastes from OECD to non-OECD countries by tightening domestic
legislation. 20 2 In the summer of 1996, China launched a campaign to
implement and publicize20 3 the new restrictions. The new controls
shifted responsibility for the granting of licenses for waste imports
from local governments to the central government, and in the summer
of 1996 the central government was reported to have announced that
it would not grant any new licenses. 2°4 China's tightening of its solid
waste law led Hong Kong to strengthen its own laws on waste shipments, 20 5 as Hong Kong suddenly faced the possibility that it would
see Bryan Bachner & David McKellar, Regulating the InternationalTrade of Waste in Hong Kong, H.K.
ENvmr. L. Ass'N NEWSL. (Hong Kong Envtl. Law Ass'n), Mar. 1995, at 3, 5-6.
198. See Basel Plenary Approves Protocol Work, ENVTL. LIABITrY RiP., Apr. 25, 1994, at 6,
available in 1994 WL 10096886; see supra note 153 (discussing current status of the ban).
199. WHITE PAPER THIRD REV W, supra note 72, at 65.

200. See MuSHKAT, supra note 76, at 100 n.57 (stating that Hong Kong continued to permit "the
import, export and trans-shipment of radioactive and other toxic substances if a license [was]
obtained').
201. See id. ("[IThe territory is a major transshipment point for waste which is not necessarily
destined for an internationally recognized specialist plant with adequate disposal facilities,");
International: Greenpeace Points to China as Emerging Dumping Spot, 8 MED. WASTE NEws 14, July
9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8299946 (reporting increased dumping of foreign medical waste
in China); Elisabeth Tacey, A Dirty Trade, Dumped on Asia, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 12,
1992, at 17 (stating that "Hong Kong is thought to be one of the world's biggest transshipment
ports for waste"). Some of Hong Kong's own exports go to "legitimate recycling facilities" in
China, Tacey, supra (quoting Hong Kong principal environmental protection officer Dr. Ellen
Chan Ying-lung) (internal quotation marks omitted), but in some cases "facilities are not sufficient
or [are] non-existent." Id. Much of the waste shipped through Hong Kong to China is in plastics,
which the Basel Convention does nor control. See id
202. See Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China,
supra note 53.
203. In the summer of 1996, Chinese media carried repeated stories detailing illegal shipments
of waste from developed countries, especially the United States, to China. See, e.g., Environmental
Group Callson US to Stop Dumping Waste, Agence France Presse, June 25, 1996, availablein LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (discussing Chinese media reports of U.S. trash shipments to China).
Hong Kong environmental NGOs echoed the Chinese government's attacks on the United States
for shipping toxic waste to China. See id.
204. See Tacey, supra note 201; Yojana Sharma, Hong Kong-Environment: Free Port Becomes
Dumping Groundfor Waste, Inter Press Service, July 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File; see also Waste Import Ban and Water Bill, ENV'L. LIABILITY REP., Nov. 1, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 9767646 (discussing NPC Standing Committee approval of ban on imports
of non-reusable waste, and limits on imports of recyclable waste).
205. See Hong Kong Waste Regulations Spurred by Chinese Law, Conform with Basel Treaty, 19 Int'l
Env'c Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 19, at 830 (Sept. 18, 1996). Hong Kong was to have implemented
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be stuck with both waste being shipped through Hong Kong to China
and with increased amounts of the colony's own waste, which formerly
206
had been shipped to China.
Hong Kong's recent moves to comply with the Basel Convention
illuminate three qualifications to the Basic Law's grant of autonomy to
Hong Kong. First, Hong Kong's moves to comply with the convention
show that Chinese laws that do not officially apply to Hong Kong may
have a significant impact on Hong Kong's own laws. 207 Second, these
moves show that even in an area in which the Basic Law provides for
the Hong Kong SAR's autonomy-international trade-Hong Kong's
actions are likely to be curtailed if its policies run counter to those in
China. Third, they emphasize the inseparability of trade issues from
208
environmental issues.

the new regulations by the end of 1996, but advanced the date of implementation after being
"caught off guard by China's strict new law banning the import or transshipment of hazardous
waste into or through the country." Id The revised regulations require an application from

importers for a permit to import waste; if waste is being transshipped through Hong Kong, the
importers must also show approval from the shipment's intended destination, and post a bond to
pay for transportation in the event that the waste is rejected by the destination country. See id.
Environmentalists said that the law did not go far enough, noting that the regulations did not
"cover the import or export of non-hazardous waste unless the cargo is intended for disposal

purposes" in Hong Kong, and that the revised regulations did not include sufficient provisions
for increased enforcement. Id.; see also Waste Disposal (Amendment) Ordinance No. 14 of 1995
(1996) (Hong Kong); P. T. Bangsberg, Hong Kong Cracks Down on US HazardousCargo, J. COM.,
Aug. 21, 1996, at A4 (discussing new Hong Kong regulations controlling waste).
Hong Kong enacted the 1995 ordinance in order to bring the territory's laws into line with
the Basel Convention. For discussion of the enactment of the 1995 ordinance, see EPD to Propose
Amending Waste Control Law to Bring Measure in Line with Basel Treaty, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr.
Rep. (BNA) 21, at 866 (Oct. 19, 1994); Bill to Bring Territory in Line with Basel Treaty Moves
Closer to Passage, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 25, at 1050 (Dec. 14, 1994).
206. One Hong Kong official stated that "trihe reason we are having this problem now [in
Hong Kong] is that China suddenly decided it does not want to import waste," and added that
"[l]ast year China was one of the main importers of waste, but now they have fouid that it is
not very cost effective and it is not very good for the environment." Sharma, supra note 204
(quoting Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department Advisory Council Chairman Peter
Wong) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original); f Rachel Clarke, Green
Groups Praise Move but Tighter Laws Urged, S. CHINA MoRNaG PosT, Jan. 24, 1997, at 4 ("In
China trade in toxic waste is seen as bad. In Hong Kong the philosophy is trade in toxic waste
is a business which we want to monitor and control." (quoting Greenpeace International's Anne
Dingwall) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
One press account noted that a factor motivating Hong Kongs decision to tighten its
regulations on solid waste was the fear that "[w]ith China closing its doors, Hong Kong will be
at the receiving end of a lot of rejected waste unless we step up our own legal controls." United
States Intervenes in Hong Kong Waste Dumping Row, AGENCE FRANCE PRFssE, July 26, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting Friends of the Earth-Hong Kong
chairwoman Mei Ng) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sharma, supra note 204 ("Hong
Kong at present has no effective laws to prohibit the entry of recyclable waste.").
207. This situation is not unique to Hong Kong: China may also be able to exert similar
influence over other neighbors, including Taiwan.
208. One explanation given for Hong Kong's relatively weak enforcement of restrictions on
waste shipments compared to other countries was that "we are a free port, so we don't have very
strict regulations of what comes in and what goes out." Sharma, supra note 204 (quoting Hong
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E The Status of InternationalLaw in Hong Kong:
A Possible Hong Kong Veto?
Even if the Basic Law's statement that China will have the final say
over the international status of the Hong Kong SAR is correct,20 9 the
status of international law in Hong Kong itself is unclear. This section
will discuss the status of international environmental law in Hong
Kong, in particular the possibility that in preserving Hong Kong's
pre-reversion legal system the Basic Law may also have authorized the
SAR's government to exercise significant autonomy in international
commitments. After a brief discussion of the status of international law
in the Hong Kong and Chinese legal systems, this section will address
the possibility that the non-self executing status of international agreements in Hong Kong will allow the SAR legislature to block, modify,
or delay the application of international agreements to Hong Kong.
This possibility is not unique to the environmental realm, but environmental agreements are particularly significant because both the
SAR chief executive and legislature may be more willing to exercise
autonomy in environmental law than in other areas,
Two major differences separate the Hong Kong legal system's treatment of international law from the treatment of international law in
the Chinese legal system. First, treaties are not self-executing in Hong
Kong. International agreements thus must be incorporated into local
law.210 Hong Kong therefore has enacted, for example, legislation to
implement its commitments under the Montreal Protocol and the
Basel Convention. 211 In contrast, although China's constitution does
not include any provisions governing the status of treaties or international law in Chinese law,212 China "tends to adopt" a system in which
"treaties are directly applied internally."213 China's General Principles

Kong Environmental Protection Department Advisory Council Chairman Peter Wong) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
209. See Basic Law, arts. 150-157.
210. See MUSKHAT, supra note 76, at 164, 171-79; Roda Mushkar, Foreign, External, and
Defense Affairs, in THE BAsic LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 249, 258 n.26.

For a discussion of the historical development of local application of treaties in Hong Kong, see
Geoffrey Marston, UnincorporatedTreaties and Colonial Lau--Hong Kong's "ParliamentBeige," 20
H.K. LJ. 178, 194 (1990) ('[D]omestic courts will not enforce obligations and rights under
international treaties, unless they are embodied in the domestic law." (citing Tai Ping-hoi v.
Attorney General, 1987 HKLR 324, 328 (Nazareth, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
211. See supra notes 181 & 205; see also MUSHKAT, supra note 76, at 100 & n.56 (stating that
"Iffor the most part, appropriate steps have been taken by the authorities to implement the
respective duties, by incorporating the relevant conventions into domestic law" and listing
relevant domestic laws).
212. See XIANFA [CONSTITUrION] (1982); see also Wang Tieya, The Status of Treaties in the
Chinese LegalSystem, 1 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 1, 2 (stating that China's constitutions have failed
"to clarify the status of treaties in the Chinese legal system").
213. Wang, supra note 212, at 4.
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of Civil Law stipulate that where treaties to which China is a party
conflict with domestic civil laws, the provisions of the international
treaty govern, except where China has issued reservations to the treaty
2 4
measures in question. 1
Second, customary international law applies in Hong Kong as part
of English common law.2 15 In contrast, China has taken a skeptical
view of the application of customary international law. Although the
General Principles of Civil Law state that "where the law of the PRC
or international treaties which the PRC has concluded or participated
in do not contain a relevant provision, international custom may be
applied," 216 China has in practice rejected applying customary international law, due to its view that it is not bound to norms that it did
not play a part in forming. Although the comparatively non-sensitive
nature of environmental law compared to human rights norms may
mean that Hong Kong's courts will be more willing to use customary
environmental norms 217 than human rights norms, the general reluctance of the Hong Kong courts to employ customary international law
in any form 218 and the undeveloped nature of customary international
environmental law makes such a scenario unlikely.
214. See General Principles of Civil Law, art. 142, para. 2 (1986); see also Wang, supra note
212, at 9-10 (discussing the General Principles of Civil Law and noting that the primacy of

international treaties also applies for "matters relating to criminal jurisdiction").
Whether treaties are ever in practice self-executing in China is questionable. Despite the
language of the General Principles of Civil Law, there are few examples of China enforcing the
provisions of an international treaty absent domestic legislation. Nevertheless, the distinction
with Hong Kong law remains important. As discussed below, the factthat treaties are never
self-executing in Hong Kong allows for a potential clash between local Hong Kong law and
international obligations agreed to by China.
215. See MUSHKAT, supra note 76, at 163-64, 167-71; Mushkat, supra note 79.
216. General Principles of Civil Law, article 142(1) quoted in MUSHKAT, supra note 76, at 186
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).
217. For discussion of customary international environmental law, see, e.g., PA'nRucL W.
BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 11, 84-85 (1992);
Oscar Schacter, The Emergence ofInternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 44 J. INT'L AFF.457, 470 (1991);
Mushkar, supra note 33, at 116. Customary international environmental law may include principles such as a prohibition against states conducting or permitting activities in their territories
without regard to the effects on the rights of other states, sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and the polluter pays principle. See Roda Mushkat, Applicability of International
EnvironmentalLaw to Hong Kong, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAw IN HONG KONG 87, 92-95 (Gary N.
Heilbronn ed., 1993); MUSHKAT, supra note 76, at 101-02; Lothar Gundling, Our Responsibility
to Future Generations, 84 Am. J. INTL L. 207, 212 (1990). Certain "soft law" instruments, such
as the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, may also have some effect on environmental policy in
Hong Kong. See Mushkat, Applicability of InternationalEnvironmentalLaw to Hong Kong, supra, at
100 (arguing that the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 are "highly authoritative" and thus should
be implemented by Hong Kong).
218. The degree to which customary international law is permitted to develop in Hong Kong
will depend on the degree to which the common law itself is permitted to develop. The Basic
aw stipulates that "[t]he laws previously in force in Hong Kong" including "the common law
... shall be maintained." Basic Law, art. 8. Whether the Basic Law permits the common law to
continue to develop, however, is unclear. See Goas, supra note 4, at 351-54. If the common law
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The Basic Law's broad language regarding the preservation of the
Hong Kong legal system leaves unclear the degree to which the Hong
Kong legislature must enact laws to comply with international obligations Beijing has undertaken. Examination of the need for legislation
implementing Hong Kong's international obligations demonstrates
that it may be impossible to allow the Hong Kong legislature to
maintain autonomy with regard to local legislation if Hong Kong lacks
autonomy in international environmental law. Similarly, if Hong Kong
maintains autonomy in local environmental laws, Hong Kong may
actually possess de facto veto power over international commitments
the central government applies to it. Moreover, environmental law may
be an area in which the SAR's legislature is willing to disregard
Beijing's dictates.
Future environmental commitments the central government makes
for the entire nation will require legislation by the Hong Kong SAR
to become effective in Hong Kong. Yet such legislation-whether on
controls of emissions of carbon dioxide, on waste transport, or on some
other area-also appears to fit within the sphere of local authority the
Basic Law cedes to Hong Kong. 219 The Basic Law grants the SAR
legislature autonomy in local environmental policy, and prohibits the
national government from enacting laws for the SAR except for the
limited application of certain national laws. 220 The potential conseis permitted to continue to develop, customary international law is also likely to continue to
develop.
219. Cf. Ago, supra note 80, at 620 (suggesting that International Labor Organization conventions that China has ratified but that are not applied in Hong Kong pre-July 1, 1997, as well
as ILO conventions that China ratifies after the formation of the Hong Kong SAR, may not be
applicable in the SAR).
220. National laws applicable to the SAR are listed in Annex III to the Basic Law; the NPC
Standing Committee "may add to or delete from the list of laws in Annex III," but such laws
"shall be confined to those relating to defense and foreign affairs as well as other matters outside
the limits of the autonomy of the Region as specified by this aw." Basic Law, art. 18; sce also
Basic Law, Annex III (listing national laws applied in Hong Kong from July 1, 1997). The Basic
Law recognizes that even national laws cannot be directly applied to Hong Kong: national laws
become applicable "by way of promulgation or legislation by the Region." Basic law, art. 18; sce
also GHmI, supra note 4, at 182 ("[Ihe national authorities have no power to make laws directly
for Hong Kong, and in the limited scope for national laws, the modality of their application is
regional enactment or promulgation."). In 1997, the NPC Standing Committee reaffirmed the
primary role of national laws in Hong Kong, particularly in reference to Hong Kong's foreign
affairs, deciding that "where any law making provision for foreign affairs in respect of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region is inconsistent with national law applicable in the Hong
Kong [SAR], the national law shall prevail so that it accords with the international rights enjoyed
and international obligations home by the Central People's Government." Decision of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress on Treatment of the Laws Previously in Force in
Hong Kong in Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, supra note 103.
The Central Government may also be able to force Hong Kong to comply with national laws
via Basic Law article 48, which provides that the Chief Executive of the SAR shall "implement
the directives issued by the Central People's Government in respect of the relevant matters
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quences of a conflict between Beijing's international obligations and
the Basic Law's grant of autonomy to Hong Kong are unclear; although
Hong Kong's legislature is unlikely openly to defy a treaty to which
Beijing has committed the entire nation, such procedures may allow
Hong Kong to delay adhering to or enforcing the treaty, as it has done
221
in the past.
Commentators have suggested that the SAR's appointed legislature
is likely to follow Beijing's dictates. 222 Yet there are three reasons this
may not always be the case, particularly in environmental affairs. First,
China's regional governments have been notoriously slow to obey central commands to improve environmental protection. 223 There is little
reason to suggest that the SAR's legislature will be less protective of
local economic interests than are other regional governments. 224 Second, the SAR's legislature and executive branch disproportionately
represent Hong Kong's business interests, which have historically led
opposition to further environmental regulation. 225 In 1996, SAR Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa expressed doubts about the polluter pays
principle and, referring to calls for tighter environmental protection,
stated that "[ilndustries cannot survive if we impose a lot of charges
on them." 226 In turn, Hong Kong environmentalists have repeatedly
provided for in this Law." Basic Law, art. 48, para. 8. This provision is dependent on interpretation
of the Basic Law's provisions regarding fbreign affairs: the more expansive a definition of foreign
affairs, the greater the number of national laws or policies that the central government may be
able to direct the Chief Executive to implement in Hong Kong.
221. See supra note 71 (discussing Hong Kong's compliance with CITES).
222. See supra note 195 (discussing Beijing's influence over the SAR's political leaders).
223. However, in most cases local disregard for national environmental policymaking comes in
the fbrm of refosal to enfbrce environmental norms. Author's interviews with academics and environmental officials in Beijing, summer 1996. Local authorities only rarely have obligations to enact
legislation. Cf Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Shuiwuran Fangzhifa [Water Pollution Prevention Law of
the People's Republic of China, May 11, 1994, revised May 15, 1996, art. 7 (permitting local and
provincial authorities to enact provisions stricter than those in the national law).
224. However, the SAR's initial legislature may be more directly linked to the central
government, and thus more likely to listen to Beijing's dictates, than are representatives in the
provinicial people's congresses. Representatives in the initial SAR legislature were appointed
directly by Beijing, whereas members of provincial people's congresses are largely appointed by
provincial and local Communist Party branches.
225. Prior to Hong Kong's reversion, the pro-China Democratic Alliance for the Betterment
of Hong Kong moved to eliminate Hong Kong's "sewage charges on domestic households" and
"surcharges on the business sector." Ip Kwok-him, ChargesAre Unfair, ONE EARTH, Spring 1996,
at 30. The motion failed. See id. According to an opponent of the motion, those in favor of
scrapping the charges argued that such charges damaged Hong Kong's economy. See Christine
Loh, PollutersShould Pay, ONE EARTH, Spring 1990, at 31. Hong Kong's pre-transition legislature
was also criticized for being anti-environment. For example, in 1995 LEGCO voted down a
government plan that would have mandated that taxis and minibuses switch from diesel to petrol.
See Hong Kong Pollution Scare Recedes as Breeze Blows Through Colony, Agence France Presse, Jan. 4,
1996, available in LEXIS, Allnews File. For criticism of corporate Hong Kong's concern for the
environment, see Ruth Mathewson, Top Companies FailBasic Green Test, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 6, 1994, at 4.
226. Genevieve Ku, Tung Seeks Sewage Plan Review, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Nov. 23, 1996
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227
questioned Mr. Tung's commitment to protecting the environment
The members of the pre-reversion Legislative Council who were the
leading voices in favor of tightening environmental protection also
tended to be advocates of greater democracy. China excluded such
individuals from the provisional SAR legislature. Third, obsession with
maintaining economic development is likely to dominate politics in
the SAR. In such a context, arguments traditionally made against
tightening environmental regulation-that further regulation will undermine economic growth-are likely to carry particular force. China's
concern with maintaining Hong Kong's role as an economic center may
similarly lead it to turn a blind eye to attempts by the SAR's legislature to weaken environmental laws or ignore international environ228
mental obligations.
Yet the ability of the SAR legislature to refuse to translate international environmental norms into local law will also be a test of the
territory's autonomy in other spheres. In the short term, it is unlikely,
if not inconceivable, that the SAR legislature will challenge Beijing
on human rights issues. But any actions by the SAR government to
assert autonomy in international obligations the Basic Law does not
explicitly delegate to the SAR may, over time, lead to a legislature that
is more willing to exert its autonomy in other fields.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to suggest that it is likely
that the Hong Kong SAR's legislature will directly challenge Beijing's

at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Provisional legislators have similarly objected to the
polluter pays principle, stating that it would harm economic growth. See Reggie Rathour, No
Backing for Polluter-Pays Scheme, H.K. STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Curnws File (reporting criticism of provisional legislators for failing to support the
polluter pays principle).
227. See Angela Li, Tung Accused of Bias Against Green Views, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec.
7, 1996, at 6 (reporting claims that Tung "just listens to the business sector" (quoting Conservancy Association chairman Ng Cho-nam) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Alison Smith,
Tung Success Worries Greens, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 31, 1996, at 7 (reporting that one
environmental organization ranked Tung's election as Chief-Executive as "the biggest environmental concern of the year"); FRIENDS OF 'n EARTH, supra note 44 (stating that ulung's

"background is pro-business and there are few green voices in the new provisional legislature"
but noting that Friends of the Earth hopes "that better communication with the PRC will mean

increased action on cross-boundary pollution and development issues"). Bt see Grassroots Bodies
Want ClearPolicy on Welfare, Homes, H.K. STANDARD, Dec. 11, 1996, availablein LEXIS, World
Library, Curnws File (reporting environmentalists' belief that Tung's "links with China will help

in tackling cross-border pollution problems" (quoting Friends of the Earth-Hong Kong spokesperson Lisa Hopkinson) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Environmentalists were also critical
of Mr. Tung's predecessor, Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten. See, e.g., Patricia Young, Pledges
Stall at Planning Stage, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Sept. 25, 1995, at 6 (detailing criticisms of
Patten's environmental record); Patricia Young, Lack of Vision Hampers War Against Pollution, Say
Groups, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 12, 1995, at 4 (same).

228. But f MUSHKAT, supra note 76, at 36 (arguing that Hong Kong "may be internationally
responsible for violating its obligations under treaties to which fit] is a party," including "its
obligations pertaining to ...

protection of the environment").
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dictates in any area. A more likely scenario is that Beijing will turn a
blind eye to the SAR's environmental policy, even if such policy
involves disregard of international obligations. Nevertheless, even if the
Hong Kong legislature does not directly challenge Beijing, any failure
to enact legislation implementing international environmental obligations may be a de facto assertion of autonomy in environmental policy,
local and international.
The preceding discussion is subject to two caveats. First, environmental agreements are not self-executing even in countries where
international obligations are ordinarily self-executing. Although environmental treaties are "cast in the language of state obligation," such
treaties are "designed ultimately to change the behavior of private
actors," and thus "states must enact domestic legislation and establish
administrative machinery."' 229 Thus even China must enact legislation
to give effect to its international environmental commitments. Second,
even if Hong Kong is considered part of China for the purposes of
international environmental law, China will not be obliged to give
effect to all treaty obligations in Hong Kong. Treaties may require
China to take certain steps-such as prohibiting the import of controlled species under CITES, or cataloguing greenhouse gas emissions
under the Climate Change Convention, in all areas under its jurisdiction, but China may choose to comply with other provisions-such as
reducing emissions of controlled substances-in some areas and not in
others. 230 China might thus choose not to require compliance by Hong
Kong. Neither caveat undermines the importance of the different
status of international agreements in Hong Kong and China. Environmental laws China enacts pursuant to international obligations will not
be applicable in Hong Kong, and absent incorporation of such international agreements into Hong Kong law the SAR will not be obligated to enact such legislation, although Beijing could apply national
laws to Hong Kong or force Hong Kong to comply with national
laws. 231 Moreover, in the case of international agreements that require
equal application in all areas of a country's territory, giving local effect
to international obligations will require the approval of the SAR
legislature.

229. Chayes & Kim, supra note 60, at 3.
230. Environmental agreements that track national emissions do not require equal measures
in all areas of a country.
231. Cf. supra note 220 (discussing application of national laws in Hong Kong).
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G. Inconsistency of InternationalAgreements and the Erosion of State-only
Participation
The problems the previous sections describe are not the Basic Law's
creation alone. The inconsistencies that will exist if Hong Kong, a
non-sovereign entity, is permitted membership in the WTO but not
autonomy in environmental agreements are due to more general inconsistencies between the international trade and environment fields. Trade
agreements permit membership by subnational units; environmental
agreements do not. Such a distinction becomes questionable as the two
areas become increasingly intertwined. Similarly, inconsistencies in
development status may not have raised significant problems to date
because the treaties themselves are able to operate largely independent
of each other. As trade agreements develop to encompass provisions
regarding the environment-just as environmental agreements include
provisions regarding trade-it may be increasingly difficult to sustain
radically different measurements of development status. The potential
incoherence of the differing definitions of trade and the environment
is perhaps best demonstrated by the Basel Convention. As an OECD
member, Mexico may soon be banned under the Basel Convention from
exporting hazardous waste to "developing" nations; Hong Kong, with
a per capita income more than twice that of Mexico, will not face such
restrictions.
Additionally, Hong Kong's status in international environmental
agreements challenges the conventional belief that participation in
environmental agreements should be by states, not sub-national units.
The rationale behind the conventional wisdom has been that requiring
national participation may raise environmental standards in an entire
nation. In Europe, participation in international treaty-making is increasingly by a supra-national unit, the European Union. Yet Hong
Kong's position in the ozone agreements demonstrates that, in some
cases, requirements of national compliance may reduce environmental
obligations in certain parts of a country.232 Allowance of membership
by sub-national units in the GATT and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
appears an anomaly when compared to the general trend toward supra-national organizations. In a world with weakening sovereignty and
increasing interconnectedness, however, Hong Kong's experience suggests that it may be desirable to allow sub-national units to participate
in areas traditionally restricted to states.

232. This observation is not unique to Hong Kong. A similar argument can be made
regarding the European Union's move to a common environmental policy.
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III. THE BASIC LAW AND THE RESOLUTION OF
TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PEARL RIVER DELTA
This Article has thus far. explored the ways in which the Basic Law
fails to consider the complexities and contradictions inherent in attempts to define Hong Kong's status in international environmental
law. Many of these problems trace back to the Basic Law's attempts to
grant Hong Kong significant, but carefully delineated, autonomy without China ceding its sovereignty over Hong Kong; this Article has
shown how the structure the Basic Law creates is inapplicable to
international environmental law. The actual effect these problems have
on efforts to restore and protect Hong Kong's environment are unclear:
the status of international environmental law instructs more about the
Basic Law than it does about Hong Kong's environmental policies. Yet
the Basic Law's emphasis on separation may also impede efforts to
address Hong Kong's environmental woes. This section examines the
scope of cross-border pollution in the Pearl River Delta and pre-reversion efforts at regional environmental planning. Such examination
yields two observations. First, Hong Kong's problems are integrated
with Guangdong's, and thus Hong Kong can only address its environmental problems in cooperation with authorities across the border.
Second, the Basic Law's emphasis on separation without providing for
a clearly defined or functional sphere of autonomy may frustrate efforts
at regional problem solving.
A. The Scope of Cross-BorderEnvironmental Problems
The effect of pollution from Guangdong on Hong Kong is potentially immense. 233 Hong Kong receives more than two-thirds of its
water from Guangdong, and environmentalists have repeatedly expressed concern that continued development in Guangdong threatens
Hong Kong's water supply.234 In 1995, Hong Kong's director of envi233. See Patricia Young, Borderingon a Crisis, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 14, 1995, at 16;
see also Liu Jianhua, Peter Hills & Bill Barron, Cross-Border Water Pollution and Sustainability in
Hong Kong: The Need for an Integrated Approach with China 1 (1996) (unpublished paper on file
with author) (arguing that "Hong Kong's environment is now under threat . . . from rapid
urbanization and industrialization in Guangdong" and that "[ilt is unlikely that Hong Kong can
make significant progress in the pursuit ofsustainability if it fails to take account of developments

in adjacent cross-border regions").
234. See, e.g., Elisabeth Tacey, Save Water,Shower with a Friend,S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Jan.
25, 1995, at 5. According to Friends of the Earth, 76% of Hong Kong's water comes from
Guangdong. See Friends of the Earth, Agenda 2047 (Phase I): Friends of the Earth's Initial Response
to the Territorial Development Strategy Review, Dec. 1996 (on file with author). Hong Kong's
agreement with China to provide water for Hong Kong runs until 2010; Hong Kong environmentalists point out that as water shortages worsen in China, Hong Kong may also face shortages.
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ronmental protection commented that pollution from a power station
under consideration in Guangdong had the potential to offset twenty
years of improvements in Hong Kong's air quality.235 Hong Kong
environmentalists have noted that Hong Kong's attempts to reduce air
pollution face challenges not just due to local opposition, but also due
to factories across the border in Shenzhen being the source of much of
Hong Kong's air pollution. 236 The Shenzhen River, which divides
Hong Kong from Shenzhen, "is marked by choking, ecosystem-threatening pollution." 237 Construction in Shenzhen threatens the ecology of
Deep Bay, once a prime area for Hong Kong fishermen, and Hong
Kong's first and only Ramsar site, the Mai Po Nature Reserve. 238 Even
cross-border noise pollution has become a significant environmental
issue: a 1995 report stated that more than 200,000 Hong Kong
residents were "being driven mad day and night by ear-splitting con239
struction work just meters away in Shenzhen."
Yet pollution moves in two directions: Chinese officials have blamed
Hong Kong for focusing on the effects of pollution from Guangdong
on Hong Kong, not the reverse. Speaking in Hong Kong, Xie Zhenhua, director of Chinas National Environmental Protection Agency,
commented that "People here worry about whether the pollution (in
Guangdong] will affect their water quality. We understand that but
on the other hand, the pollution in Hong Kong might affect the water
quality in Guangzhou. ''240 Similarly, Hong Kong environmental reSee Editorial, Water CrisisBrewing, ONE EARTH, Spring 1997, at 2; see also Fresb Water: The Coming
Crisis?, ONE EARTH, Spring 1997, at 6, 11 (reporting that "cross-border communication is rare"
on issues related to water quality, and that as pollution increases in Hong Kong's water sources
in Guangdong, "there's little Hong Kong can do besides watch, and wait").
235. See Get Tough with China, Say Greens, supra note 57; Hong Kong Pollution Scare Rccedes as
Breeze Blows Through Colony, supra note 225.
236. See Hong Kong Pollution Scare Recedes as Breeze Blows Through Colony, supra note 225; sce also
Get Tough With China, Say Greens, supra note 57 (reporting concerns that "mainland pollution
could lead to a deterioration in air quality in Hong Kong").
237. Kevin Kwong, The Frontier of Filth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 27, 1996, at 1.
Pollution in the river comes both from agricultural waste from Hong Kong and from industrial
and household pollution from Shenzhen. See id. However, Hong Kong officials have noted that
determining what proportion of waste comes from which side of the border is difficult, and that
Shenzhen officials have authority over measuring water quality in the river. See id. Shenzhen
environmental officials have stated that they have been unable to keep up with the city's rapid
growth. See Ng Kang-chung, Territory's Efforts Undermined by Lack of Treatment Plants antl Lax
Controls in Shenzhen, S. CHINA MORNING Posr, July 8, 1996, at 6.

238. See Patricia Young, Projeet May Scar Deep Bay, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Aug. 31, 1995,
at 3 (reporting that reclamation project in Shenzhen directly across Deep Bay from the Mai Po
Reserve threatened the reserve).
239. Billy Wong Wai-yuk, Bordering on Madness, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at
4. The report noted that Hong Kong authorities were "helpless to act because the source was
outside their jurisdiction." Id. Environmentalists claimed that noise from China also threatened
birds in the nearby Mai Po Reserve, but a Hong Kong environmental official commented that
"we are not bound to take any action due to the different jurisdictions." Id. (quoting Environmental Protection department spokesman Lillian Chan) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Kathy Griffin, 1997 Assurance, ONE EARTH, Spring 1996, at 30 (internal quotation marks
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searchers note that "Hong Kong has long exported much of its water
and part of its air pollution to neighbouring regions of China." 24 1
Chinese officials have observed that pollution from Hong Kong comes
not only in the form of pollution moving across the border, but also
via Hong Kong-owned polluting industries242that have relocated from
Hong Kong to China over the past decade.
Although China and Hong Kong have taken some steps toward
cross-border environmental policymaking, China's views of pre-1997
attempts by Hong Kong to clean up the Hong Kong environment at
times mirrored Chinas distrust of the departing colonial government
in other areas. The Chinese government argued that Britain engaged
in excessive spending, depleting the territory's coffers before Hong
Kong reverted to China, 243 and that Britain attempted to clean up
Hong Kong's environment at the expense of Chinas environment. In
January 1995 China demanded Hong Kong halt a multi-billion-dollar
project to install new sewers and build a new sewage treatment facility
in the colony. China claimed Britain should have consulted China
regarding the project, 244 and complained that the plan consisted of
omitted). Mr. Xie also stated that Hong Kong's environmental standards would not be lowered
after 1997. See id.; see also Ng, supra note 57, at 22 (reporting Mr. Xie as stating that "Hong
Kong already has a well-maintained and developed social, economic and political system" and
that "[i]t would be unreasonable to force Hong Kong to follow the environmental management
practices of China as they are considerably behind those of Hong Kong"). Although such a
statement may have reassured Hong Kong environmentalists, the Basic Law leaves little room
for NEPA to set environmental standards for Hong Kong. Unless environmental standards in
Hong Kong can be said to affect China's foreign relations or state security, such standards will
be wholly in the purview of the SAR legislature. China might be able to increase environmental
standards in Hong Kong by signing on to new international agreements, but see supra text
accompanying notes 209-221 (discussing need for legislation in Hong Kong to implement treaty
commitments), but China cannot directly lower existing standards, except, perhaps, by the
appointment of legislators not sympathetic to the environment. This is particularly the case given
the central government's relation to provincial environmental legislation: national laws set minimum standards for environmental protection, and provinces are permitted to enact more stringent
laws.
241. Liu, Hills & Barron, supra note 233, at 4.
242. See Environment; Hong Kong, A!acao, Guangdong Urged to Improve "DeterioratingEnvironment,"
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 7, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Cumuws file.
Guangdong's provincial government claimed that 20% of labor-intensive Hong Kong and Macao
enterprises in the Pearl River Delta "fell into the category of polluting enterprises." Id.
243. One of the chief areas of contention was Hong Kong's construction of a new airport:
China originally opposed construction of the airport out of fear that the departing British
government was incurring excessive debt. For an analysis of the controversy over construction of
the airport, see generally Michael S. Bennett, Financingthe Chek Lap Kok New Airport: A Case
Study in Amending the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, 9 J. CHINESE L.
77 (1995). A parallel exists between the sewerage plan and the airport not just in Chinas
objections to major spending by the outgoing colonial government, but also in the colonial
government waiting until virtually the last minute to engage in long-needed infrastructure
projects.
244. See Simon Holberton, China Opposes Plans to Clean Up HK's FragrantHarbour:Beijing Wants
HK Dollars 22bn Project Delayedwhile Alternatives are Considered, FiN. Timas, January 12, 1995, at
4 ("[Oinly in Hong Kong could a plan to clean up [the harbor] . . . become the subject of
diplomatic controversy."). China's opposition appeared to be based on the desire to have a say in
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"flushing Hong Kong's toilets on China's doorstep. '245 The Hong
Kong government, in turn, complained of an "unholy alliance" of
2 6
environmentalists, private interests, and legislators blocking the plan. 4
The fight over the sewage plan mirrored dashes with China over
democratization: 247 by waiting until shortly before Hong Kong's return
to China to take action, the colonial government invited Chinese
objections. 248 The debate moved from disagreement over the most
cost-effective route to reducing pollution in Victoria Harbour to a
debate over sovereignty. 249 The British argued that those aspects of the
project that were to be completed by 1997 were not China's concern. 250
Yet the British view, perhaps justified in discussions regarding some
construction projects, was less well-founded in the context of a plan
that would dump sewage into either present or future Chinese waters:
regardless of Hong Kong's reversion, international norms required
251
Britain to consult China about the plan's possible impact.

the project, as well as on environmental concerns. The project would have resulted in all of Hong
Kong's waste being treated in a single facility, with waste then being dumped "into a deep water
channel off the coast of China." Id. China claimed the project would damage Chinese fishing
fields. See id. Hong Kong environmentalists also opposed the plan, largely because of objections
to the dumping of semi-treated waste into Chinese waters. See Patricia Young, Sewage Plan
Demand, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, June 23, 1995, at 6. One Chinese academic claimed that the
sewage plan would breach international environmental law regarding protection of the oceanic
environment, and stated that neighboring "Zhuhai could definitely sue Hong Kong" in the
International Court of Justice. Queenie Wang, MainlandTold to Sue Over Waste Proposal,S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 4, 1994, at 2.

245. Government Defends Sewage Disposal Plan, Cites 'Unholy Alliance' Opposing Proposal, 17 Int'l
Env'r Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 22, at 906 (November 2, 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Patricia Young, Beijing to Reect Sewage Scheme, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 15, 1994,

at 6 (detailing China's objections to the plan).
246. See Government Defends Sewage Disposal Plan, Cites 'Unholy Alliance' Opposing Proposal,supra
note 245 (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. For a description of British attempts to increase democracy in Hong Kong, see GHAI,
supra note 4, at 75-78; GOODHART, ADDRUSE, DOWD & KUIEHNE, supra note 26, at 68-72.

248. See Holberton, supra note 244 (noting that "the politicisation of the issue is a consequence
of the past inaction, for which the Hong Kong government is responsible," and quoting Hong
Kong Environment and Lands Department deputy secretary Tony Cooper as stating that "[wle
under-invested in the past and are trying to make up in the 1990s for what we did not do in
the 1970s and 1980s" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also China Escalates Opposition to
Plans Being Made by Hong Kong for Sewage Works, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. Curr. Rep. (BNA) 24, at
998 (Nov. 30, 1994) (describing Chinese skepticism about the sewage plan, and Hong Kong
attempts to prevent "formal" talks given difficulties faced in discussions on political reforms and
the financing of Hong Kong's new airport).
249. See China Escalates Oppositionto PlansBeing Made by Hong Kong for Sewage Works, supra note
249 (quoting Hong Kong's chief environmental officer, David Hall, on the project as stating that
"[i]t's an issue of sovereignty" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
250. See Sewerage Master Plan Study Commissionedfor Tseung Kwan 0 Area, 10 Int'l Env't Rep.
Curr. Rep. (BNA) 15, at 646 (July 27, 1994).
251. The plan ran into further trouble after an independent expert panel retained by the Hong
Kong government failed to support the plan. The panel noted that dumping waste into Chinese
waters "might violate regional water quality standards unless higher treatment was given to the
waste." Government Does About-Face on Ambitious Sewage Disposal Plan, 18 Int'l Env't Rep, Curt.

1998 / EnvironmentalLaw and the Basic Law of Hong Kong

287

Yet environmental reforms in Hong Kong differ from political reforms: regardless of Hong Kong's reversion to China, efforts to clean
up the Hong Kong environment will only succeed via cooperation with
Guangdong. 252 To a limited degree, Hong Kong and Guangdong have
recognized the need for coordinated action, establishing the "Hong
Kong-Guangdong Environmental Protection Liaison Group" in 1990
"to improve co-operation between the Hong Kong and Guangdong
governments on environmental issues of mutual concern." 253 The group,
which meets once a year, has largely been concerned with issues of
water pollution and exchanges of information. Despite these annual
meetings, 254 environmental planning in the region has continued to
suffer from a lack of coordination. One example 255 came in August
1995, when the Hong Kong government stated that it had been
unaware of a major reclamation project in Shenzhen until a Hong Kong
Rep. (BNA) 2, at 63 (Jan. 25, 1995); see also Hong Kong Government Environmental Protection
Department, Review of Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme Stage II Options, Executive Summary and
International Review Panel Report 28-31 (1995) (summarizing findings of review panel) (on file
with author); Emily Thornton, Affluence and Effluents, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 14, 1996, at 57
(reporting that Hong Kong was rushing to finish the first stage of the sewage treatment facility
before July 1, 1997, and that a joint Chinese-Hong Kong task force was investigating the project's
second stage).
252. See Hung, supra note 173, at 263 (arguing that Hong Kong and Guangdong need "[a]
commonly agreed set of rules for the discharge of pollutants into common waters as well as a
joint enforcement team").
253. WHITE PAPER THIRD REViEW, supra note 72, at 35. Despite the existence of the group,
one Hong Kong environmentalist noted that Hong Kong environmental officials were, until
recently, reluctant to talk with their Guangdong or NEPA counterparts; part of this reluctance
stemmed from Hong Kong government limits on official contacts with PRC officials. Author's
interviews in Hong Kong, March 1997. Hong Kong environmentalists report that, in general,
Hong Kong's non-government environmental organizations have had far more extensive contacts
with provincial and national environmental officials in China than have Hong Kong environmental officials. Id.
254. Issues the body discussed at its January 1996 meeting included pollution in Mirs Bay
and Deep Bay, "exchanges of information on major infrastructure projects," "a seminar... on
pollution control in power stations," the next liaison meeting, a study of endangered white
dolphins, and "a programme of visits." WHITE PAPER THIRD REVIEw, supra note 72, at 36. For
reports of earlier meetings of the body see HK-Guangdong EnvironmentalGroupMeets, Xinhua News
Agency, December 22, 1994 available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; see also R.J.S. Law,
Close Ties with China, in ENVmRONmENT HONG KONG 1995, at 98, 98-99 (Hong Kong Envtl.
Protection Bureau ed., 1995) (noting numerous "informal technical expert meetings during
1994," as well as plans to study pollution in Deep Bay and an agreement to exchange environmental information on development projects in Hong Kong and Shenzhen). Environmental
groups have criticized Hong Kong officials for failing to take a harder line in discussions with
Guangdong environmental authorities. See Get Tough with China, say Greens, supra note 57 (citing
Hong Kong environmentalists' arguments that Hong Kong should press Guangdong authorities
to adopt Hong Kong's air pollution standards).
255. An additional example is wetland conservation. The manager of Hong Kong's Mai Po
Nature Reserve, which borders Shenzhen, stated that "There is an uncoordinated approach to

development from both the Hong Kong and Shenzhen sides," and called on the Hong KongGuangdong Joint Environmental Protection Liaison Group to address development at the border.
Anne Stewart, Nature Reserve Action Plea,S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 10, 1996, at 7 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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environmental group informed the government of the threat the project posed to Hong Kong's environment. 256 One Chinese academic
notes that while both Hong Kong and Guangdong officials conduct
daily tests of water from the Dongjiang River, Hong Kong's primary
water source, they do so separately and non-comprehensively. 257 Moreover, despite increasing cross-border environmental problems, the Hong
Kong government's 1996 "Third Review on the 1989 White Paper"
makes only passing references to China.258 Coordination appears at its
weakest in the most sensitive areas, most prominently the Chinese
nuclear power plant at Daya Bay. Hong Kong environmentalists have
repeatedly raised concerns about contamination from the plant, 259 and
260
about lack of coordination between Hong Kong and Chinese officials.

256. See Young, supra note 238. Although Hong Kong and Guangdong were at the time
engaged in a project to control pollution in the Shenzhen River, the reclamation project was "not
a joint project and [was) not related to Hong Kong itself," and thus the Shenzhen government
did not consult Hong Kong officials. See id. (quoting Raymond Cheung Tat-kwing of the Hong
Kong Drainage Services Department). Hong Kong environmentalists pointed to Hong Kong's
experience with reclamation to warn of the threat the Shenzhen project posed to the Hong Kong
environment. See id. Yet given Hong Kong's history of environmentally destructive reclamation
projects, the Shenzhen authorities are unlikely to be persuaded that they should be responsible
for protecting Hong Kong's wetlands.
Coordination relating to pollution in Deep Bay itself appears to have been more successful. See
Clarence Tsui, Cross-Border Team to Study Bay Pollution, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, July 22, 1995,
at 5 (reporting commissioning of report on pollution in Deep Bay "so as to develop a regional

control strategy for the bay"). As of 1995, one third of Shenzhen's waste went directly into Deep
Bay, though construction was under way on pipes that would direct sewage to other waters, See
idL Hong Kong and Guangdong officials also agreed to develop plans to protect Mirs Bay "rather
than wait for it to reach the stage Deep Bay is in." Keith Wallis, Cleanup Plan Under Threat, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 10, 1996, at 4 (quoting Hong Kong Environmental Protection
Department assistant director Malcolm Broom) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. See Chen, supra note 50, at 17. Professor Chen argues that it would be preferable for
Hong Kong's environmental and water authorities "to join forces with their counterparts in
southern China to test the water and work out problems before it's piped into the territory." Id
258. The review notes the ongoing efforts of the Hong Kong-Guangdong Environmental
Protection Liaison Group, mentions the need to coordinate with China on ocean pollution, and
THIRD
notes the likelihood of continued growth in the Pearl River Delta. See WHITE PAPE3R
REviEw, supra note 72, at 35-36, 41. Yet such references are often vague, like the mention of
possible pollution to China's waters from Hong Kong's planned new sewage facility: "Discussions
with the PRC on EIA for the oceanic outfall will continue." WHITE PAPER THIRD RviEw, ,tupra
note 72, at 59.
259. See, ag., Elizabeth Tacey, Daya Bay Contamination to Increase During Refueling, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 10, 1994 (reporting a potential tenfold increase in radiation during
refueling at the plant); Editorial, Open Communication Lines on Daya Bay, S. CHINA MORNING

POST, January 25, 1996, at 12 (stating that "Daya Bay's record in its first year of operation has
nor been an encouraging one" and blaming the plant for greeting requests for information about
the plant with "stone-walling and evasion"); Patty Koo, Nuclear Exposure, ONE EARTH, Summer

1996, at 28 (describing continued concerns over the operation of Daya Bay).
260. For a discussion of public reaction to Chinas plans to build the Daya Bay nuclear plant,
see IAN SCOTT, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN HONG KONG 309-12
(1989). Scott notes that China's plans to build Daya Bay placed the Hong Kong government "in
a situation where it had to endorse a decision opposed by a majority of the territory's inhabitants"
and that while "the government argued that it had no jurisdiction over a plant which was being
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B. The Basic Law: An Impediment to Solution
Hong Kong's return to China should, in theory, make regional
solutions more attainable: policymaking can be conducted absent the
political tensions that undermined attempts at regional solutions prereversion. Yet although official contacts between Hong Kong and
Guangdong will increase, any improvements in environmental policy
coordination will occur despite, and not due to, the Basic Law. There
are two reasons the Basic Law itself may be an impediment to effective
resolution of environmental problems in the Pearl River Delta. First,
although the Basic Law does not impose any actual bars to increased
coordination between Hong Kong and China, the Basic Law's emphasis
on keeping Hong Kong separate from the rest of China reflects a view
that may discourage attempts at cross-border problem solving.2 61 Second, the Basic Law's delegation of local environmental policymaking
to the SAR government suggests that Hong Kong's environmental
policy can be conducted without regard for environmental policy on
the opposite side of the Shenzhen River; in reality, Hong Kong's
environmental problems can only be fully addressed in coordination
with both Guangdong's environment and the environmental problems
facing China as a whole.
By emphasizing Hong Kong's separation from the rest of China, the
Basic Law encourages Hong Kong to think of its environmental problems as distinct from those in China. Three articles of the Basic Law
are directly relevant to how Hong Kong views cross-border environmental problems. First, Article 119 states that "[t]he Government of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall formulate appropriate policies to . . .pay regard to the protection of the environbuilt in China, the project was not viable unless there was a marker in Hong Kong for the

electricity generated at Daya Bay." Id. at 312.
Coordination may be improving in other areas: when China shut the door on imports of
hazardous waste, thus potentially leaving Hong Kong to deal with waste transshipped through
the territory on its way to China, Hong Kong environmental officials met with mainland officials
to discuss appropriate steps fordealing with the problem. See Sharma, supra note 204.
261. See Alex Lo, Pollution Policies 'Hindered by Split', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 1, 1997,
at 6 (reporting comments from Hong Kong environmentalists that the one country, two systems
policy hampers cross-border coordination of environmental policy because Chinese authorities "do

not want to see provincial governments try to influence Hong Kong" (quoting Friends of the
Earth-Hong Kong Assistant Director Plato Yip Kwong-to)). But cf C. K. Lau, Tung's Bridge to
the Mainland,S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at 19 (arguing that Hong Kong's return
to China means that consultations between Hong Kong and Guangdong "should take on a
fraternal tone and help drive co-operation"); Lucia Palpal-latoc, China Vows to Step Up Efforts for
a Cleaner Environment, H.K. STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1997, available in LEXJS, World Library,
Curnws File (quoting NEPA director Xie Zhenhua as stating that "after the handover, it is now
easier for China to discuss environmental problems with Hong Kong"). Hong Kong's Chief
Executive has indicated that environmental planning will be included in a list of issues on which
Hong Kong and Guangdong authorities will work together, but no specific actions have been

taken. See Tung Address, supra note 1.
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ment. ''26 By expressly granting Hong Kong the right to design its
own environmental policies, the Basic Law suggests Hong Kong can
continue to formulate environmental policies in isolation from regional
concerns. Second, Article 106 explicitly protects the SAR's financial
independence, providing that the SAR "shall use its financial revenues
exclusively for its own purposes, and they shall not be handed over to
the Central People's Government." 263 Article 106 may not technically
bar Hong Kong from spending money on environmental measures in
Guangdong that benefit Hong Kong, but it may make such expenditures difficult. Article 106 reflects fears in Hong Kong that China will
misuse Hong Kong's wealth; even if Article 106 does not formally bar
the Hong Kong government from spending money across the border,
2
political concerns may make such expenditures impossible. 6
Third, Article 22 states that "no province, autonomous region, or
municipality directly under the Central Government may interfere in
the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own 265 The meaning of Article 22, like the meaning
of Article 160, is ambiguous. Combined with Article 119's suggestion
that local environmental policy is within the sphere of the SAR's
autonomy, Article 160 may make the SAR government reluctant to
engage in substantive discussions related to environmental policy with
either NEPA or provincial environmental authorities. Moreover, al262. Basic Law, art. 119.
263. Basic Law, art. 106.
264. The Basic aw may be indirectly responsible for such concerns: by failing to create a
system that assures Hong Kong of its autonomy, the Basic Law may make it difficult for future
Hong Kong governments to take steps that the Hong Kong public sees as undermining Hong
Kong's economic welfare.
Environmentalists and the business community are likely to object to efforts to spend Hong
Kong's finances on environmental measures in Guangdong, even where such measures are in Hong
Kong's own interest. One Hong Kong academic commented that allowing Hong Kong to spend
money on the mainland would suggest that Hong Kong's pollution is due primarily to pollution
from China, and thus might both discourage Hong Kong from taking steps to address local
environment problems and obscure the fact that Hong Kong is also exporting pollution to
Guangdong. Author's interviews in Hong Kong, March 1997. Another Hong Kong observer said
that fears of "Hong Kong's [financial] reserves being sucked dry" by China will prevent Hong
Kong from spending money on the mainland, regardless of whether the Basic Law permits such
spending. Id.
Environmentalists argue that concerns about spending money in China have already undermined the Hong Kong environment: for example, they argue that the best location for the
construction of a fuel supply for Hong Kong's new airport would have been on an island in China,
but the location was nor politically feasible due to opposition in Hong Kong. Id.
265. Basic Law, art. 22. Despite this, many Chinese provinces are already operating in Hong
Kong through province-owned commercial entities. Author's interviews in Hong Kong, March
1997. The provision restricting provincial interference in Hong Kong may have been particularly
aimed at Guangdong: Beijing has long feared the creation of a Cantonese speaking block in
southern China, and has rarely, if ever, sent a Cantonese speaking official to manage its affairs in
Hong Kong. Id. Despite such fears, however, Hong Kong's pre-1997 representatives in the NPC
served as members of the Guangdong delegation. Id.
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266
though both Hong Kong and Guangdong are subnational units,
Hong Kong's special status means that Hong Kong and Beijing may
be sensitive to interactions that suggest Hong Kong is no different
from other subnational units. Combined with Article 160, such concerns imply regional environmental planning may involve coordination
by Beijing. 267 Yet intervention by Beijing may violate Article 119's
grant of autonomy in environmental policy.
Even if Hong Kong and Guangdong are able to increase coordination of their environmental policies, coordination alone is unlikely to
make a significant dent in the region's environmental woes. Although
one Chinese environmental official has called for the establishment of
a regional agency to address environmental problems, 268 arguing that
"without a unified discharge standard and a limit for the total volume
of discharged waste, the environment in the area cannot be improved
in the near future, '269 Hong Kong's and Guangdong's environmental
regulatory frameworks differ significantly. Standardization will thus be
extremely difficult. A recent comparison of the environmental regulatory processes in Hong Kong and Guangzhou found that business and
commercial interests play a much greater role in formulation of pollution standards in Hong Kong than in Guangzhou, that Guangzhou
officials play a more active role in carrying out environmental impact
assessments than do their Hong Kong counterparts, and that Guangzhou environmental officials have greater discretionary power over
270
environmental impact assessments than do Hong Kong officials.
Additionally, Guangzhou's approach to the control of water pollution
is based on the polluter pays principle, while Hong Kong relies on
command and control policies. 271 Unlike its Guangzhou counterpart,
the Hong Kong EPD lacks the ability to fine polluters directly-the
EPD must rely on Hong Kong's courts to punish polluters. 272 More-

266. Cf. Wu, supra note 17, at 68-69 (stating that the Basic Law "makes clear that the Hong
Kong SAR is on the same administrative level as a province, an autonomous region, or a
municipality directly under the control of the Central Government"); Xiao, supra note 17, at 91
(stating that the Hong Kong SAR's autonomy "is still local autonomy").
267. Bit c Xiao, supra note 17, at 91 (stating that "no department [or] commission" of the
central government "will be allowed to issue orders" to the Hong Kong SAR).
268. See Environment; Hong Kong, Macao, Guangdong Urged to Improve "DeterioratingEnvironment,"
supra note 242. The report stated that Chinese Environmental Protection Bureau engineer Ma
Xiaoling said that regional environmental problems required cooperation among Guangdong,

Hong Kong, and Macao. See id.
269. Id. (quoting China Environmental Protection Bureau engineer Ma Xiaoling) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Ma noted that future infrastructure projects are likely to result in
increased pollution. See id.
270. Shui-Yan Tang & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Institutions and Environmental Regulatory
Processes: Comparing Hong Kong and Guangzhou, China (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
271. See id, at 11.
272. See id. at 13. Professors Tang and Lo also note that Guangzhou's water pollution controls
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over, given the Basic Law's delegation of local environmental issues to
the SAR government, any regional environmental body would lack
lawmaking power, and would probably be viewed with suspicion in a
Hong Kong concerned with maintaining autonomy and economic
growth.
Furthermore, standardizing environmental regulation in Hong
Kong and Guangdong is likely to be both ineffective and inefficient.
Actual controls will depend as much on enforcement as on actual
standards. 273 And to the degree to which reducing pollution levels is
cheaper in Guangdong than in Hong Kong, 274 Hong Kong should pay
to reduce pollution levels across the border in Guangdong, rather than
275
reduce pollution in Hong Kong.
Competitive pressures are likely to undermine attempts by Hong
Kong and Guangdong to agree on tighter environmental controls.
Experience elsewhere in China shows the difficulty China has faced in
addressing cross-border environmental problems among provinces. Although Hong Kong is no longer a major manufacturing center, Guangdong remains in competition with other provinces and regions of China
for investment, and thus may be unwilling to increase environmental
standards absent application and enforcement of such standards in
other provinces. Without national standards-which would not actually apply to Hong Kong-attempts by Guangdong and Hong Kong
to address environmental concerns may, over the long term, fall victim
276
to a "race to the bottom" within China.
include uniform standards, while Hong Kong's standards differ for different licensees, that
Guangzhou environmental authorities have "financial interests in enforcement," while Hong
Kong officials do nor, and that Hong Kong's EPD "works as a partner with clients," while its
Guangzhou counterpart "dominates agency-client relationships." Id. at 33. For a discussion of
problems that undermine the effectiveness of environmental impact assessments in Guangzhou,
see Shui-Yan Tang, Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Kai-Chee Cheung, & Jack Man-Keung Lo, Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: Environmental Impact Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai (Jan. 7, 1997) (unpublished paper on file with author).
273. A regional agency would lack enforcement power. Standardizing environmental standards, or laws, in Hong Kong and Guangdong would not necessarily result in standardized
enforcement. Cf. Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems," Three Law
Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-RegionalConflicts of Law in China, 5 Dutu J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 308 (1995) (arguing that given "different legal, social, and economic

systems," "[hiaving the national legislature enact uniform substantive laws applicable only to
certain legal regions might create more problems than it would solve").
274. See iu, Hills & Barron, supra note 233, at 6.

275. For example, Hong Kong's environment would be significantly improved if Hong Kong's
neighbors were burning cleaner fuel than they do at present. Author's interviews with academics
in Hong Kong, March 1997.
276. Cf Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of NationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE .J. 1196, 1201-02, 1215 (1977) (arguing

that "[s]rate officials have few strong incentives to assume the administrative and political burdens
of carrying out environmental policies dictated by federal agencies" and that "decentralized

environmental decisionmaking [is] flawed because spillover impacts of decisions in one jurisdic-
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Hong Kong and Guangdong thus may find it difficult to tighten
277
environmental standards absent increased standards elsewhere in China.
2 78
Although comparisons between China, a non-federal nation, and western federal countries are difficult, arguments by western academics for
27 9
a mixture of centralized environmental policy and local autonomy
tion on well-being in other jurisdictions generate conflicts and welfare losses not easily remedied
under a decentralized regime"). The "race to the bottom" phenomenon has been blamed for
problems in enforcing environmental standards in China. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUtION THROUGH REFORM 288 (1995). Professor Lieberthal writes that

in China, "it is in the specific interest of each county for all other counties to sacrifice in order to
achieve [the] collective interest [of environmental protection]." Id.
However, enforcement of environmental laws and regulations may not yet be strong enough
anywhere in China to lead companies to relocate to areas where standards, or enforcement
measures, are less strict. NEPA has stated that "foreign money that comes to China is basically
lured by cheap labour, cheap land prices, huge market potential and lower environmental
standards." Korski, supra note 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not clear whether
decisions as to where in China to invest are influenced by local environmental standards. Cf.Tang,
Lo, Cheung, & Lo, supra note 272, ("[U]nless a high level of environmental consciousness is
developed among local residents and they have an efficient means of pressuring government
officials to act on their concerns, local government officials will continue to emphasize economic
growth at the expense of environmental protection because of the competitive pressure they face
from other local jurisdictions.").
277. The race to the bottom phenomenon in environmental law may contrast with other areas
in which increased contacts between Hong Kong and China have led to higher standards in China.
For example, the listing of Chinese companies on the Hong Kong stock exchange has led to
improved accounting standards in some large enterprises in China. However, increased contacts
may, in some cases, have weakened Hong Kong's standards: the Hong Kong stock exchange has
made concessions in its usual requirements to some Chinese companies listing on the exchange.
278. See XIANFA preamble (1982) (declaring that China is a "unitary state"); cf WANG, supra
note 25, at 95 ("China under the Basic Law is nor a federation but a unitary state, and the Hong
Kong SAR will be an autonomous region."); Xiao, supra note 17, at 90 (stating that Hong Kong
"cannot be independent from China[,] neither can it be a member of [a] federal system"); q~
GHAI, supra note 4, at 182 (stating that the SAR "will have more powers than any autonomous
region or federal unit, but their exercise will be subject to closer scrutiny and supervision than
elsewhere").
Although China is, at least in name, a unitary state, it has established five provincial-level
autonomous regions where ethnic minorities form a significant portion of the population (Tibet,
Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, and Ningxia), as well as numerous autonomous prefectures,
counties, and townships. See Gita,supra note 4, at 115 n.14. The actual autonomy of such regions
is, however, limited, as "the broad framework within which the system operates denies autonomy
of choice of policy" and "tt]here is no mechanism to resist encroachments on their powers by the
centre." Id. at 116-17. Professor Ghai similarly argues that Chinas Special Economic Zones lack
autonomy, as "they are merely instruments to carry out policy decided by the normal institutions
of the state." Id. at 118. One irony of reform-era China is that although China's "autonomous
regions" lack autonomy, many local areas in China enjoy autonomy in a wide range of local issues.
Federalism remains somewhat of a taboo topic within China, in part due to fears that federalism
may lead to the collapse of central government control, and in part due to the advocacy of
federalism by Chinese dissidents.
279. For a recent argument in favor of such a mixture in environmental regulation in the
United States, see Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570
(1996). Professor Esty argues that "[i]n the realm of practice rather than theory, environmental
policymakers remain justified in fearing the dynamic of a regulatory race to the bottom." Id at
638. Professor Esty recognizes, however, that centralized environmental policy making "will not
prove to be optimal in all cases" and thus advocates "a multitier regulatory structure capable of
mixing and matching decision levels depending on the issue at hand." Id. at 652.
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resonate in China. Tightening of national standards in China has often
followed regional experiments in environmental lawmaking. 280 Yet
excessive autonomy for provincial and local authorities has also led to
under- or non-enforcement of environmental laws.
Hong Kong's paradox is that it may have both too much and too
little autonomy in environmental lawmaking. To the degree that the
central government is more proactive than future SAR governments in
addressing environmental issues, Hong Kong's environment will suffer
from the non-application of national environmental standards. Yet to
the degree to which Hong Kong's environmental controls exceed those
across the border, Hong Kong's standards may be ineffective when
faced with increasing pollution from Guangdong. Agreements with
Guangdong may be ineffective given competitive pressures, a lack of
interest in tightening environmental laws at the provincial or local
level, and Guangdong's own lack of autonomy in environmental policy. 281 And NEPA's lack of jurisdiction over Hong Kong, and Hong
Kong's own fears of interference by Beijing, may mean Hong Kong is
not consulted in the formation of new national standards, standards
28 2
which will affect the SAR without being applied there.
IV. RETHINKING AUTONOMY IN HONG KONG, CHINA
Hong Kong's environmental law paradox mirrors Hong Kong's status
in China more generally: the Basic Law both over-emphasizes Hong
Kong's separation from China and fails to grant Hong Kong sufficient
autonomy. As a result, the Basic Law's fundamental weakness is its
failure to secure Hong Kong's place in China.
The integration of Hong Kong's and Guangdong's economies mirrors the interdependence of their environments, and underscores the
impossibility of separation. Despite the Basic Law's emphasis on Hong
Kong's economic autonomy, Hong Kong's economic integration with
Guangdong was well underway when China promulgated the Basic
280. Author's interviews with academic and environmental officials in Beijing, Wuhan, and
Nanjing, June-August 1996. Western commentators have often focused on environmental problems in China's fastest growing regions, particularly Guangdong, see, e.g., Paul J. Smith, Free Trade
and the Environment: W ll Free Trade Save China'sEnvironment?, I BUFF. J. INT'L L. 27, 28 (1994),
but Chinese officials and academics argue that China's fastest developing areas, particularly
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Jiangsu, are taking the lead in introducing stricter environmental standards. Author's interviews with academic and environmental officials in Beijing,
Nanjing, and Wuhan, summer 1996. But cf Alford & Shen, stpra note 53, at 133 (stating that
China's environmental "laws presuppose a common national commitment to the goal of environmental protection and a higher degree of administrative cohesion than currently exists").
281. Chinese provinces may not have environmental standards lower than those national laws
impose, but may have higher standards. See Alford & Shen, supra note 53, at 140.
282. Hong Kong may, at least in theory, be consulted in the formation of national laws via
its representatives in the NPC.
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Law in 1990.283 By 1992, 20,000 Hong Kong factories had moved
north of the border,284 and more than twenty percent of Hong Kong's
currency was in circulation in China.285 The economic integration of
Hong Kong and Guangdong suggests that, like environmental policy,
economic policy in the Pearl River Delta may be best served by
regional planning. 28 6 For example, over time it may make little sense
for Hong Kong and Guangdong to continue to use separate currencies.
As formal and informal trade barriers between Hong Kong and Guangdong fall, it may be questionable for Hong Kong to have autonomous
status in the WTO but for Guangdong to be considered simply a part
28 7
of China in the WTO.
Hong Kong's and Guangdong's economic and environmental integration also demonstrates the emptiness of the Basic Law's grant of
autonomy to Hong Kong, both internationally and within China. As
this paper has shown, Hong Kong's autonomy as an international actor
is likely to be unsustainable due to both the interrelation of economic
and environmental issues, and to Hong Kong's economic and environmental integration with the rest of China. By creating a framework
that may result in conflicts in Hong Kong's and China's positions in
international agreements and organizations, the Basic Law invites Chinese interference in Hong Kong's autonomous spheres. Negotiations in
the WTO will increasingly include discussions not only of environmental issues, but of labor standards and domestic competition policy.
An autonomous trade policy for Hong Kong will necessarily entail
autonomy in these areas as well; to the degree to which Hong Kong
defers to China's strong views in such areas, Hong Kong's autonomy

283. See generally THE HONG KONG-GUANGDONG LINK: PARTNERSHIP IN FLux (Reginald
Yin-Wang Kwok & Alvin Y So eds., 1995) (discussing Hong Kong's interaction and integration
with Guangdong). On the economic interdependence of Hong Kong and southern China, see
Sung Yun-wing, Patternsof Economic Interdependence in the NaturalEconomic Territory, in SOUTHERN
CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN: EVOLUTION OF A SUBREGIONAL ECONOMY 14, 14-27 (Jane
Khanna ed., 1995). But c. Chen Dezhao, Effect of the National Economic Territoryon China'sEconomic
and PoliticalStrategies, in SOUTHERN CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TArWAN, supra, at 71, 74-75
(arguing that such integration will not lead to a "transformation into an independent economic
area" because "ultimate authority rests with the central government").
284. See Ming K. Chan, All in the Family: The Hong Kong-Guangdong Link in Historical
Perspective, in THE HONG KONG-GUANGDONG LINK, supra note 283, at 31, 50.
285. Id.; see also Xueqiang Xu, Reginald Yin-Wang Kwok, Lixun Li & Xiaopei Yan, Production
Change in Guangdong, in THE HONG KONG-GUANGDONG LINK, supra note 283, at 135, 148
(noting that the stability of the Hong Kong dollar has resulted in Guangdong having lower
inflation rates than other regions of China).
286. Prior to 1997, Hong Kong and Guangdong worked together in the development of
certain infrastructure projects, despite political tensions. Cf Shenzhen to Enhance Economic Ties with
Hong Kong, Xinhua News Agency, Jan. 15, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(describing areas of cooperation between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, but omitting environmental
protection).
287. Assuming China is permitted to join.
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will be weakened. Yet any reduction of Hong Kong's autonomy in such
areas will likely reflect back on Hong Kong's status in international
organizations. Will Hong Kong be permitted independent status in a
WTO that includes China if Hong Kong is no longer viewed as an
autonomous customs territory?28 8 Moreover, by ignoring the fact of
interdependence, the Basic Law may allow for greater indirect influence
over Hong Kong: just as China's tightening of controls on shipments
of hazardous wastes led Hong Kong to comply with the Basel Convention, China is already able to exert significant influence over the
289
Hong Kong economy.
The Basic Law fails to provide any guarantees of Hong Kong's
autonomy. The Basic Law itself is, like delegations of power to China's
provinces, a conditional grant of autonomy: the central government
may issue directives to the Chief Executive, the NPC may expand the
list of national laws applicable in Hong Kong, the NPC may revise or
repeal the Basic Law, 290 and the NPC may invalidate Hong Kong laws
that it views as violating the Basic Law. 291 The NPC also reserves to
itself the sole power to interpret the Basic Law. The Basic Law provides
no mechanism for resolving conflicts over Hong Kong's autonomy;
moreover, Beijing's control over the selection of Hong Kong's political
leaders suggests that Hong Kong's leaders are unlikely to challenge
incursions into Hong Kong's autonomy.
The consequence of the Basic Law's conditional grant of autonomy
is not merely a greater risk of China interfering in Hong Kong. Rather,
the Basic Law impedes Hong Kong from serving a constructive role
in China. Although the international dimensions of Hong Kong's
return to China are sui generis, Hong Kong's return to China presents
China with an opportunity to rethink regional-center relations. Yet
rather than taking the opportunity to rethink such relations, the Basic

288. Cf United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732 (Supp. V

1994) (stating that "rIthe Congress declares its wish to see full implementation of the provisions
of the Joint Declaration" and requiring that the Secretary of State report to Congress on

"developments related to the change in the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong").
289. For example, events in China already have direct influence on the Hong Kong stock
market.
290. Although Britain would likely argue that efforts to revoke Hong Kong's autonomy
violate the provisions of the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration. Cf GHAI, supra note 4, at 124 ("China

has not developed any sophisticated mechanism to deal with assertions of autonomy that it finds
distasteful, and thus denies the very premise of autonomy. There are no institutions for dialogue,

mechanisms for defining issues between parties, or procedures for negotiations or adjudication.").
In July 1997, the Hong Kong Court of Appeals upheld the legality of the SAR's provisional
legislature despite the fact that the formation of the legislature was not in accordance with the
Basic Law. The Court's ruling relied in part on the NPC Standing Committee's endorsement of
the formation of the legislature. For a critical account of the case, see Nihal Jayawickrama, A
Dangerous Bow to Beijing, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1997, at 6.
291. See Basic Law, art. 17.

1998 / Environmental Law and the Basic Law of Hong Kong

297

Law defines Hong Kong's relationship to the central government in
much the same way regional-center relations are defined elsewhere in
China: Hong Kong has autonomy in certain ill-defined areas-unless
Beijing decides otherwise. Such a structure is increasingly incapable of
resolving the complexities of contemporary China.
The transboundary pollution problems in Hong Kong and Guangdong mirror those in other regions of China. Environmental law demonstrates the problems resulting from China's decentralization, and the
importance of providing incentives for local enforcement of national
laws. Lack of enforcement of environmental laws plagues all regions of
China, and transboundary pollution issues among China's provinces,
and even among different counties and municipalities within provinces,
292
have emerged as major difficulties.
China has attempted to resolve cross-border environmental problems
via informal coordination. 293 China's attempts at such coordination
have been ineffective. 294 China's Environmental Protection Law instructs regions to work together to solve trans-jurisdictional environmental problems, 29' but many cases go unresolved. 296 In the Gansu

292. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 276, at 285-86. Professor Lieberthal notes that "very few
environmental insults occur strictly within the administrative boundaries of one local political
authority," and that the current system of environmental charges levied on polluting firms "does
not allow payments across administrative boundaries," providing incentives for local authorities
to locate "their most polluting enterprises near the downstream boundaries of their jurisdictions."

Id.
For a discussion of transboundary environmental problems, see Zhou Zifeng, GuancheZhixing
"Huanjing Baohu Fa"Jiejue KIea Xingzhengqu Huanjing Wenti [Carying Out Implementation of the
"EnvironmentalProtectionLau,' to Resolve Trane-AdministrativeDistrict Environmental Problems], ZHONGGUO HUANJING ZONGLAN [A GENERAL SURVEY OF CHINESE ENVIRONMENT), Jan., 1996, at
18; q. Alford & Shen, supra note 53, at 145 (noting the need fbr "regional regulatory approaches
that cut across existing sub-national political boundaries").
293. Author's interviews in Beijing, June-August, 1996; cf LIEBERTHAL, supra note 276, at
317 ("At each level there is much attention to garnering resources and striking deals that will
benefit the locality govemed by that level of state administration.... In the absence of formal
institutional mechanisms and a legitimate constitutional framework to give the system regularity
and predictability, much is sorted out in practice through consensus building and bargaining.");
Paul E. Schroeder, Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wuhan, in
BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 283 (Kenneth G.
Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992) ("In the absence of political, constitutional, or legal
formulas that might guide the policy process, Chinese units engage in lengthy bargaining over
the specifics of any general policy that is to be implemented.").

294. See

ZHONGGUO HUANJING

DIANXING ANJIAN YU

ZHIFA TIYAO ITYPICAL CASES AND

ENFORCEMENT SUMMARIES OF CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAw] 259 (Xie Zhenhua ed., 1994)
[hereinafter TYPICAL CASES) (stating that resolution of trans-jurisdictional environmental disputes
has long been a problem in China); see also Jane Khanna, The Calculus of Interests in the Subregional
Economy of Southern China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, in SOUTHERN CHINA, HONG KONG, AND
TAIwAN: EVOLUTION OF A SUBREGIONAL ECONOMY supra note 283, at 1, 4 (noting that "Beijing
'is proving to be weak in mediating interprovincial conflicts, which have dramatically increased").
295. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fu [Environmental Protection law
of the People's Republic of China), Dec. 26, 1989, 1989 FAGUl HUIBlAN at 419, art. 15.
296. See TfsIcAL CASES, supra note 294, at 259.
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Liancheng Aluminum Plant Air Pollution Compensation Case, for example,
ten years of negotiations between authorities in Gansu and Qinghai
provinces failed to resolve a dispute over air pollution from an aluminum plant; even central government intervention in negotiations failed
to resolve the case. 297 Finally, the affected counties sued the polluting
plant, and won substantial compensation. 298 Yet the suit was successful
in part due to pressure from the central government. 299 Moreover,
while the plant paid the judgment in full,300 it also continued to
301
pollute.
Liancheng Aluminum Plantdemonstrates a crucial problem undermining China's current environmental laws. China's formally unitary system30 2 has resulted in de facto federalism, in which regions exert
autonomy by enacting their own laws, implementing their own policies, and by refusing to enforce national laws. 30 3 In Liancheng Aluminlim,
local authorities did nothing to stop the plant from polluting, presumably because it was not in their economic interests to do so.
De facto federalism results partly from local governments exploiting
the lack of order and lack of clarity that plague Chinese law more
generally. Chinese law is both vague and of "questionable legislative
authority,"3°4 with national, provincial, and local legislatures and bureaucracies issuing sometimes contradictory laws and regulations. In
environmental law, unclear lines of authority mean that local environmental officials must often answer to the competing demands of NEPA
directives and provincial or local economic policies. The strength of
China's regions means that the central government is often unable to
compel local authorities to follow national laws. Yet improving law

297. See id. at 258-60.
298. See id. at 259. The High People's Court of Gansu Province ordered the plant to pay

Qinghai's Ledu county RMB 940,000. See id.
299. See id.at 260 (noting that resolution of the case was closely related to the fact that central
authorities had taken an interest in the case).
300. See id. at 259.
301. See id. at 260.

302. Chinas system is unitary insofar as power emanates from the central government, Within
the central government, however, responsibility for environmental policy is shared by numerous
government ministries and bodies: Professors Alford and Shen note that eight central government

ministries and commissions are engaged in China's efforts to comply with the Montreal Protocol.
See Alford & Shen, supra note 53, at 139. Moreover, the wide range of local and provincial
lawmaking in China makes classifying China's legal system as unitary somewhat questionable,

For a discussion of local lawmaking, see Keller, supra note 7, at 736-37.
303. See Alford & Shen, supra note 53, at 134. As Professors Alford and Shen point out, the
"general and aspirational" character of China's major environmental laws partially accounts for
this problem by granting excessive discretion to local officials responsible for implementing
environmental laws. Id. at 143.

304. Keller, supra note 7,at 711. Professor Keller notes that "[t]he disparate mass of laws and
regulations which makes up the formal written sources of Chinese law does not possess sufficient
unity to be regarded as a coherent body of law." Id.
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implementation and enforcement in China is not merely a question of
forcing local officials to enforce laws; it requires both ordering the
many layers of Chinese law, and the creation of formal mechanisms or
procedures for resolving conflicts among rival sources of law.
The strength of China's regions, the lack of an institution capable
of imposing order on the legal system, and fears that formal devolution
of power may undermine the legitimacy of the national government
prevent China from confronting questions of legal ordering, both between the center and provinces as well as among various arms of the
central government itself. Yet resolving questions of legal ordering is
not merely a matter of formally devolving power. Environmental law
demonstrates that devolution alone is not the solution: diversity of
environmental standards may also lead to a "race to the bottom." The
inability of the central government to force compliance with national
laws suggests China's need for a more supple structure of governance,
a structure in which regions are given more incentive to enforce
national laws because their spheres of autonomy vis-a-vis the central
government are better defined, and are protected.
Faults in the Basic Law parallel those in the Chinese legal system.
Indeed, Hong Kong's autonomy may be both ill-defined and not
guaranteed precisely because the Basic Law was constructed within the
confines of the Chinese legal system. The Basic Law is a quasi-constitutional document enacted in a system in which constitutions are both
easily changed and non-justiciable, in which law is often highly aspirational, in which central government control is exerted via policy as
often as by law, and in which regions enjoy economic autonomy within
moving boundaries established by Beijing. The Basic Law reflects the
central government's concern with asserting its sovereignty over Hong
Kong while allowing Hong Kong's economy to continue to flourish.
A similar dilemma'has faced China's reform era leaders domestically:
how can provinces be given the economic autonomy necessary to
encourage economic development without undermining central authority? The parallel between the de facto autonomy many of China's
regions currently enjoy in economic policy and the autonomy the Basic
Law grants to Hong Kong is striking. China has been content to
permit provinces and local governments to conduct their own economic
policies, with the consequence being regional disregard for national
laws that are at odds with local economic policies. Hong Kong's
autonomy is now similar. To the degree Hong Kong's assertions of
autonomy are limited to the economic sphere, the central government
may be willing to allow Hong Kong to conduct its own affairs without
significant interference.
Yet a system based on discretionary economic autonomy, whether
such autonomy is granted formally, in the Basic Law, or informally, as
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is often the case in the rest of China, is particularly problematic when
it comes to environmental law. In the case of Hong Kong, environmental law suggests separation of Hong Kong from the rest of China
cannot work. In the case of China's provinces, environmental law
demonstrates not only the negative side effects of economic autonomy,
but also the difficulty of enforcing national law when regions do not
see such enforcement as in their own interests.
As long as questions of governance are viewed as a zero-sum game,
China will find it difficult to achieve a balance of national laws and
regional autonomy, in Hong Kong or in China's provinces. Hong
Kong's return to China presented China with an opportunity to begin
to rethink how China relates to its regions; yet rather than considering
how Hong Kong might serve as a positive model for other regions in
China, the Basic Law focuses on how to separate Hong Kong from
China. China's focus is not surprising, given the desire to use Hong
Kong's return to China as a model for eventual reunification with
Taiwan; 30 5 over time, however, a system in which China's regions are
able to interact in a variety of ways with each other and with the
national authorities in both law creation and law enforcement, and in
which China's regions maintain certain defensible spheres of autonomy
against the central government, is more likely to lead to reunification
than is ill-defined autonomy.
The Basic Law's failure to define Hong Kong's status in China
mirrors the law's failure to define Hong Kong's status as an international actor. Continuing concerns over sovereignty result in an unworkable international status for Hong Kong. China's reform-era participation in international lawmaking has largely been founded on a rigid
conception of sovereignty. 30 6 Although China has been an active participant in numerous environmental agreements that challenge traditional norms of state sovereignty,30 7 China's participation in negotiations leading up to such agreements has reflected traditional state-centered
views of sovereignty. 308 Indeed, China has been slow to recognize that

305. See Xiao Weiyun, A Study of the Political System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Under the Basic Law, 2 J. CHINESE L. 95, 97 (1988).
306. See SAMUEL S. KIM, CHINA IN AND OUT OF THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER 13-19
(Princeton Center of International Studies World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No,

21, 1991). This was particularly the case post-1989, when "the old conception of state sovereignty
... returned with a vengeance to Chinese foreign policy." Id. at 18. China similarly views "the

outside world as an essentially sovereignty-centered state system." Id. at 8.

307. Cf id. at 78. ("Almost everywhere today . ..state sovereignty is either in voluntary
retreat or in a permeated situation. Economically, virtually every state today has a shared or
compromised sovereignty.").
308. Professor Kim argues that while it is "tempting to see China's sudden activism in global

"China has managed
environmental politics as evidence of... functionalist leaning[s]," in fact
to exploit environmental diplomacy to maximize foreign aid and technology transfer and to
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participation in an increased web of interconnected international agree309
ments may not be congruent with such rigid notions of sovereignty.
China's domestic legal structure parallels Chinas sovereignty-centered view of world politics: China has been wary that excessive devolution of power to its regions will undermine stability and, ultimately,
the legitimacy of the central government. Just as environmental law
challenges rigid conceptions of sovereignty in the international sphere,
domestic environmental law suggests the need to move toward a
system in which both central and local authorities have stakes in law
enforcement. Centralized environmental planning alone has led to nonenforcement; excessive devolution may likewise lead to ineffective environmental policies. Similarly, Hong Kong's status both internationally and domestically requires a more nuanced framework, in which
not all assertions of autonomy are viewed as challenges to Chinas
sovereignty, and in which not all incursions into local policymaking
by China are viewed as undermining Hong Kong's autonomy.
The Basic Law does not preclude evolution; indeed, to the degree
the Basic Law fails to provide a coherent framework, it may invite the
development of a more subtle relationship between Hong Kong and
the rest of China and may permit Hong Kong to maintain a degree of
international personality. Yet the text of the Basic Law is not irrelevant:
China's repeated statements that the law will answer questions of
governance that arise in the SAR suggest that the law will play an
important role as Hong Kong and China continue to work out the
details of their new relationship. Environmental law is unlikely to be
an early concern of the SAR government, or to be a key aspect of
China's policy toward the SAR. Yet the ability of Hong Kong and
China to address their common environmental problems will reflect
the degree to which they are able to define Hong Kong's place in
China.

minimize the international normative and material costs of the Tiananmen crackdown." Id. at 40.
China's strong view of state sovereignty leads it to the view that "[tlhe manner of exploitation,
utilization, and protection of a nation's natural resources is entirely an internal matter." Cai &
Voigts, supra note 59, at S-33. China is extremely wary of environmental concerns being used
"asan excuse to interfere with China's internal affairs." Id. at S-35.
309. Cf KIM, supra note 306, at 80 ("Against... global megatrends Chinese state sovereignty
is a paper tiger."); ABRAMa CiAYas & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEw SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANcE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS passim (1995).

